AMBASSADOR ENGAGES NEW THAI PM ABHISIT ON HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003700 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WILDER, PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES NEW THAI PM ABHISIT ON HIS PRIORITIES, ECONOMIC CHALLENGES, BURMA, AND BOUT REF: A. BANGKOK 3695 ¶B. BANGKOK 3648 ¶C. BANGKOK 2882 (SOMCHAI) ¶D. BANGKOK 340 (SAMAK) ¶E. STATE 131474 (ASEAN CONGRATS) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and political counselor, met new Thai PM Abhisit Vejjavija late December 18 to congratulate him and lay the groundwork for our engagement with the next Thai government in advance of the rollout of the new Cabinet. Abhisit said his most urgent task was healing the political rift in the country; his administration would introduce a fiscal stimulus package in January with a particular eye on the north and northeast, traditional bastions of support for ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra. The new Cabinet lineup would be announced December 19. Ambassador raised the current state of the economy in both countries and emerging labor problems at some U.S. investments in Thailand, our desire for a successful extradition of Russian arms-trafficker Viktor Bout once the Thai judicial process ran its course, and interest in finding ways for more effective cooperation to promote positive change in Burma. ¶2. (C) Comment: As a next generation leader born and educated abroad (in the UK),Abhisit cuts a much different image than previous Thai PMs. Whether he is able to capitalize on his oratory, good looks, and "clean" reputation, given the circumstances of his ascension to office, the nature of the cobbled-together coalition he must lead, and the challenges he and the country face, remains an open question. He is the fourth Prime Minister for Thailand this year, a sign of the fractions political scene here. On foreign policy, the Democrat Party traditionally has been more flexible on issues like Burma and promotion of human rights, as policy under the Chuan-Surin team from 1997-2000 demonstrated. There will likely be room on the margins for some improvement in cooperation, but Abhisit's response and body language underscored that we are unlikely to see any dramatic reversals. End Summary and Comment. Abhisit - third PM's the charm? -------------- ¶3. (C) For the third time in 2008, Ambassador met a newly endorsed Thai PM prior to formal establishment of a cabinet: PM Samak Sundaravej (February, ref D),PM Somchai Wongsawat (September, ref C),and now PM Abhisit Vejjavija. The meeting took place in the Queen Sirikit Convention Center, where President Bush addressed a Thai audience including then-opposition leader Abhisit in August. Abhisit explained that he will not start working out of Government House, the formal seat of government, until his Cabinet has been sworn in, expected early the week of December 22. Ambassador congratulated Abhisit on becoming Prime Minister, a great step for Abhisit, his party, and the democratic process, given some of the alternatives discussed over the past several months. Abhisit replied that he hoped to make it a victory for the nation by delivering good governance. ¶4. (C) Abhisit said that his TOP priority would be "healing the rift" in the country; from day one, he would reach out to reassure "those who would wear red shirts" (a reference to Thaksin supporters) that he would work for their interests as well. His government intended to roll out a large fiscal stimulus package in Jannuary, necessary given the current economic conditions, which could address problems faced by the upcountry populace. In addition to continuing policies initiated by Thaksin, the package would fund some of the Democrat Party priorities, such as free education and assistance to the elderly, plus two-three new programs still to be developed. ¶5. (SBU) Another early priority would be pushing through parliamentary approval for a raft of ASEAN-related agreements, including various free trade pacts, Abhisit stated. Thailand would be ready to host the rescheduled ASEAN summits as early as late January. The February 24-26 dates announced in Jakarta December 15 might not work due to BANGKOK 00003700 002 OF 003 Brunei National Day; mid-February now appeared a more likely date, though both Japan and Singapore had raised parliamentary budget review scheduling conflicts. The MFA had not yet set whether the summits would be held in Bangkok or Chiang Mai, he added. Coalition Cabinet and Thaksin's influence -------------- ¶6. (C) Abhisit acknowledged that his new Cabinet would have some "new friends" in it, in addition to the "old friends" the U.S. knew well, the former a reference to the minority partners, including the defectors from the pro-Thaksin party led by banned former Thai Rak Thai executive Newin Chidchob. He acknowledged that, after the initial negotiations to form the coalition, there had been some "surprises" during the voting December 15 which elected Abhisit PM that had required adjustments in the distribution of Cabinet portfolios. He did not offer a prediction on how well the new team would gel, stating that would become clearer once they started meeting as a unit the week of December 22. ¶7. