SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: STATISTICS SUGGEST MILITANTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000628 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND DRL NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: STATISTICS SUGGEST MILITANTS ARE GETTING MORE SOPHISTICATED BANGKOK 00000628 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Understanding the situation in Thailand's deep south through analysis of violence statistics and economic indicators is difficult. Although multiple organizations keep statistics on the violence, inconsistent methodologies coupled with inaccurate and unreliable reporting of events renders statistical analysis problematic at best. Regardless, some general trends are discernible: statistics from a number of organizations indicate that attacks are becoming more lethal, and at least one set of figures shows the numbers of casualties attributable to the violence have increased each year since 2004. Conversely, an academic contact in the deep south maintains the economy of the region is doing well compared to the rest of the south. End Summary. The Numbers -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a meeting in mid-February with Dr. Sisomphop Chitphiromsi, an academic at Prince of Songkhla University's Pattani campus, Poloff and USAID officers discussed the state of the insurgency at the end of 2007, as well as trends in violence and casualty statistics. According to Sisomphop, 2007 was a particularly bad year for violence in the south -- perhaps the most violent of the past four years. He explained the statistics indicate attacks are getting increasingly lethal, and that the numbers of dead and injured because of the violence have increased each year since the violence escalated at the beginning of 2004. This is worrying, he said, because it indicates the militants are becoming more sophisticated in their tactics and use of IEDs. He described the situation as "stable in its instability," i.e., the situation rumbled along in 2007 as it had for the previous three years, with neither the government nor the militants gaining an upper hand. His incident and injury figures are: 2004: 1850 incidents resulting in 1438 injuries and deaths 2005: 2297 incidents resulting in 1643 injuries and deaths 2006: 1815 incidents resulting in 1877 injuries and deaths 2007: 1861 incidents resulting in 2295 injuries and deaths ¶3. (SBU) Statistics kept by other organization point to a similar ratio of incidents to casualties for 2007. For example, statistics compiled by the Isara News Institute of the Journalists Association of Thailand show 2025 incidents, resulting in 2587 casualties. Breaking Isara's statistics down further, there were 867 deaths and 1720 injuries; Deep South Watch's Violence-Related Injury Surveillance program (VIS) reports there were 1228 violent incidents, accounting for 628 deaths and 2362 injuries; the Region 4 ISOC, although not reporting the number of incidents, reports 994 deaths and 1,782 injuries. What They Mean -------------- ¶4. (C) Sisomphop said violence increased in the first half of 2007, decreased, and then rebounded again towards the end of the year. In January 2008, casualties increased again. He said there seems to be an invisible ceiling beyond which the level of violence will not go. Asked about what conclusions he draws from these figures, he said he believes the initial decline in violence after the first half of the year was due to the more aggressive tactics used by security forces -- the Army and police did some real damage to the insurgents, networks. He thinks the violence escalated again because the security forces failed to take advantage of the security window they opened up and lacked either the will or ability to win over "hearts and minds." He thinks the government wants to first "get rid of the insurgents" before attempting reconciliation. He said security forces continue to use heavy-handed tactics and there is little room for local leaders to solve the violence themselves. BANGKOK 00000628 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Picking up on the theme of conflict resolution, Sisomphop spoke about the prospect for autonomy in the deep south. Sisomphop said, based on recent polling in the insurgency afflicted areas of Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 50 percent of the people polled believe there is a need for some form of political autonomy in the deep south, while another 40-50 percent think the situation can be solved without changing the way the south is governed. (Note: Sisomphop did not specify what organization conducted the polling. End note.) Sisomphop is worried about these statistics and said 50 percent of the population looking for a some form of autonomy does not bode well for stability in the deep south. Bangkok needs to get serious about solving the issues underlying the insurgency. He agrees that some form of administrative reform or decentralization is needed for the south, and said the Thai model of a unitary state, i.e., that only the current model of central authority will work to hold the country together, is too shallow. The government already has a model for autonomy in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area where the governor is elected, not appointed as in the majority of the provinces. It's Not the Economy... -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Turning to the economic situation, Sisomphop said he is working on a project to determine the impact of the unrest on the economy in the extreme south. In short, Sisomphop said, the economy is not collapsing. He said since 2004 the government has spent about eight thousand million baht on development projects, which seems to have mitigated the economic impact of the violence. According to Sisomphop, the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) in the three extreme southern provinces is growing at about 6 percent per year. He contrasted this with the growth rate for the rest of the south, which he said is growing at about 4 percent. He attributed most of the growth to the government sector, which he said accounts for roughly 20 percent of GPP. He said the agricultural sector is maintaining about 3 percent growth, and the tourist and service sectors, which he did not have estimates for, are suffering the most. (Comment: We have no information regarding the time period Dr. Sisomphop's figures are based on, or the methodology he is using for his estimates of GPP growth. End Comment.) Government development projects, he said, are focused on job training, creating industrial food complexes, and product promotion. Local people who are the targets of these projects say they need more, but also say they do not trust the government. He thinks the government may be missing a valuable opportunity to win back some trust by not doing more public relations work to make people aware of the investment and development efforts it is undertaking. ¶7. (C) In addition to government spending on development and infrastructure, Sisomphop said the deep south has also benefited economically from the high troop levels. When soldiers are sent to the south, they spend money and contribute to the economy. Citing anecdotal evidence, he said the big box stores in the south are always full, packed with villagers from remote areas. He also believes the transportation sector is thriving, judging by the large number of trucks he sees along the transportation corridors between Songkhla, Pattani and points further south. Sisomphop linked this economic activity to the economic impact of the troops. ¶8. (C) When asked about development activities of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) in the villages, Sisomphop said the SBPAC has tried to push development activities down to the local level, but it is difficult because of the security situation and the intensity of military operations. In areas considered "red zones," where there is significant militant activity, it is too dangerous for civilian agencies, so the military runs the projects. According to Sisoomphop, this totals about one BANGKOK 00000628 003.2 OF 003 third the area of the extreme south. Sisomphop said that although some of these projects have been well received, the locals, in general, won't get involved with the military for fear of being caught between the security services and the insurgents. (Note: All development assistance from the Thai government to areas affected by the insurgency in Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat are administered through the SBPAC. End note.) ¶9. (C) Comment: Although casualty statistics and economic indicators provide valuable insight into the situation in southern Thailand, it is dangerous to ascribe too much meaning to them. Reporting on the number of incidents and injuries is at best incomplete; news organizations, citing safety concerns, generally report only what the government releases to them. Very seldom is any attempt made to vet the information. We believe Sisomphop, at least, has tried to use a conservative approach to his statistics over the years, and to weed out the high level of background violence prevalent in the South, in an effort to count only attacks related to the insurgency. Sisomphop's economic figures provide an interesting counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that the economy in the deep south is suffering because of the insurgency. JOHN