EAP A/S HILL STRESSES ASEAN DEVELOPMENT, BURMA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KPAO ASEAN TH BM
SUBJECT: EAP A/S HILL STRESSES ASEAN DEVELOPMENT, BURMA
WITH ASEAN SECGEN SURIN


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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) During a February 29 meeting with ASEAN Secretary
General Surin Pitsuwan, A/S Hill stressed the importance of
strengthening ASEAN as an institution; this could in
turnencourage the organization to address the situation in
Burma, as well as other regional issues, such as North Korea.
Supporting this position, Surin mentioned the possibility of
ASEAN hosting a dinner for the North and South Koreans, to
which he would also invite key interested governments,
including the U.S. Regarding Burma, Surin stressed the
importance of continued engagement with both China and ASEAN,
as they each had an important role to play. Both sides
emphasized that U.S.-ASEAN engagements should not just focus
on Burma. End Summary.

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REGIONAL VALUE OF A STRONGER ASEAN
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2. (C) Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Christopher R. Hill joined Ambassador John, U.S. Pacific
Commander Admiral Keating, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs Scot Marciel, on February 9 for
a meeting with ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, Former
Deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra, and Poj
Aramwattananont, Counselor to the ASEAN Secretary General.


3. (C) A/S Hill emphasized the need to focus on strengthening
ASEAN as an institution in order to improve its ability to
act as a regional leader. Hill recognized that the trend in
ASEAN was a movement towards democracy, open markets, and
overall improvement in standards, all of which would
ultimately benefit the region. Surin agreed, and stressed
that as ASEAN continued to evolve, it would gain added
influence over members and other regional players. A/S
Hill's underlining of the need to strengthen ASEAN
institutions was well-received by Surin, who also welcomed
the appointment of the first U.S.-ASEAN Ambassador. Both
sides emphasized that U.S.-ASEAN engagements should not just
focus on Burma.


4. (C) President Bush's recent nomination of DAS Marciel to
be Ambassador for ASEAN affairs was part of this effort to
further support ASEAN, A/S Hill added. Surin pointed out
that the U.S. was the first dialogue partner to appoint an
Ambassador to ASEAN and that this move would encourage other
partners to follow suit. Admiral Keating stated that
the U.S. military would continue to engage ASEAN on a number
of levels, including participation in various ASEAN
events as a way to enhance PACOM's understanding and
interaction with the institution. Hill described proposals
regarding the establishment of a Northeast Asia Peace and
Security Mechanism stemming from the Six-Party Talks, and
added that while the role of ARF and ASEAN in such an
undertaking was not yet clear, ASEAN could have a lot to
offer.


5. (C) Surin mentioned that in recent weeks the South Koreans
had privately approached him with the idea of ASEAN

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hosting a dinner to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue.
According to the South Koreans, ASEAN's long-standing policy
of noninterference would allow it to act as a neutral host
for the ensuing discussion between North and South Korea as
well as the members of the Six-Party Talks. Surin
characterized the dinner as a "Friends of Korea" gathering.
A/S Hill agreed that this was a good idea and expressed his
interest in coordinating his upcoming travel to the region in
April in order to attend such a meeting.

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BURMA INFECTING ASEAN RELATIONS
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6. (C) A/S Hill explained to Surin that the situation in
Burma continued to complicate U.S. dealings with ASEAN and
that the USG wanted to find a way to address this dynamic.
Surin lamented that Burma had had the same effect on ASEAN's
relationship with other dialogue partners such as the EU, New
Zealand and Australia. He continued that it was difficult
for ASEAN to extricate itself from this particular problem,
even as the institution witnessed missed opportunities such
as Secretary Rice's participation in recent ASEAN Ministerial
meetings and the indefinite postponement of President Bush's
invitation of ASEAN Prime Ministers to Texas.


7. (C) ASEAN had tried to explore creative solutions. By way
of example, Surin described his invitation to New Zealand to
a recent Ministerial at ASEAN's expense to allow the GONZ to
participate without having to explain why it used public
funds to attend a meeting that included Burmese officials.
The problem extended to intersessional
activities, Surin noted, as dialogue partners led many of
those important initiatives. A/S Hill inquired if ASEAN
had ever seriously discussed the possibility of suspending
Burma, or holding the GOB otherwise accountable for its
actions. Surin replied that members had privately discussed
Burma's suspension, but because there existed no legal way to
impose such a penalty the conversations never moved beyond
quiet political pondering. Even the idea of a
"minus one" procedure was not viable in the case of Burma due
to ASEAN's highly ingrained adherence to the principles
of consensus and non-interference.

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ROLE OF CHINA IN BURMA
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8. (C) Prime Minister Samak had mentioned Thailand's interest
in a dialogue on Burma similar to the Six-Party Talks on
North Korea, noted Ambassador John, asking whether Surin
believed there existed general support for such a proposal.
Surin claimed that many people were interested in this type
of a regional approach. However, he emphasized that the key
to such a negotiation would be China. Surin offered that if
the Chinese changed their approach and pressured the Burmese
to sit down and talk with the UN, ASEAN, and other players,
it would greatly benefit all involved. Until now China's
public stance had been to keep other countries from becoming
involved in what China viewed as Burma's domestic problem.


9. (C) A/S Hill countered that many people had called for
China to do more about Burma, but the situation was much
too complicated; simply asking one country to intervene would

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not lead to a solution. Hill agreed with Surin's
desire to engage China on Burma; however, China's economic
interests in Burma were the driving force behind its
dealings with the Burmese junta. This constrained Chinese
influence. At the same time, due to the 2,100 kilometer
border between China and Burma, the Chinese shared Thailand's
concerns about the spillover effects of Burma's
persistent decline. DAS Marciel added that the Chinese
recognized the need for some kind of political change
inside Burma to ensure continued stability, and that the USG
had emphasized in meetings with the Chinese that such a
change did not have to happen overnight.


10. (C) Surin replied that the prudent approach was to
recognize the positive efforts the Chinese had made to date.
A/S Hill said that UN Special Envoy for Burma Ibrahim Gambari
had to clarify his objectives and his needs to give the
Chinese, and others, a precise goal that they could support.
A/S Hill emphasized that, even more important, Gambari needed
to be able to freely come and go from Burma to allow him to
fully focus on the task at hand. Surin mentioned that he
would be traveling to Beijing on March 17 and that he planned
to pass the message of the importance of ASEAN and China
working together to resolve the situation in Burma.


11. (U) A/S Hill cleared this cable.
JOHN