MFA PERMSEC ON BURMA, BILATERAL ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000835 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON TH SUBJECT: MFA PERMSEC ON BURMA, BILATERAL ISSUES Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle reason 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA Permsec told the Ambassador in a March 13 meeting that Thailand would press Burma on reform issues during the Prime Minister's visit there on March 14. The Permsec also recounted at length the many bilateral issues on which Thailand had to cooperate with Burma, such as refugees and fighting narcotics trafficking, pointing to the impact on Thailand's national security of these problems. The Ambassador underscored the importance the U.S. places on supporting democratic reform in Burma. We believe that the Thai will press the Burmese, but are not now prepared to take a leadership role within ASEAN on the Burma issue. The Ambassador thanked the Thai for their cooperation on the arrest of international arms dealer Viktor Bout, and explained why Bout should face trial in the U.S., rather than in Thailand. The Ambassador urged the Thai to enter into a real dialogue with the pharmaceutical companies over the compulsory license issue. Both sides looked forward to a productive meeting on March 20 in the US between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary. End summary. ¶2. (U) In a March 13 meeting, Ambassador and MFA Permsec Virasakdi Futrukul reviewed issues of bilateral concern in advance of the Foreign Minister's meeting in Washington DC with the Secretary on March 20. The Ambassador underscored that the Foreign Minister's visit would be a chance to highlight the 175 years of friendship between our two countries. (Note: refugee issues are discussed septel. End Note.) Viktor Bout Case -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador thanked Virsakdi for the MFA's assistance so far with this very high-profile case. He underscored the importance of ensuring that Bout faces trial in the U.S, rather than in Thailand. He cited a number of reasons why this made sense, including the fact that one of the codefendants, now cooperating with US law enforcement, was already in the US. We cited the precedent of Amcit Van Duc Vo, who was extradited in 2006 to face trial here for placing a bomb at the Vietnamese embassy in 2001. Despite Vo's arrest in the U.S., we dismissed our terrorism charges and deferred to the Thai prosecution because of the location of the evidence and Thailand's greater interesting in the case. Virasakdi said he would convey our points to the Foreign Minister and relevant legal authorities. BURMA -------------- ¶4. (C) We had an extended discussion on Burma. The Ambassador told Virasakdi said that this issue was likely to be a key concern of the Secretary's when the Foreign Minister met her. He reiterated the points that A/S Hill had made in his meetings here earlier this month: we understand that Burma poses a complex challenge for its neighbors. Nonetheless, we hoped that Thailand would use its contacts with Burma to convey the concerns of the international community, and that Thailand would also genuinely support democratic reform in Burma, including in its public statements. Virasakdi assured us that the Thai side would press the Burmese on these issues of concern to the international community. ¶5. (C) Virasakdi confirmed that Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, in his one-day visit to Burma on March 14, would sign a "standard agreement" on investment protection and promotion. We pointed out that the rest of the international community was looking for ways to ratchet up the pressure on Burma; the announcement of this agreement at this time would not look good. Virasakdi defended the agreement, saying that Thailand was the third largest investor in Burma (UK was in first place and Singapore second),and Thai business needed protection. He said that the agreement had been negotiated 19 years ago. This year, Virasakdi said, Thailand and Burma would sign an agreement on contract farming, making the need for a framework to protect Thai business more urgent than ever. ¶6. (C) Virsakdi reviewed the range of difficult issues on BANGKOK 00000835 002 OF 003 which Thailand and Burma had to cooperate, including narcotics interdiction, trafficking in persons, and dealing with refugees. A quarter of the Thai population lived along the border with Burma; he warned that the border could explode "at any time" and that Thailand and Burma had narrowly avoided armed conflict in the past. The relationship with Burma affected Thailand's national security, Virasakdi maintained. Virasakdi pushed back against the Ambassador's assertion that Burma needed Thailand as much as Thailand needed Burma. He used the example of a recent power project in which Thailand had been slated to get 40% of the project, but had been knocked down to 24%, with China moving in to take the majority share. China is taking "practically everything" and had even taken over projects that the Thai had pioneered. Virasakdi warned that the US sanctions policy was pushing Burma to be a satellite of China, first economically and eventually in the area of security. That is what the region had wanted to avoid when it brought Burma into ASEAN. Virasakdi said the Burmese had taken a hard line during the Gambari visit because the junta has the backing of China. "China told us they will never let Burma be like Iraq," Virasakdi said, explaining that the Chinese were not worried about US military action, but about Western-forced "regime change." ¶7. (C) Virasakdi said that the recent announcement of the timetable for the referendum and election could in some ways be seen as positive. He noted that "just like last time" the voting may not turn out the way the junta expected. Virasakdi said the Thai will tell the Burmese that the referendum should be transparent and credible during their upcoming meetings. ¶8. (C) We made clear that we understood Thailand's difficulties regarding Burma, but we hope to be reassured that Thailand was on the same side as we were in wanting democratization in Burma; this was a very important issue for us. Virasakdi said he understood, but pointed out that it was the US, not Thailand, that had "set up Burma as a condition of our relationship." Virasaksi reiterated, however, the Thai delegation to Burma would certainly press the concerns raised by the international community. Strategic Dialogue -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador again raised our hope that Virasakdi would be able to lead a delegation to the US soon to hold the second round of the Strategic Dialogue. Virasaksi agreed, and asked us to propose a date. (Note: He also joked that he might not be around long enough to participate -- a reference to the rumors of some imminent personnel changes at the MFA. There is speculation that Virasaksi, perhaps tarnished by his service to the coup-backed government, might be replaced soon. End note.) Business Climate -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised two issues that affected the business climate. On compulsory licensing. the Ambassador reiterated the US position, urging the RTG to engage in a genuine dialogue with the pharmaceutical companies. The Ambassador also asked the MFA to look into recent changes in Thai law that required international schools to have a Thai citizen as manager. Depending on how this was implemented, it could have a negative impact on the families of foreign investors and businesspeople living here, and thus make Thailand a less attractive destination for foreign business and investment. The Permsec said he would look into the matter and encouraged those concerned to meet with the Minister of Education. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Talking about Burma, the Thai MFA's new buzzword is "neighborly engagement." The Thai appear to want to keep to a middle course, In a statement to the press published today, the Foreign Minister said Thailand wanted to see "inclusiveness in Burma's political process," but, like other ASEAN members, would not interfere in Burma's internal BANGKOK 00000835 003 OF 003 affairs. He talked about neighborly engagement as a policy falling between Western-backed sanctions and full engagement. The Thai seem to understand the need for Burma to make some kind of progress, and we think that they will find a way to press that point during the Friday PM visit. But the new Thai government so far shows no inclination to take a leadership position within ASEAN on the Burma issue. The Foreign Minister's March 20 call on Secretary Rice will be a good opportunity to clarify the new Thai government's policy on Burma. JOHN