Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BASRAH2
2008-01-22 07:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

GOVERNOR WANTS TO MAKE BASRAH A REGION

Tags:  PGOV ECON EPET IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO7485
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0002/01 0220738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220738Z JAN 08
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0246
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0663
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0697
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON EPET IR IZ
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR WANTS TO MAKE BASRAH A REGION

BASRAH 00000002 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, REO Basrah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV ECON EPET IR IZ SUBJECT: GOVERNOR WANTS TO MAKE BASRAH A REGION BASRAH 00000002 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Howell Howard, Director, REO Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Basrah Provincial Governor Mohammed Wa'eli told REO Basrah on January 16 that Basrawis (except for those tied to Iran) wanted their own region and that he was ready to start the process. Wa'eli suggested a likely compromise region that would consist of Basrah, Dhi Qar and Maysan, rejecting the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq's (ISCI) nine-province southern region proposal. If Dhi Qar and Maysan did not want to join Basra, Wa'eli said Basrah was prepared to become a single-province region. Using the Region Formation Law, Wa'eli's Fadhila party could circumvent the wait for nationally organized provincial elections and end up with a new government by the end of 2008. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a January 16 meeting with REO Officers, Governor Wa'eli said there had been much debate recently among Basrawis about the formation of a formal region in the South. Basrawis wanted their own region with its attendant control over revenues; the only opposition was from politicians and citizens who were allied with Iran. These latter, he claimed, still favored the nine-province Southern region that ISCI had proposed in the past. Wa'eli noted that in a trip to Iran he made months ago, the Iranians asked him to support the nine-province region proposal. Wa'eli stressed that a nine-province region would give too much influence to Iran. ¶3. (C) Wa'eli pointedly asked REO Director what the U.S. position was on Basra's formation of a region. Director replied that he had not received guidance from Baghdad on an official position, but that in general the USG would want Iraqis to resolve federalism questions themselves so long as the process was legal and transparent. (Note: Wa'eli asked the UK Consul General the same question a few days earlier, and received a similar reply. End Note.) ¶4. (C) To the question of how many provinces could reasonably agree to form a region, the governor answered that a compromise would be a region comprised of Basrah, Maysan and Dhi Qar. Why not Muthanna? The governor said that Muthanna was too big to make an easily governable region with the other three. (Note: Wa'eli likely recognizes that the poor and underdeveloped Muthanna would be an
economic burden on the region. End Note.) Wa'eli noted that the logical capital of a Southeastern Region would be Basrah City. To REO Director's query whether the residents of Maysan and Dhi Qar, and their governors and provincial councils would stand for a region dominated by Basrah, Wa'eli replied that if they would not, then Basrah would simply become its own region. ¶5. (C) Governor Wa'eli claimed that the governor of Maysan also wanted to transform the province into its own region, but the latter was willing to be part of a grouping with Basrah. Wa'eli said he was planning an imminent trip to Amarah to discuss the nuts and bolts with Governor Maliki. (Note: This would be the first such visit. End Note.) Wa'eli claimed that his Fadhila party had a majority in Dhi Qar and anticipated no trouble rallying that province into a southeastern region. ¶6. (C) Wa'eli said that he wanted to start work on a region so that the process would be ready by what he understood was the window that opened in April. He was vague in our meeting as to which of several methods listed in the Law Regarding the Formation of Regions he would pursue. Wa'eli noted to the UK Consul General that using the method whereby one-third of Provincial Council (PC) members could petition the Central Government, his Fadhila party had 12 of 14 necessary to make one-third, plus five other council members who worked with Fadhila. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Basrah's electoral system could conceivably pull off the referendum required by the Region Law by the end of the year. A reading of the law indicates that after a valid petition for a referendum, the Council or representatives would within 15 days task the Independent Electoral Commission to organize a referendum within three months. Hazim Joda, General Manager for Basrah Branch of the Electoral Commission, told REO on January 2 that his office could be ready to conduct provincial elections as soon as March. While the Regions Law contemplates a special registration procedure for a regions referendum, we believe Hazim could make registration happen using the food ration card as an aid in registration validation. ¶8. (C) In REO meetings with many contacts, we have found Basrawis to be conflicted and somewhat ignorant of what federalism means for Iraq. We have found many to be suspicious BASRAH 00000002 002.2 OF 002 of a nine-province region that might be dominated by ISCI and therefore (to many) Iran; the larger region would also drain oil revenues from Basrah. Most contacts have expressed dissatisfaction with the central government and the slow pace in organizing provincial elections. A referendum will probably boil down, at least in part, to whether a three- or single-province region would be more or less independent of Iranian influence. REO Basrah will canvass PC members in the coming weeks to assess whether Fadhila can mobilize support for a referendum on region formation. ¶9. (C) It is remarkable that in all of REO's meetings with Governor Wa'eli, he has not mentioned the Kurdistan Regional Government as a potential model for Basrah. He has always noted to us that the national Hydrocarbons Law is a necessary prerequisite to attracting further oil and gas investment in Basrah. In this meeting he did not mention control over hydrocarbon resources as a motivation for formation of a region, but Fadhila's dominance of the oil industry in Basrah is well known. Fadhila likely views a Basrah Region, though, as an avenue to consolidate control of the province and the oil industry. SIGNATURE

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