AMBASSADOR AND FORMER PM ANAND DISCUSS ELECTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000487 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FORMER PM ANAND DISCUSS ELECTION, BURMA, AND U.S. ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BANGKOK 00000487 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun spoke with deep pessimism about the new Thai administration. In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, Anand complained that he saw no alternative to the dominance of pro-Thaksin politicians, whom he considered poorly qualified and lacking in legitimacy. Anand declined to speculate about the new administration's policy toward the South. When the Ambassador emphasized the importance of improving the political situation in Burma, Anand sought to discourage the USG from focusing on the Thai-Burma relationship; instead, he encouraged the USG to work with an independently-minded Japan to help ensure that China and India do not exert excessive influence over Southeast Asia. End Summary. DISGUSTED AND DISCOURAGED -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun welcomed the Ambassador for an introductory call on February 12. After an exchange of pleasantries, Anand expressed in strong terms his dismay with the December 2007 election results and with the administration of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej. He called this "the least trustworthy government ever," deploring the influence of figures outside of the formal government (read: deposed PM Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates). Citing Samak's false claim to the international media that only one person died during a period of POLITICAL upheaval in 1976, Anand deplored Samak for having "no respect for the truth," and he characterized Samak as having politically self-destructive tendencies. ¶3. (C) Anand lamented that the cabinet consisted largely of "nominees" -- people put forward by former Thai Rak Thai officials who were themselves ineligible to hold government posts because of the May ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal. Anand envisioned the cabinet members dividing up the spoils that traditionally accrue to office-holders in Thailand. He denounced Interior Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung as a "criminal." Acknowledging the popular support in rural areas for Thaksin, Samak, and their cohorts, Anand complained that in the current climate he could envision no viable alternative, and Thailand could end up like Zimbabwe under President Mugabe. Thai voters who had elected the PPP government were "gullible" and "damn stupid," Anand despaired. THE SOUTH -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Anand believed that his National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) report might become the basis for the new administration's policies toward southern provinces plagued by separatist violence. Anand admitted he did not know how the new administration would formulate its policy toward the South. Thaksin's government did not have time to implement NRC recommendations (the NRC issued its report in June 2006, just a few months before the coup). The Surayud administration tried to heed the NRC's recommendations but did not make sufficient efforts. Anand admitted that he was not currently in contact with decision makers on this matter and mostly received his information from the media. BURMA -------------- ¶5. (C) The POLITICAL situation in Burma would inevitably affect U.S.-Thai relations, the Ambassador explained; the USG would pay attention to Thailand's actions, and Thai public statements encouraging democratic reforms in Burma would be welcome. Anand indicated he had little hope for positive BANGKOK 00000487 002.2 OF 002 developments in Burma in the near future, saying nothing the USG could do would influence domestic conditions there. The Burmese junta may be misguided, Anand assessed, but they were proud and "not stupid." Anand said the USG would be better off trying to deal with Burma in an ASEAN context, rather than pressing ASEAN members on Burma, which could have the unfortunate effect of increasing Chinese and Indian influence in Burma. The Ambassador stressed this was a high-level priority for the USG. CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN -------------- ¶6. (C) Anand commended the Chinese government for effective use of "soft power," particularly in Southeast Asia. China was devoting much attention to the region, and many Thais had a positive view of China. Anand encouraged the Ambassador to help to bring high-level USG officials to the region, saying a U.S. presence in Southeast Asia was essential and in America's interest, given projections of strong economic and population growth in the region in the next 15 years. Anand believed that the U.S. and Japan -- especially if Japan positioned itself as increasingly independent of the U.S. -- would help to provide balance that would offset what would otherwise prove to be overwhelming influence on the part of China and India. The Ambassador agreed that the USG had important interests in Southeast Asia, had taken note of China's increasing influence, and encouraged Japan to play a positive role in the region. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) In a revealing moment, Anand quipped dismissively that Samak's administration's only claim to legitimacy was that his party had won the election. Anand clearly does not believe that Samak and his crew are capable of good (much less wise) governance. Time may prove Anand correct, but he nevertheless should acknowledge that a peaceful transition back to rule by elected leaders is a positive and necessary step back toward POLITICAL normalcy -- even if the Thai majority's preference differs from Anand's. JOHN