SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL KEATING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000585 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL KEATING Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Admiral Keating, your visit to Thailand will afford you a chance to see the importance of Thailand to our regional security interests as the United States and Thailand celebrate 175 years of relations. You will also have an opportunity to underscore the United States Government's commitment to working with a democratically elected Thai government. THE POLITICAL SITUATION -------------- ¶2. (U) Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and his People's Power Party (PPP) received a substantial plurality in Thailand's December 23 national legislative election. The new constitution, approved by the Thai public in an August 19, 2007 referendum, differs from the 1997 version by, among other aspects: creating term limits for the Prime Minister; establishing a partially-appointed / partially-elected non-partisan Senate; and creating multi-member electoral districts and regional party lists for the House of Representatives. Elections for the Senate will take place March 2. ¶3. (C) Samak and PPP campaigned in the December 2007 election as allies and followers of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The substantial plurality that PPP won reflected not only the effectiveness of the party's machinery, but also Thaksin's continuing appeal in much of Thailand, as well as widespread dissatisfaction with the interim government installed by the coup leaders. Samak and his cabinet took their oath of office before King Bhumibol February 6 and the inauguration marked both the return to power of a democratically elected government and a return to influence for Thaksin. ¶4. (C) Samak eagerly presented himself as Thaksin's follower during the campaign; post-election he has taken a more independent line. Local media have reported that Samak and Thaksin clashed over cabinet appointments but it remains unclear whether those stories were accurate or were planted to enhance Samak's credibility. MILITARY QUIETLY IN THE BARRACKS -------------- ¶5. (C) Pre-election speculation about whether the Royal Thai Army would tolerate a PPP administration has faded. Samak appointed himself Defense Minister -- a civilian Defense Minister is rare but not unprecedented in Thailand -- and signs from the military point to the institution's willingness to work cooperatively with Samak. In a significant departure from 2006, there seems now to be a widespread recognition that military-installed governments have no special capability to resolve Thailand's problems. Under current conditions, most of the political class, the business elite, and many average Thais who welcomed the coup in 2006 would likely not support another instance of military intervention in politics. PPP figures speak well of Army Commander Anupong Paochinda, both privately and publicly. THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶6. (C) Prior to the coup, bilateral relations with Thailand were very good and we are optimistic that this will be the case going forward. Sanctions were lifted February 6 and the RTG has signaled its willingness to return to a close mil-mil relationship. The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive response to the December 26, 2004 tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a Treaty Ally, has been firmly supportive of the International War on Terror, and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). American businesses have over $23 billion in direct investment in Thailand. The United States is Thailand's single largest export market and its second-largest foreign investor, after Japan. ¶7. (C) Responding to the recent crackdown in Burma by the authorities, then-Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont used his appearance at the UN General Assembly to criticize publicly the Burmese regime's actions in a manner that we viewed as constructive. In general, however, the Thai bureaucracy, and especially the military, fears instability in Burma will spill over across Thailand's border. Thailand relies on Burma for substantial energy imports as well. These factors incline Thailand to want to preserve the status quo. We believe it will be necessary to keep pushing the RTG to ensure it remains energized on Burma and does not allow commercial ties or concepts of ASEAN solidarity to overshadow human rights concerns. ¶8. (C) The Royal Thai Supreme Command has the lead on resolving the difficult problem of the influx of Hmong from Laos seeking resettlement in the US. The Thai have set up a screening process for almost 8,000 Hmong currently in a camp in Petchaboon province; this process also involves other ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We are uncertain whether the Thai screening process will meet international standards; the Thai have refused to allow UNHCR to play any role in these refugee determinations. We believe that a portion of the group, but not a majority, may have a legitimate claim to refugee status and could face harsh treatment by the Lao government if returned. There is no objective third-party review of conditions for Lao Hmong who are returned to Laos. We continue to urge the Thai side to permit those with a genuine fear of persecution to be resettled by third countries. UNHCR will have to be involved in order to make referrals to the US refugee resettlement program. A smaller group of 152 Lao Hmong, recognized as refugees by UNHCR, has been confined in an immigration jail in Nong Khai for over one year. The RTA has resisted moving them temporarily to more humane conditions at the Army-run camp in Petchaboon. Until recently, U.S. law created significant obstacles to the resettlement of many Hmong, due to their history of support for anti-Lao government activities that were classified as terrorism in the Real ID act and other laws. A change to the law in December appears to diminish these legal obstacles, but we are not yet in a position to make a specific commitment to assist with the resettlement of these Hmong. Nonetheless, we want to take every opportunity to underscore to the Supreme Command the importance of handling these refugee cases properly. THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶9. