STALEMATE, LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT: BANGKOK AIRPORTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003504 SIPDIS NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC CASC TH SUBJECT: STALEMATE, LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT: BANGKOK AIRPORTS REMAIN SHUT, THAI PRIME MINISTER DECLARES EMERGENCY REF: OSC REPORT SEP20081127042008 (SOMCHAI'S SPEECH) BANGKOK 00003504 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Bangkok's international and domestic airports remain closed as of COB November 28 due to continuing anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests, with no clear path out of the stalemate in the offing. Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat on November 27 declared a state of emergency covering the airports and gave police officials authority in the matter, but police plans are unclear. PM Somchai fired police chief Patcharawat late November 28, leading to speculation he wanted somone who would take action. Ambassador engaged two leading Privy Councilors about the possibility of King Bhumibol's intervention in the national interest, but they rejected the option and vowed to "protect" him from becoming involved in the political crisis; as in the past, the King would only intervene after significant bloodshed. Ambassador and other mission officials continue to stress privately USG opposition to a coup. The MFA and Tourism Ministry plan to assist stranded foreigners. Thailand may not host the mid-December ASEAN Summit as planned. The Embassy has expanded staffing outside of regular working hours in order to field calls from inconvenienced Amcits. Septels will report on Ambassador's late November 28 meeting with deputy RTA Commander Jiradej and the economic impact of the airport closures. ¶2. (C) Comment: The best, though least likely option, would be a peaceful resolution of the airport occupation through voluntary PAD departure so as to avoid damage to the airport that might further hinder operations. Post recommends issuing a statement condemning the PAD's occupation of the airports and urging the PAD to walk away peacefully; suggested text has been emailed to EAP/MLS and EAP/P. As of early evening November 28, the authorities have not moved to forcibly evict protestors from the airports. We believe the police are following standard procedures and are starting with an attempted negotiation before escalating to the use of force. PAD leaders have committed themselves publicly to bringing down the current government; some PAD supporters are armed, and there is a widespread sense that the police will not be able to clear the protest sites easily. Both politicians and security officials appear to hope to avoid responsibility for the deaths or injuries that could ensue if the police move forcefully against the PAD. It is difficult to predict how various key actors will react as this crisis deepens. End Summary and Comment. PM DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY, SACKS POLICE CHIEF -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Faced with continuing People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protests that have closed Bangkok's international and domestic airports, Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat on the night of November 27 announced a limited state of emergency (ref OSC report),in accordance with the provisions of Thailand's 2005 Emergency Decree. The state of emergency applies only to the vicinities of the airports, not to the entire Bangkok metropolitan area. Stressing the economic impact of the airport closures, Somchai announced that he had placed Minister of Interior Kowit Wattana, former Commissioner of the Royal Thai Police, in overall charge of the situation; other police commanders would be responsible for the airports, and they would receive assistance from elements of the Air Force and Navy. ¶4. (SBU) Note: Somchai sacked National Police chief Patcharawat Wongsuwan late on November 28, the police spokesman confirmed to us. Details are not yet available. However, in the run-up to the October 7 police clearance operation against a PAD blockade of parliament, sparking a day of violence that left two dead and hundreds injured, PM Somchai reportedly had to order Patcharawat to conduct the BANGKOK 00003504 002.2 OF 004 clearance operation or face dismissal. That may suggest Patcharawat was resisting carrying out a similar clearance operation at the airports, and Somchai wanted someone who would. Police sources indicated to us early November 28 that they felt they lacked the capacity to conduct the operations. NO WAY OUT? PAD DEFIANT; KING NOT IN PLAY -------------- ¶5. (U) PAD leader Chamlong told supporters at an airport stage November 28 that an important person (phu jai in Thai) had asked him to stop the protest, but that he had replied it was too late to do so, for the nation's sake. Chamlong vowed that the PAD occupation of the airports would continue until Somchai stepped down and warned of a massive uprising by PAD supporters if core leaders were arrested. A fellow leader acknowledged additional "lightly armed" guards were reinforcing PAD presence at the two airports in anticipation of police action. Several trucks bearing a medical logo/red cross were caught on video unloading weapons at Suwannaphum airport late November 28. ¶6. (S) At this point, perhaps the best option for a non-violent, peaceful resolution of the current crises, both airport occupation and political stalemate, would be for the Thai King to intervene. Such extraordinary intervention, technically outside the constitution, has happened twice before in the King's 62 year reign: in 1973 and 1992. With this in mind, Ambassador separately engaged the two most politically active Privy Councilors November 28, Privy Council Chair Prem Titsulanonda and ACM Siddhi Savetsila, suggesting that the King's intervention now could prevent bloodshed and resolve the crisis in the national interest. ¶7. (S) Both Prem and Siddhi said such intervention would not happen, and that they would act to protect the King from being dragged into the political crisis. Prem stated that the King could intervene after bloodshed occurred, but not prior. Prem lamented the stalemates -- between the PAD and government, and the government and military -- but did not offer any solutions. Both circled back time and time again to Thaksin; the real problem in this crisis was not the PAD and the airport occupation, but Thaksin, who would not admit/accept his guilt, and would use every resource at his disposal to fight to the end. Prem said that for the King's intervention to be effective, as it was in 1992, Thaksin and Chamlong needed to be in the room; Somchai and Chamlong would not solve the matter. ¶8. (S) Prem in particular seemed crestfallen by Ambassador's depiction of the international mood vis-a-vis the PAD and