NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING TRENDS IN THE GAMBIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANJUL 000380 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 TAGS: SNAR KJUS EFIN MASS PGOV GA SUBJECT: NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING TRENDS IN THE GAMBIA Classified By: AMB Barry L. Wells, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) We are concerned with the danger to political stability and the rule of law in the Gambia that is represented by the rise of narcotics trafficking in the region, All of our key interlocutors report a rise in trafficking in and through The Gambia. We are also concerned about the possibility of money-laundering in the rapidly expanding pool of commercial banks. We believe The Gambia is very vulnerable to narcotics traffickers, and particularly to narco-corruption. We recommend beginning some targeted assistance, in coordination with the UK and potentially other interested donors, to improve the ability of Gambian authorities to resist traffickers use of the country. The Current Situation -------------- ¶2. (C) Post took advantage of the visit of INL/AEE adviser Joe McBride to discuss narcotics trafficking with our key interlocutors, including the head of the National Drug Enforcement Agency (NDEA),the Inspector General of Police (IGP),the former IGP, and the British High Commissioner and EU Charge,. All interlocutors agreed that they were troubled by the rising tide of trafficking in the region, saw trafficking on the rise in The Gambia, and believed The Gambia was vulnerable. ¶3. (C) The IGP and the NDEA chief noted increased arrests and seizures, although most of the cases they mentioned involved marijuana, which is grown locally. However, they said that they believed there was increasing cocaine traffic as well in The Gambia, although they could not quantify the extent of the problem. Although a good deal of institutional rivalry exists between the NDEA and the Police, and the former IGP and NDEA chief both accused each other,s organization of corruption, both agreed that cocaine trafficking exists in two forms: first is a considerable traffic across the narrow Gambia from southern Senegal (and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau) toward Dakar; second is increasing traffic through the airport. Neither knew much about the possibility of maritime trafficking. The Acting British High Commissioner confirmed that there have been an increasing number of seizures from mules on flights from Banjul, and said that London was &concerned8. All our interlocutors lamented that the NDEA, the Police and other security forces are ill-trained and poorly-equipped to deal with increased trafficking. They asked for training and equipment across the board. Key Vulnerability ) Money Laundering -------------- ¶4. (C) The poorly regulated Gambian banking sector has expanded rapidly over the last few years. While 3 or 4 established commercial banks continue to dominate the market here, and seem to control the lion,s share of legitimate banking, a dozen more banks have sprung up in the last few years. While some of them are filling a niche in the market by taking on smaller accounts that do not interest the big players, we and our interlocutors question whether there are legitimate reasons for the presence of 15 commercial banks in a developing economy of 1.5 million people. 13 of the 17 banks are Nigerian-owned and most have begun operations recently (and 2 more have applied for licenses). There are few barriers to entry into the Gambian market (only USD 1.5 million in operating capital is required),and our interlocutors said that licenses for the banks are approved by the Finance Ministry without any background check or clearance by law enforcement agencies, which have no say in the approval process, which they characterized as a rubber stamp ¶5. (C) There is no financial investigations unit (FIU) in the Gambian government (GOTG),and out interlocutors admitted they do not have the capacity to investigate suspected money-laundering or other financial crimes. Key Vulnerability ) Legislation and Prosecution -------------- -- ¶5. (C) The Gambia does not have modern legislation capable of dealing with significant levels of narcotics trafficking. For example, according to the former IGP, the maximum penalty for trafficking is 10 years or a fine equivalent to about USD 40K. This allows traffickers to buy their way out of prison. While this might be a sufficient deterrent for marijuana traffickers, the higher profit margin of cocaine trafficking would make the threat of a USD 40K fine an acceptable cost of doing business. ¶6. (C) In addition, our conversations with interlocutors revealed that the NDEA and Police do not have even a rudimentary knowledge of how to investigate and prosecute narcotics traffickers. The concept of plea bargaining, vital to the investigation of trafficking rings, is completely foreign to them. They also lack adequate procedures