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over fifty years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to coup sanctions, Thailand was the fourth largest participant in the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami assistance program was key to making Operation Unified Assistance a success. In fact, Utapao was designated as the most important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. While we avoid using the term "CSL" with the Thai due to their sensitivities about bases, Utapao remains vital to our interests in the region and is accessed by close to nine hundred flights annually. In your meetings with Thai military officials, you will want to note our desire to return to a more healthy military-military relationship and reaffirm the importance and value we place on the relationship. COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND -------------- ¶10. (C) After June 2007, the Thai interim government took a more assertive role in trying to quell the ethnic Malay Muslim-led insurgency in southern Thailand, a region that has witnessed episodic violence since its incorporation into Thailand in 1902. Regional violence has claimed some 2900 lives since January 2004, when the violence began to escalate. In late 2006, the interim government of Prime Minister Surayud made some attempts at ending the violence through reconciliation, but lack of political support and preoccupation with the on-going political crisis in Bangkok caused these efforts to stall. ¶11. (C) Since this round of violence erupted in 2004, separatist attacks have become more complex and sophisticated in terms of tactics and use of Improvised Explosive Devices. The root causes of the insurgency -- government neglect, human rights abuses, and a lack of social justice, combined with a desire for some form of self-determination, have not been addressed by any Thai government to this point. As the new government has only recently formed, it is too early to speculate how it will address the southern insurgency. ¶12. (C) Although there is not yet evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah involvement in Southern Thailand, JI has exploited similar Muslim separatist and religious tensions in Indonesia, and we remain concerned by the possibility that southern unrest may attract international terrorist groups. ¶13. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do not label any assistance or training as directly linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station. ¶14. (C) The Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to improve our military cooperation in order to address the violence in the South: 1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, especially the Thai Army; 2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai military, police forces, and civilian agencies; 3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect international human rights norms as they counter the violence. MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM -------------- ¶15. (C) Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for exercises unique in Asia. Thailand offers the United States military good base infrastructure, large areas in which our aircraft and ground forces can conduct unrestricted operations and access to bombing ranges -- all in short supply in Asia. Located near strategic maritime choke points and having good liberty ports, Thailand also has the potential to play a greater role in U.S. Naval planning. Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises than are other countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security, or Australia, which avoids multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership. This has allowed us to use our exercises in Thailand to further key U.S. objectives such as supporting Japan's growing military role in Asia and engaging the TNI. We are on track for the first multi-lateral FTX phase of the major JCS-directed COBRA GOLD exercise, in addition to CPX and UNPKF pieces. THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION -------------- ¶16. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger relations with the two regional powers. The Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal. While Thai military links with the United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the military. The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea in 2005, Thailand and China are exploring conducting joint SAR exercises. The RTN has acquired several ships from China over the past decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's. Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded in recent years as has the number of bilateral military VIP visits. India's "look east" policy has impelled the country to forge closer ties with Thailand as well. REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY -------------- ¶17. