CODEL PRICE'S MEETINGS IN BANGKOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000609 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM ECON EINV KHIV TH BM SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE'S MEETINGS IN BANGKOK REF: BANGKOK 340 (DISCUSSION WITH SAMAK) BANGKOK 00000609 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej told CODEL Price on February 22 that he favored multilateral talks on Burma, and he viewed China as a communist country "in name only." Samak addressed domestic criticism that he recently trivialized a traumatic event in Thai history, acknowledging his relationship with the media was poor. The Ambassador and the CODEL pressed House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairath to advocate democratic reforms in Burma. Yongyuth expressed a desire to correct slanderous accusations against deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva briefly discussed the investment climate, possible constitutional amendment, Burma, HIV/AIDS, and the Election Commission's ongoing investigation of alleged election improprieties by Yongyuth. End Summary. PRIME MINISTER -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej received CODEL Price, accompanied by the Ambassador, on February 22. Samak welcomed the CODEL's visit as an encouraging sign that Thailand was returning to normal after the 2007 elections. He said the Election Commission had performed its duties "very well," and he considered the election fair. Recalling widespread popular support for the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) prior to the 2006 coup, Samak said his government would pursue TRT's populist policies. ¶3. (C) CODEL members expressed their appreciation for Samak's receiving them and explained the value they placed on the U.S.-Thai relationship. They asked about Samak's foreign policy priorities, including his view of Burma and China. Alluding to private advice given him by his Foreign Ministry, Samak said he would communicate the government's foreign policy views through the MFA, to avoid misunderstandings; he also said that, as an ASEAN country, Thailand would have to consult its neighbors on Burma policy. ¶4. (C) Nevertheless, Samak then departed from his script and, citing EAP Assistant Secretary Hill by name and his efforts on North Korea, suggested multi-party talks on Burma, involving Singapore, Japan, China, India, Thailand, and Burma, thereby placing "soft pressure" on the Burmese junta. Samak said UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon should have engaged directly with the Burmese, rather than leaving this task to UN Special Envoy Gambari. Samak also raised the example of Cuba, noting the U.S. had tolerated a communist dictatorship in its backyard for many decades, implying the USG should not criticize the RTG for failing to apply strong enough pressure on the Burmese junta. ¶5. (C) Turning to China, Samak said he was sensitive to reasonable Chinese concerns about national unity and secessionist movements. He said China had come reasonably far in its development and now was communist in name only. Samak told the CODEL he felt it was not necessary to push the Chinese to adopt democratic reforms. ¶6. (C) Demonstrating sensitivity to widespread criticism that he had misrepresented facts relating to the RTG's response to political demonstrations in October 1976, Samak gave a lengthy defense of his earlier remarks to a journalist. He admitted he had been advised to improve his relationship with journalists, but he conceded, "They don't like me, I don't like them." Nevertheless, he added that after his meeting earlier in the month with the Ambassador, he had noticed the positive press the Ambassador had received when he went out and met with the media. In the future, Samak said, he would try to folow this example and build a better relationship BANGKOK 00000609 002.2 OF 003 with reporters. HOUSE SPEAKER -------------- ¶7. (C) In a February 22 call on House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairath, the CODEL members explained their work with other parliaments in the region, highlighted the value of peer-to-peer exchanges, and said they would welcome a reciprocal visit to the U.S. by Thai legislators. Yongyuth said he was grateful for U.S. support, as he had spent much time in Texas following the 2006 coup d'etat. He explained that, following the elections, Thailand was hoping to restore international confidence in its political and economic systems. He said the legislature would support the Samak administration but, at the same time, not neglect its "check and balance" role. ¶8. (C) The CODEL asked Yongyuth's view of Burma. Yongyuth said that Burma needed support from the world community, and he would support economic cooperation with Burma. Congressman Price observed that the Burmese draft constitution would exclude Aung San Suu Kyi from holding political office; that indicated the Burmese junta was not working with its critics in good faith, and friendly approaches were not sufficiently effective. Yongyuth replied that Thailand could not act as Burma's "big brother," but China and India might have more influence over the Burmese. The Ambassador pressed for Thai public statements about the need for democracy in Burma, noting that many of those in Yongyuth's position immediately after the 2006 coup in Thailand had welcomed USG statements urging a restoration of democracy. The Ambassador recommended that Yongyuth empathize with current day Burmese democracy advocates as he considered the best approaches for Thailand. ¶9. (C) As the meeting came to a close, Yongyuth requested the CODEL's help to repudiate some "wrong information" that he believed was circulating around Washington. Specifically, he said that the previous administration had made false accusations against deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and Yongyuth believed it was important to correct the record, to protect Thaksin's "human rights." OPPOSITION LEADER -------------- ¶10. (C) The CODEL concluded its substantive meetings with a February 22 lunch with Democrat Party (DP) Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva. During remarks to the group, Abhisit said he was pleased with the return to power of an elected government. He hoped the Samak administration would move quickly on the Foreign Business Act (presumably rejecting draft amendments) and on capital controls (presumably removing them) in order to regain foreign confidence. He also pledged the DP stood ready to cooperate with the government, if the government desired, to address the conflict-ridden southern border provinces. ¶11. (C) Abhisit said the 2007 constitution was not dramatically different from the 1997 version, but some issues remained for the current parliament to address (presumably through amendment),including the power and composition of the Senate. When Congressman Farr requested an assessment of Burma, Abhisit said that ASEAN was the key forum for dealing with the bilateral relationship. He added, however, that he was disappointed with the low level of pressure that Thailand placed on the junta; the last Democrat-led administration had been tougher and clearer with its neighbor. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked how the USG might support Thailand's political development. Abhisit replied that poor governance could leave Thailand moving from one crisis to another. He hoped Thailand's international friends would confront the RTG in the event that human rights, the rule of law, and the integrity of government institutions come under BANGKOK 00000609 003.2 OF 003 pressure from the new administration. ¶13. (C) Congressman McDermott asked about Thailand's progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Abhisit said Thailand was becoming complacent, a victim of its earlier success. Now, proportionately more people not in traditional high risk groups were becoming infected. Abhisit added that, as Prime Minister, former DP Leader Chuan Leekpai had chaired the RTG's AIDS committee. This committee hardly met during the Thaksin administration, however, and Abhisit did not believe that the current government had a comprehensive plan for HIV/AIDS. ¶14. (C) Congressman Conaway asked what might happen if the Election Commission were to determine at the conclusion of its ongoing investigation that House Speaker Yongyuth had engaged in improper election-related behavior. Abhisit said this initial conclusion could prompt the dissolution of the People's Power Party, although pursuing that end would require further investigation, and party dissolution would be an extreme measure. ¶15. (C) CODEL Price did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. JOHN