(WE'VE GOT THOSE) PARTY DISSOLUTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000972

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: (WE'VE GOT THOSE) PARTY DISSOLUTION,
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BLUES

REF: 07 BANGKOK 5041 (ROUND-UP: ELECTION LAWS)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The parties in the governing coalition are
proposing constitutional amendments to try to avoid the
dissolution of their parties by the Constitutional Court.
Although there is little love for the 2007 Constitution, some
anti-Thaksin elements are seeking to block changes that would
help parties accused of election fraud escape the proscribed
penalty. This process is likely to dominate the political
landscape for the next few months, although the public would
prefer the government concentrate on economic issues. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Three months after the election for the lower house of
parliament, the election fraud cases are still grinding
through an increasingly controversial adjudication process.
Three parties in the governing coalition -- most importantly,
the People's Power Party (PPP) -- face the possibility of
dissolution.


3. (C) In early March, the Election Commission (ECT)
reviewed the cases against Chart Thai and Matchima parties.
In both cases, members of the party executive leadership had
been issued red cards for serious election fraud, and
disqualified from holding office for one year. Having issued
the red card, the ECT was then required to rule on whether
cases should be referred to the Constitutional Court to
consider whether the parties should be dissolved in
accordance with the Election Law and article 237 of the 2007
Constitution. The parties breathed a sigh of relief in
mid-March, when word leaked out that the subcommittee set up
to review the case would recommend against dissolution,
finding in both cases that the fraud had been carried out by
the candidate alone for his personal advantage, and that the
parties had not colluded in the acts. An ECT official told
us at that time that the general view at the ECT was that
party dissolution was a very serious measure not to be
applied lightly, and that staff there generally supported the
subcommittee's assessment.


4. (C) The parties' relief was short-lived, however. ECT
Commissioner Sumeth said that the ECT would refer the case to
legal specialists to review, as the ECT subcommittee might
not have fully taken into account the ramifications of the
2007 election laws. He explained that the law appeared to
give the ECT no real latitude: if an executive member of a
party was found to have committed election fraud, then the
ECT was supposed to submit the case to the Constitutional
Court, according to Sumeth. On March 20, this legal
subcommittee decided by a vote of six to one that the law
required the ECT to submit the Chart Thai and Matchima
dissolution cases to the Constitutional Court. The ECT has
not yet made a final determination in these cases, but is
expected to decide within the next two weeks.


5. (C) While the ECT statements predictably provoked an
outcry from Chart Thai and Matchima, the more important
response was from the People's Power Party -- with 233 seats,
by far the largest party in the Parliament, and the real
power in the governing coalition. PPP executive member and
(now suspended) House speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairat, a close
associate of former PM Thaksin, has been accused of serious
vote fraud by the ECT, and the Supreme Court will shortly
begin to hear the case against him. If the Supreme Court
concurs with the ECT recommendation for a red card, the ECT
will have to determine whether to submit a PPP dissolution
case to the Constitutional Court as well. The legal opinion
delivered this week on the Chart Thai and Matchima cases,
therefore, does not bode well for PPP. (Note: while we agree
that the law gives the ECT little latitude on the submission
of the case to the Constitutional Court, it is not at all a
foregone conclusion how the Court will rule. One of the
drafters of the very tough fraud provisions told us last year
that he did not believe many parties would be dissolved
because of this law given that the parties would have the
benefit of the presumption of innocence in any trial, as well
as the ability to pay for better lawyers than the government
side would have (reftel). End note.)


6. (C) Prime Minister Samak (leader of PPP) reacted with
outrage to the possibility of the party facing dissolution.
He returned to his previous tendency to mutter darkly about
an "invisible hand" seeking to destroy his party and with it,

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Thai democracy. The PPP launched a campaign to amend article
237 of the Constitution (which includes the dissolution
procedures),along with the relevant election laws. In
response to criticisms that the party was clearly acting out
of narrow self-interest to avoid dissolution, the PPP
announced that it would propose amendments to several other
articles of the Constitution, but so far has not spoken with
one voice about which articles. Some proposals include
amending article 309, which provides amnesty for the coup
makers and for officials who undertook actions under the
junta's authority, such as the corruption investigations
against Thaksin. PM Samak proposed in his Sunday morning TV
show on March 23 that the whole Constitution be reviewed and
amended, using the 1997 Constitution as a basis.


7. (C) Predictably, a range of anti-Thaksin voices were
raised in collective outcry against the PPP proposal. While
there has been broad agreement that the 2007 Constitution had
flaws and would need to be amended, there is much less
agreement on which articles need to be fixed. The battle
lines on this issue are just being drawn, and it may be a
messy business. Many who hated Thaksin also loved the 1997
Constitution and would like to make the current Charter more
like the previous one.


8. (C) The issue of retroactivity will also be tricky.
Already, many opponents of the current government are
pointing out that, whatever amendments are made, they should
not be retroactive -- parties that competed in the December
elections implicitly accepted the terms of the bargain, which
included possible party dissolution for those who cheated.
Some are also calling for a referendum on any constitutional
changes, as the 2007 Constitution was adopted by popular
vote. In the end, the governing coalition probably has the
votes to push through amendments. They need 316 votes - a
majority of the combined House (480 seats) and Senate (150
seats); the coalition has 315 already, a solid base even if
there are some defections, and many senators will likely
support amendments. Opening up the amendment process,
however, may put strains on the coalition. On the issue of
retroactivity, the key question for the parties at risk, the
Constitutional Court may also have something to say.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) As noted before, the December election did not
resolve the underlying conflicts in Thai society. Over the
next few months, we are likely to see the next act in this
protracted political drama. A weary and worried public would
prefer the government focus on economic issues, and appears
to have little enthusiasm for the prospect of more party
dissolutions. The legal machinery is likely to grind on
without much regard for popular sentiment, however, unless
the politicians figure out a way to end the war of attrition
between Thaksin supporters and opponents.

JOHN