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve maritime security. As part of an effort funded by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, we worked closely with PACOM and sister Embassies in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Colombo to develop a regional maritime security architecture to improve communications, domain awareness and intercept capabilities in the waters surrounding Southeast Asia. The Thai portion of the initiative, approved by Congress but suspended as part of coup sanctions, was a layered approach to assist the Thai military secure territorial waters while also providing coverage of the northern shipping lanes feeding into the Strait of Malacca. Encouragingly, the Thai Cabinet January 23 earmarked funding to support maritime patrols in conjunction with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in the Straits of Malacca. We intend to work closely with the democratically elected Thai government on maritime security. PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS -------------- ¶18. (C) Thailand has been an active contributor in peacekeeping missions; best known for leading forces in the UNTAET mission in East Timor. The Thai government last year committed to deploying a battalion of peacekeeping troops to Darfur but the Government of Sudan has so far refused to agree to allow the United Nations to include Thailand as troop contributing country for UNAMID. The Royal Thai Supreme Command also has ambitious plans to develop a regional peacekeeping operations center. DEFENSE REFORM -------------- ¶19. (C) Royal Thai Supreme Commander General Boonsrang Niumpradit, your primary interlocutor for your visit, has been a key proponent of defense reform and was the driver for Thailand's acceptance of the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS). With the Phase One assessment complete, we are hopeful the military leadership continues with Phase Two to design and adopt better resource management processes. THE ROLE OF THE ARMY -------------- ¶20. (C) The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is a legacy force faced with serious modernization issues. The RTA is still primarily designed to defeat the large conventional threat that Vietnam represented in the mid-1980's. On paper, the RTA would seem to possess the capability to defeat a large conventional attack -- however, it is plagued by an almost universally low operational readiness rate. ¶21. (C) Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the Asian Financial Crisis. Since that time, budgets have increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels. Increasing the military budget shortfall was a key focus of the interim government, allowing all the services to improve their capabilities. The increase in the military's budget, during a period of economic uncertainty, was controversial and resulted in RTA plans to purchase Ukrainian armored personnel carriers and Israeli rifles. The Samak government has yet to signal its intentions regarding military spending. ¶22. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are perfect training partners for the RTA and field exercises in Thailand afford our Marines many opportunities they do not have elsewhere in Asia. THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶23. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force. The RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less open with U.S. counterparts. Prior to the coup, we were working more closely with the RTN on potential projects like the 1206 Andaman Sea Maritime Security Initiative and worked with PACFLT and Seventh Fleet to increase the tempo of U.S. Navy ship visits. U.S. aircraft carrier visits were well received by the RTN, received front page and prime time media coverage, and were successful opportunities to demonstrate the benefits of the U.S.-Thai security relationship. Recently, the Chinese have improved their ties to the RTN as mentioned above. Likewise, the RTN has been developing a closer relationship with the Indian Navy and has conducted some exercises with the Indians. ¶24. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities. For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand. This NSW relationship was compellingly demonstrated during the tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts. The Prime Minister was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the SEALS. Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai SEALS are not well-supported by senior RTN officials. THE AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶25. (C) The RTAF has very close ties to the USAF. Training in F-16 and C-130 programs has established a solid history of cooperation and shared expertise and experience. The annual COPE TIGER flight training exercise among the United States, Thailand and Singapore is the largest joint/combined air combat exercise in Thailand. The RTAF recently agreed to purchase Saab JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters and Saab 340 Erieye AWACS aircraft to replace their F-5 fleet. The Gripen is fully NATO compatible and will contain significant US technology. We are urging the RTAF to proceed with a Mid-Life Upgrade for existing F-16A/B planes or procure new F-16C/Ds for future fighter jet requirements for interoperability reasons. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT -------------- ¶26. (C) We look forward to meeting with you when you come to Bangkok and to sharing views on how best to promote our strategic interests in Thailand. In your meetings with Thai officials, we suggest you emphasize that Thailand is a valued partner and that the U.S. stands ready to assist the Thai military in moving forward on defense reform via the DRMS process and in establishing a regional leadership role. JOHN