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about the extent of Thaksin's continuing influence, Abhisit noted that the redshirt fundraiser held December 17, to which Thaksin phoned in (ref A),was less well-attended than he had anticipated. The December 13 outdoor redshirt rally had a good turnout, but redshirt efforts deteriorated thereafter, with an ugly confrontation outside parliament December 15 (ref B). Ambassador noted that Thai authorities had issued arrest warrants for those captured on tape using rocks to smash the windshields of MP cars exiting the compound, citing it as the kind of effort needed to restore law and order. Abhisit nodded. Economic Crises and impact on Investment -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador explained how, during his November trip to the northeast, the governors of Udon and Khon Khaen had expressed concern about the localized impact of returning migrant workers who no longer had employment opportunities around Bangkok and the Asian region. Abhisit nodded, adding that he had spent the previous day meeting with farmers about low crop prices and employer and employee groups about how best to deal with the economic downturn while avoiding labor unrest. Ambassador suggested that governmental guaranteed price supports for crops set earlier in the year now posed a large fiscal drain on the budget. Abhisit agreed, and said his government would push the legal limits of allowable deficit spending to help the Thai economy through the current downturn. ¶9. (C) Ambassador raised the US-Thai economic agenda, starting with U.S. investment in Thailand. While the levels of new investment had dropped considerably in 2008, in part due to conditions in the U.S., the unsettled political situation in Thailand the past six months had taken its toll. Of specific concern for current investment was labor unrest, and some unions' resort to illegal coercive action rather than available dispute resolution mechanisms. Abhisit immediately agreed, reiterating that he had delivered the message to both employer and employee groups the day prior to maintain good labor relations in the current environment. Waiting for a Thai Ambassador, Viktor Bout -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador stressed the importance of Thailand sending a new Ambassador to Washington to replace former Ambassador Krit, who had been recalled in May to work at the Palace. Thailand's interests suffered in the interim. Abhisit agreed, and said the long-delayed Ambassadorial rotation should be resolved in the near future. ¶11. (C) Ambassador raised U.S. interest in Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, charged with attempting to sell weapons to a terrorist organization intent on attacking U.S. citizens, being extradited to the U.S. once the Thai judicial process concluded. Abhisit, who did not appear familiar with BANGKOK 00003700 003 OF 003 the case, asked if there had been any problems. Ambassador emphasized that there had not been, though Bout of course had sought all avenues, both inside the court process and outside of it, to secure his freedom and departure from Thailand. The U.S. understood the extradition process took time, but it was important to Washington that Bout eventually be extradited to the U.S. Abhisit nodded, and an aide made a note. Burma -------------- ¶12. (C) Ambassador looked forward to engaging the new Foreign Minister, once named, on the foreign policy agenda; he predicted the incoming U.S. administration would be as equally determined as the outgoing one to pursue change in Burma, given bipartisan support for U.S. Burma policy. The U.S. understood Thailand faced a number of challenges in managing its relationship with its troublesome neighbor, but we hoped there would be additional flexibility in Thai Burma policy under Abhisit's administration. Abhisit said he agreed on the need for complementary approaches, and that it was a good sign for U.S.-Thai relations that diplomatic conversations had turned to ASEAN and Burma, not just the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). POTUS Photo and ASEAN letter delivered -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Note: Ambassador passed the signed photo of the President shaking Abhisit's hand after the August speech delivered in the same Queen Sirikit Center; the photo had serendipitously arrived via pouch the week prior. After the meeting concluded and Abhisit and the Ambassador made comments to the waiting press, Abhisit's aides held up the photo for the press to see and take pictures. Ambassador also passed to Abhisit the Secretary's congratulations on the signing of the ASEAN Charter (ref E). JOHN