AMBASSADOR AND FM SOMPONG DISCUSS CHOICES FACING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003522

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FM SOMPONG DISCUSS CHOICES FACING
PM SOMCHAI

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador engaged FM Sompong Amornvivat
December 1 on the ongoing political crisis and the choices
facing PM Somchai Wongsawat. Sompong said that there would
be informal discussions on the margins of a December 2
Cabinet meeting to be held in Chiang Mai about whether
Somchai should resign and call new elections, even before an
expected Constitutional Court decision disbands the ruling
People's Power Party (PPP) and forces PM Somchai to step
down. Sompong asked Ambassador for advice on the way
forward; Ambassador counseled that the government needed to
ensure law and order, and the ruling party probably only had
one shot to use a resignation or court decision to convince
the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) to end its
occupation of Bangkok's airports peacefully. Sompong shared
Ambassador's doubts about how much various members of the
monarchy truly supported the PAD, as claimed by both the PAD
and the "red" pro-government forces. In a follow-on meeting,
Ambassador raised U.S. concerns with the lack of law and
order in connection to both the current airport standoff and
a worrisome investment development on the Eastern Seaboard
with MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul. End Summary.

What comes next: Cabinet meeting, parade
--------------


2. (C) In the presence of MFA and embassy notetakers, FM
Sompong told Ambassador that he would fly to Chiang Mai later
December 1 for the Cabinet meeting December 2 at 0900. The
Cabinet, including PM Somchai, would then return to Bangkok
in order to attend the King's Birthday parade the evening of
December 2. Sompong said he would convey the concerns of the
private sector, particularly the need for law and order, to
PM Somchai late on December 1. Somchai faced a decision on
what to do next, in particular whether he should resign and
dissolve parliament, as Army GEN Anupong had suggested. The
pressure to make a decision was increasing, Sompong asserted.
The longer the current situation drew out, the worse it was
for the government and country. FM Sompong thanked
Ambassador for the constructive U.S. statement issued
November 28.

Way Forward: Sompong asks for advice; Somchai unsure
-------------- --------------


3. (S) In an extended one-on-one session, FM Sompong brought
the Ambassador to his private office and asked him for
friendly advice on the way forward, recognizing that the
Constitutional Court would likely soon rule against the PPP.
Ambassador acknowledged that a forceful removal of the PAD
from the airports would be counterproductive, but stressed
that the government needed to ensure law and order and be
prepared to defend other infrastructure. In terms of the
political dynamics, Ambassador noted neither side was
blameless in the current standoff. The PAD's transgressions
were clear, but the government had not done itself any favors
by attempting to ram through constitutional changes without
meaningful discussion, more specifically amendments designed
to assist those accused of crimes. Just because the
coalition had won a majority in the election did not mean it
should completely ignore the minority's views. Sompong said
he agreed.


4. (S) PM Somchai was unsure what to do next, FM Sompong
continued. Somchai might have a soft image, but he was
resilient, and did not want to give up. However, Sompong
planned to suggest to Somchai that he consider resigning and
calling new elections. Sompong had met with the private
sector earlier December 1. The business community had two
messages: the government must ensure law and order; and if it
could not, Somchai should resign. Somchai was torn between
resigning and staying on. Ambassador noted that the Court
decision might FORCE the issue imminently any way; Sompong
agreed that was probably true.


5. (S) Ambassador noted that the ruling party really had only
one shot to resolve the impasse with the PAD peacefully, in
the aftermath of the upcoming court decision. Handled
correctly, the PAD might be induced to walk out peacefully

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from the airports. The alternative--bloodshed, an extended
inability to access Bangkok's airports, and a ripple effect
of violence with impunity elsewhere in Thailand--would be
disastrous for the country. The government needed to find
someone who could speak to the PAD, perhaps Privy Council
Chair Prem, to get them to vacate the airports were the
government to resign. Broadening representation in the next
government, even if the opposition Democrat Party were not
formally a part of a coalition, would show a change in
government would not just be another opportunity for the
pro-Thaksin FORCE to keep the current constellation locked
in. Sompong said part of the problem was that the PAD
insisted it would only negotiate with Somchai.

Role of the Queen/monarchy with PAD overblown?
-------------- -


6. (S) FM Sompong asked Ambassador what he thought of the
PAD's claim to have royal support, particularly from the
Queen. Ambassador expressed doubt, suggesting that both the
PAD and the pro-government red forces exaggerated the
connection for their own purposes and messaging to their
respective bases. King Bhumibol appeared neutral and above
the fray; Crown Princess Sirindthorn had clearly expressed
her views while in the U.S. in early October that the PAD was
acting for itself, not on behalf of the monarchy. Sompong
expressed agreement; he did not see the alleged solid
connection either.

Raising concerns with PermSec Virasakdi
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador met MFA Permsec Virasakdi Futrakul after
the Sompong meeting concluded. Ambassador expressed
appreciation for the military's reassurances that there would
be no coup. The U.S. understood the government's approach to
resolving the airport sieges without resort to force, since
that could lead to bloodshed and damage to the airports that
could keep them inoperable for an extended time. The PAD
action had created a serious situation for stranded Amcit
travelers; the Embassy might need MFA assistance in securing
extra slots at Utapao if Northwest and United added
additional flights. Virasak replied that Thai authorities
were planning on opening up the Khorat AIR field to charter
flights.


8. (C) Ambassador raised concerns that Thai authorities,
particularly law enforcement personnel, seemed ill prepared
for any additional PAD action targeting critical
infrastructures. The PAD had signaled its intent to take
over the airports days prior to initiating action. Their
threats to blockade ports and cut utilities like electricity
and telecoms should be taken seriously, but there seemed to
be no contingency planning. Ambassador urged the RTG to
examine ways of protecting facilities rather than waiting
until the PAD's next move. Virasak said he would pass the
message to appropriate ministries but noted that sympathetic
state-owned enterprise workers could do damage to
infrastructure from the inside, obviating the need for PAD
demonstrators.


9. (C) Ambassador raised the separate concern of an
industrial action at the Ford plant in Rayong. Plant
employees dissatisfied with negotiations seemingly took a
page out of the PAD playbook, blockading the factory November
27, locking in 1000 employees, and damaging some equipment.
When Ford management asked the police to intervene, the
police refused, suggesting management work out the problems
internally. This was an unacceptable and worrisome
development, the Ambassador stressed, with implications for
other businesses along the Eastern Seaboard and Thailand's
investment climate reputation. The U.S. understood the
current political crisis dominated Thai official attention,
but we wanted to be able to maintain the close U.S.
relationship with Thailand, not only the long-standing
alliance but also our productive trade and investment
relationship. Virasak promised to pass the message of
concern to the Ministry of Industry.
JOHN