for gathering and documenting evidence, gathering and preserving the chain of evidence for representative samples from drug seizures, and for destruction of seized drugs. Key Vulnerability ) Border Control -------------- ¶7. (C) The Gambia is a small country with exceptionally long borders, completely surrounded by Senegal except for the maritime border. On land, there are only a few formal border crossing points, but the Customs, Immigration and police officials do not have a focus on drug interdiction, and do not have any training or equipment to carry out that function. In addition, there are so many informal crossing points with no government presence that strict control of the border is a virtual impossibility. ¶8. (C) Although the MSSIS system recently granted to the Gambian Navy by the U.S, is a potentially powerful tool for identifying and interdicting maritime traffickers, currently there is little to no interdiction capability. On any given day, the Gambian Navy may not be able to launch any of its boats, due to age and poor maintenance, leaving The Gambia almost completely unable to patrol its territorial waters. ¶9. (C) The airport is modern and has fair to good general security procedures, but little attention is currently given to drug interdiction, and there is no specialized training or equipment. What Our Allies Can or Will Do -------------- ¶10. (C) CDA and Joe McBride met with Acting British High Commissioner Jo McPhail and EU Charge, Helene Cave, to discuss the drug situation in The Gambia. McPhail indicated that narcotics trafficking in The Gambia was a priority concern for the UK, as well, and noted increasing arrests of mules in London coming from Banjul. She said that the UK government was prepared to devote resources to combat the problem, but that they were having trouble getting enough quantifiable hard data to support the request, as the GOTG simply did not have any useful statistics to share. However, she pledged cooperation on the drug issue and promised further coordination with us. Cave,, on the other hand, made it clear that we could expect little from the EU in the short run. She sees her job in The Gambia as being primarily to facilitate EU development programs, and showed little interest in the drug situation. Cave, said it would take a long time to divert any EU resources to a different priority. The only possibility she could see in the immediate future might be a &study8 of the problem in the region. What The Gambia Has Going For It -------------- ¶11. (C) The Gambia does have some strengths in a potential battle against narco-trafficking and narco-influence. We have strong relationships with both the police and the NDEA and believe both are credible partners that we can work with. There is a strong societal rejection of drug trafficking and drug use, exemplified by the removal from office and prosecution of a ruling party National Assembly member caught with marijuana earlier this year. We do not believe narcotics traffickers have made significant inroads into corrupting Gambian official yet, and believe there is still time to prevent it. The Gambian court system, although flawed, is probably the most credible branch of government, and does have some talented individuals. Targeted Assistance That Could Help -------------- ¶12. (C) We believe that, in coordination with the UK, it would be productive to focus on a few priority areas of assistance to The Gambia to help &inoculate8 it against te spread of narcotics trafficking. These measures, modest in size, could potentially pay great benefits by helping to preserve political stability and the rule of law in this small country. ¶13. (C) First, it would be productive to assist The Gambia in setting up a Financial Intelligence Unit and strengthen its oversight of financial institutions to prevent the spread of money laundering. ¶14. (C) Second, we should provide The Gambia with assistance in updating its trafficking laws to provide the legal framework for successful prosecution of drug cases. In addition, we should provide the police and prosecutors with training in how to develop and prosecute drug cases. ¶15. (C) Third, we should provide a small amount of training and equipment to support interdiction. Specifically, we should help The Gambia develop a more credible interdiction capability at formal land crossings to prevent traffickers from seeing The Gambia as an easy transit point to Dakar or further north. We should also work with the airport authorities to strengthen their interdiction capabilities and prevent the use of the airport for trafficking. DoD should continue to work with the Gambian navy to make better use of its MSSIS system for drug interdiction, and work to restore its one U.S.-origin patrol craft to functionality. ¶16. (C) We believe with relatively small amounts of targeted assistance, we can prevent The Gambia from following the path of other nations in the region which have fallen increasing under the sway of traffickers. WELLS