the airport occupation, and the explanation of how actions by the PAD, which claims to act in defense of the monarchy, were actually actively undermining the monarchy's standing at a critical moment. Prem countered that it was Thaksin who was damaging the monarchy. ¶9. (C) Siddhi echoed the same themes, while acknowledging that a Privy Council meeting November 26 concluded that the situation would worsen; they feared bloodshed, particularly if the pro-Thaksin redshirts swung into action. Time worked against the PAD, said Siddhi. The best option would be for the PAD to abandon the airports and return to Government House, but he was not optimistic that they would do so. Siddhi thought it possible that the Constitutional Court might rule to dissolve Somchai's ruling People's Power Party (PPP) December 2-3, which would offer a way out. Prem, however, suggested the Court wished to call several more witnesses, and that a decision was not imminent. COUP RUMORS FLY, BUT REMAIN RUMINT -------------- ¶10. (C) Throughout November 27, Embassy contacts from various sectors conveyed to us rumors of an impending coup, with conventional wisdom holding that the Army would most likely move against the government if Somchai were to remove General BANGKOK 00003504 003.2 OF 004 Anupong Paojinda from his position as Army Commander. The Ambassador spoke on November 27 with former Defense Ministry Permanent Secretary General (ret) Winai Phattiyakul, a player in the 2006 coup; Winai, like other high-level contacts, believed it necessary to resolve the airport situation quickly, but he readily agreed when the Ambassador stressed that the Army should not respond to the crisis by launching a coup. Other Embassy officials made the same point with military and civilian contacts. Colonel Saranyu Viriyavejakul, Anupong's Aide-de-Camp, repeatedly assured us that the Army was neither launching a coup nor seeking to intimidate the government, and that Army leaders continued to conduct their routine affairs. In his public address on the night of November 27, Somchai emphasized that the Army had done nothing out of the ordinary. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador also stressed the undesirability of a coup in phone conversations on November 27 with Arsa Sarasin (King Bhumibol's Principal Private Secretary) and MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul. Both promised to forward the Ambassador's views to the relevant authorities. Arsa noted that the PAD was trying ardently to provoke a coup that would lead to the formation of a new government that would include PAD figures. Arsa claimed not to know the King's views on the situation, but he said the King could not intervene in a situation where he might be seen as supporting one social group over another. ¶12. (SBU) A spokesman for General Anupong has stressed publicly that the Army has been assigned only a supporting role in responding to the crisis and would not deploy troops in any crowd dispersing action, which have been left to the police. General Anupong has stressed that troops will show restraint in all activities, all actions must comply with the rule of law and principles of democracy, and conflict must be resolved by the political leadership, not the military. LACK OF TOURISM ASSISTANCE BOTHERS DIPCORPS -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Foreign Minister Somphong Amornwiwat -- stranded in Frankfurt by the airport closures -- told the Ambassador by phone November 27 that the RTG planned to restore law and order by opening the airport soon, but did not know if the RTG had a plan. A late November 27 MFA briefing for the diplomatic corps attended by Ambassador and poloff delivered the same pledge. The MFA was contemplating a plan to provide a 2,000 Baht (approximately 60 USD) daily food and lodging allowance for stranded travelers. The RTG was contemplating opening the Utapao Naval Air Station airfield for commercial flights normally scheduled for Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi airport. Some commercial flights operated out of Utapao November 28 (Comment: Utapao, 140 kilometers from Bangkok, lacks the facilities to substitute for Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi airport for large scale commercial operations. End Comment.) ¶14. (SBU) At the briefing, numerous irate European Ambassadors expressed deep frustration with the RTG. Citing the increasing number of Europeans stranded in Thailand, the diplomats angrily urged the MFA to devise a plan to help foreigners and encouraged the RTG to retake Bangkok's airports by force if necessary. The Japanese Ambassador, also agitated, noted that there were 22 daily flights scheduled from Bangkok to Japan, and every day that the airport remained closed resulted in approximately 2-3,000 additional stranded Japanese citizens. (note: the Minister of Tourism has convened a briefing at 1830 November 28 to clarify what the RTG will do for stranded tourists). ¶15. (C) Following the briefing, the Ambassador talked with Virasakdi Futrakul, who had just received a demarche from the EU Troika. Virasakdi explained that the EU diplomats had stressed that the EU would react very negatively to a coup, including by revoking visas of the Thai military leadership. Virasakdi said the Europeans had emphasized that using force to clear protestors from the airport would be less damaging to Thailand's reputation than launching a coup. Virasakdi BANGKOK 00003504 004.2 OF 004 told the Ambassador that he passed along the Europeans' views to Army Commander Anupong. ¶16. (SBU) There also has been public speculation that the RTG will postpone or cancel its plan to host the December 15-18 ASEAN Summit. Foreign Minister Somphong told Ambassador that he favored postponement, but he had not yet proposed this to the Prime Minister. (Note: The RTG had already shifted the summit's venue from Bangkok to Chiang Mai, in order to minimize the impact of anti-government protests. End Note.) SHOTS FIRED, VIGILANTE KILLING -------------- ¶17. (SBU) There continue to be press reports of small explosions and gunfire in the vicinity of PAD demonstrations. There have been no reports of people being injured in these incidents in the last 24 hours. The pro-government United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) warned late November 28 that if security forces did not move to clear the airport by midnight, the UDD might take matters into their own hands November 29. A red mob did exactly that the evening of November 26 in Chiang Mai, pulling the father of a radio station manager sympathetic to the PAD out of his car in front of the station, beating him and then shooting him. CONSULAR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶18. (U) The Consular section continues to assist stranded American citizens. The ACS section will be staffed 7 AM to 7 PM both Saturday and Sunday to field calls. JOHN