GENERAL WARNS BASRA BATTLE LOST WITHOUT U.S. TROOPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000026 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS IR IZ SUBJECT: GENERAL WARNS BASRA BATTLE LOST WITHOUT U.S. TROOPS REF: A) BASRAH 0025 B) BAGHDAD 0969 AND PREVIOUS BASRAH 00000026 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Regional Coordinator, Regional Embassy Office Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S/REL MNFI) SUMMARY: MG Mared Beni-Malik (Strictly Protect),Director of Tribal Affairs, spoke with the REO Director on March 30 after meeting with PM Maliki in the Basrah Palace. He said that the ISF will lose the battle for Basrah without intervention of U.S. ground troops and increased air support. Basrah has become an IED minefield. If the GOI wins in Basrah, it will win against JAM in the South; if the GOI loses, there will be a cascading effect in other southern provinces. PM Maliki came to Basrah confident he could arrest 28 cells of extremists; he was surprised at an entrenched, organized JAM response that has stopped the ISF in its tracks. The PM cannot bring in sufficient troops from outside Basrah because they are engaged with JAM elsewhere. Mared suggested that the USG offer U.S. troop support to PM Maliki. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S/REL MNFI) REO Director conducted a telecom in the early hours of March 30 with MG Mared Beni-Malik, GOI Director of Tribal Affairs. Mared is in the Basrah Palace with PM Maliki. Mared explained the origin of PM Maliki's Basrah offensive. Maliki had developed a list of 28 "targets" that he believed could be quickly neutralized; each target consisted of JAM-affiliated criminal elements that were responsible for the wave of oil smuggling, political killings, kidnappings and crimes against scientists, doctors, academics and women. Maliki felt the growing strength of the cells and their serious crimes meant he needed to act quickly and decisively. Maliki was unmoved by General Mohan's protestations that IA in Basrah were not ready to move and thought Mohan was simply not being aggressive enough. ¶3. (S/REL MNFI) Maliki, according to Mared, was wholly surprised by the entrenched and organized resistance that JAM cells gave to IA offensives. He did not appreciate the extent to which JAM fighters either had already emplaced IEDs or were able to quickly set them up. Mared said that the combination of IEDs, combined with heavy RPG7 and accurate mortar fire, had stymied IA movements all over the city. There was no adequate plan (that he knew of) to regain the offensive, and Mared assessed that the IA would be unable to secure the city. While Mared would not specify how many members of the 28 cells had been arrested or killed, he alluded that some had been arrested but not enough to matter. ¶4. (S/REL MNFI) Majed assessed that the current offensive would fail. Basrah city had become an IED minefield that was and would continue to be impossible for the IA to handle. The Iranians were too effective in supplying heavy weapons and logistics for the IA to match. Maliki's current plan appeared, Mared said, to use the slack period intended for weapons turn-in as a time for the IA to regroup; however, few weapons had been turned in and JAM were continuing a busy schedule of emplacing IEDs and reinforcing their own strong points in preparation for the next IA offensives. Mared saw no way to deliver humanitarian supplies to the population without JAM either denying the people access or quickly seizing the supplies themselves. ¶5. (S/REL MNFI) Mared said operational command was now split into two parts. Basrah BOC Commander Mohan was in command of forces for one half of the city while the Minister of Defense was in command of the other half. Mared was unwilling to discuss the "secret plan" that Maliki reportedly had for a renewed offensive to start during the evening of March 29. (Note: Earlier in March 29, MND-SE and General Mohan mentioned that Maliki had a secret plan of which they still knew nothing. There were reports that IA were engaged during the night of March 29 in a cordon operation around Al Jumhuriyah sector of central Basrah. End Note.) ¶6. (S/REL MNFI) Regarding the utility of using tribal forces to secure parts of the city (Ref A),Mared said that it would not work. He related that he had held two conferences with tribal sheiks and they were unwilling to take an active part in assisting the IA. Mared reported the sheiks' alarm over "horrifying" displays of intimidation against the tribal residents in Basrah, showing detailed lists of names and addresses that would be hit if tribes cooperated. Mared said that he had received specific threats while in Basrah, with a clear indication that JAM elements knew where his family lived in the IZ. ¶7. (S/REL MNFI) Mared said the GOI needed two things to save the battle for Basrah: increased Coalition air support for IA BASRAH 00000026 002.2 OF 002 troops and the addition of Coalition, specifically U.S. ground troops, to support IA troops. (Note: Basrah Generals Jalil and Mohan have told REO Director the same. End Note.) He continued that PM Maliki continued to insist the IA could handle the situation and was unlikely to admit Coalition support was needed. Mared suggested that if the USG offered ground troop assistance in a call to Maliki, he might relent. REO Director did not offer any opinion on the possibility of U.S ground forces, but said he would pass this conversation on to Embassy. ¶8. (S/REL MNFI) Mared noted that President Bush's high profile support of Maliki had raised the stakes such that if Maliki, as a Shia, failed to secure the Shia second city of Iraq, his government would fail. If we win in Basrah, we will win everywhere in the South; if we cannot secure the city, ultimately JAM will use that strength to defeat or stalemate the GOI in other southern provinces and in key Basrah Province sites such as Umm Qasr, Safwon, Al Zubayr and oil facilities. Because of contests with JAM in other parts of Iraq, Mared concluded that PM Maliki would not be able to divert IA troops from the North into Basra; by the time Maliki prioritized such a diversion it would be too late. ¶9. (S/REL MNFI) Mared listed the delegation with the PM as: Ministers of Defense, Interior, Security and the Director of Intelligence; the generals in charge of administration and logistics; the "Director of Explosives" (meaning EOD); Director of Government Investigations; and several others as well as various aides. Mared said Maliki was still planning for to remain at the palace indefinitely with his entourage. ¶10. (S/REL MNFI) COMMENT: Even more than other REO contacts, Mared took a great risk in speaking by phone from the palace with criticism of his commander in chief. Mared was speaking out of relationship with our interpreter and desire to speak candidly with REO Director and confided that PM Maliki would probably dismiss him if he knew Mared was speaking with the USG. REO has noted the desperation that contacts have shown in making unsecure cell phone calls. Although not on the ground in the city, Mared has been sitting in Maliki's equivalent of situation room, and the REO believes his operational assessment is credible given his 40 years as an army officer. Mared and other contacts continue to stress that the Basrah populace wants the ISF to root JAM out, but failure would be worse than no attempt at all. Significantly, despite allegations from other contacts, Mared made no mention of ISCI and other parties influencing Maliki's decision to confront militias in Basrah. HOWARD