Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3618
2008-12-11 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES AS VOTE FOR

Tags:  PGOV KDEM TH 
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1248
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6606
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9281
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1821
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 5960
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003618 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES AS VOTE FOR
PM APPROACHES

REF: A. BANGKOK 3585 (DEMOCRATS PREPARE)

B. BANGKOK 3529 (PPP DISSOLVED)

C. 07 BANGKOK 4905 (EX-TRT FORM PARTY)

BANGKOK 00003618 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4
(b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003618 SIPDIS NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAI POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES AS VOTE FOR PM APPROACHES REF: A. BANGKOK 3585 (DEMOCRATS PREPARE) ¶B. BANGKOK 3529 (PPP DISSOLVED) ¶C. 07 BANGKOK 4905 (EX-TRT FORM PARTY) BANGKOK 00003618 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Thai politicians appear to remain engaged in coalition-building maneuvers in advance of the House of Representatives election of a new Prime Minister, likely to take place on December 15. While Democrat Party Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva appears to be the frontrunner, we do not rule out the possibility of the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party securing majority support for its candidate, who remains undetermined. The role of the military in political negotiations remains unclear; a pro-Thaksin figure alleged the Army Commander helped finance the Democrats' efforts, and that a Constitutional Court judge demoralized Puea Thai's potential allies. Pro-Thaksin "redshirts" are scheduled to hold a large rally in Bangkok on December 13, likely involving Thaksin's participation by phone from abroad. Pro-Thaksin figures have said publicly they will demonstrate at the parliament in order to show their displeasure with Abhisit's possible election as PM. The anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has remained relatively quiet since ending its protests on December 3. End Summary and Comment. PM ELECTION SOON... -------------- ¶2. (C) Arsa Sarasin, Principal Private Secretary to King Bhumibol, told the Ambassador on the afternoon of December 11 that the King had just signed the royal command that would allow the House of Representatives to convene an extraordinary session to elect a new Prime Minister. Earlier, House Speaker Chai Chidchob has said publicly he would convene the House within three days of the issuance of the royal command. Most political observers now expect the election on Monday, December 15. ... BUT POLITICIANS CONTINUE TO MANEUVER -------------- ¶3. (C) The coalition announced by the Democrat Party and its newfound allies on December 6 (ref A) seems to remain intact, according to media reports. The pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party (PT) appears to have turned to Sanoh Thienthong, the TOP figure in the Pracharaj Party (the
smallest in the House),to build support for a "government of national unity" that includes the PT (if not a PT-centered coalition that excludes the Democrats). On December 10, Sanoh assembled the press corps at his residence for a "national unity" dinner with leading figures from other parties invited, only to be humiliated when none of the other politicians outside of ex-PM Somchai and PT figures came. (Comment: Sanoh was a key veteran backroom dealmaker in the 1990s but has lost his touch in recent years; in 2007, he assembled a coalition of former Thai Rak Thai figures -- ref C -- only to have that collapse immediately thereafter. End Comment.) ¶4. (C) Sanoh's unsuccessful efforts aside, all indications are that Puea Thai has not given up the fight. Bangkok daily "The Nation" quoted an anonymous source who claimed MPs could receive up to 55 million Baht (approximately $1.6 million) by signing up as Puea Thai members and voting for the PT candidate for Prime Minister, who remains undetermined. (Note: The PT has few senior figures left in the parliament; most senior pro-Thaksin legislators were on the People's Power Party (PPP) executive board and were barred from politics for five years by the Constitutional Court's December 2 ruling (ref B). Press reports credibly indicated that the PT was willing to offer the Prime Ministership to a coalition partner in order to prevail in the competition with the Democrats. End Note.) BANGKOK 00003618 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (SBU) The media has reported that pressure from the PT is sufficiently intense that some members of the Newin Chidchob faction of PPP, which defected to the Democrats, have had to sequester themselves outside of Bangkok. The Democrats are presumably also contending with demands from leaders of the various factions within their partner parties. REDSHIRT RALLIES -------------- ¶6. (C) It remains unclear whether Thaksin will publicly appeal to MPs to rally to his side. Pro-Thaksin "redshirt" demonstrators have planned a large rally in Bangkok on December 13, and PT figures have said Thaksin would weigh in at that event by phone. Such a move could have a significant impact. Conventional wisdom holds that Thaksin remains highly popular in the North and Northeast, and many MPs would have reason to fear that siding with the Democrats -- who remain highly unpopular in the Northeast -- could jeopardize their chances for reelection. There also have been press reports of Thaksin supporters in the Northeast showing acrimony toward Newin and his faction of defectors. ¶7. (SBU) Several "redshirt" leaders spoke at a Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand event on December 9. They claimed they had stressed to their followers the need to remain nonviolent and not to arm themselves, but they provided the disclaimer that they could not fully control all their sympathizers. They spoke of possibly fighting some form of "civil war" in order to protect democracy in Thailand, and they indicated that a Democrat victory in the parliament would reflect Army interference in politics, tantamount to a coup. The redshirts may hold a demonstration at the parliament at the time of the extraordinary session, according to press reports. The anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD),meanwhile, has not organized rallies since the December 3 conclusion of its demonstration at Bangkok's airports. THE ALLEGED ROLES OF THE ARMY AND THE COURT -------------- ¶8. (C) Various political figures and commentators have alleged that the Army played a role in building the Democrat-centered coalition, though evidence is hard to come by. Thaksin loyalist Jakrapob Penkair alleged to us on December 9 that Army Commander Anupong Paojinda had financed the defections from the PPP coalition to the Democrats, providing 25-30 million Baht per head (over $700,000),though this claim has not surfaced elsewhere. When asked whether he had heard reports of the Army coercing politicians -- which, unlike monetary payoffs, would contravene political traditions -- Jakrapob said he had heard no such stories, adding that Anupong was not the type to threaten. ¶9. (C) Jakrapob alleged that, in addition to the Army, the Constitutional Court also had a significant impact on coalition negotiations. He said one of the Constitutional Court Justices had assured politicians that the Court would rule that legislators elected by virtue of their position on the party list of the now-defunct PPP would not be entitled to vote in the election for Prime Minister, since they had not won their seats in the capacity of an individual candidate. Jakrapob claimed that this news -- that the pro-Thaksin side would lose the votes of all 33 party-list PPP MPs -- crippled the PT's negotiations and gave the Democrats valuable momentum. (Note: Senate PresidentPrasobsook Boondech subsequently declined to forward a petition by 40 Senators for a court review of status of the party list MPs, saying the Senate did not have standing to initiate such a review. End Note.) JOHN

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