Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK3426
2008-11-20 10:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE

Tags:  PGOV ASEC TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003426 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV ASEC TH
SUBJECT: LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE

REF: A. BANGKOK 3386 (THAKSIN'S DIVORCE)

B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN ADDRESSES RALLY)

C. BANGKOK 3255 (GRENADE ATTACKS)

D. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS)

E. BANGKOK 3032 (CRISIS RETURNS)

F. 07 BANGKOK 3625 (BACKGROUND ON PALLOP)

G. 07 BANGKOK 15 (ASCRIBING BOMBINGS)

H. BANGKOK 3425

BANGKOK 00003426 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason: 1.4 (b and d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003426 SIPDIS NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER AND LIZ PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV ASEC TH SUBJECT: LETHAL EXPLOSION AT BANGKOK PROTEST SITE KILLS ONE REF: A. BANGKOK 3386 (THAKSIN'S DIVORCE) ¶B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN ADDRESSES RALLY) ¶C. BANGKOK 3255 (GRENADE ATTACKS) ¶D. BANGKOK 3154 (EX-COP THREATENS) ¶E. BANGKOK 3032 (CRISIS RETURNS) ¶F. 07 BANGKOK 3625 (BACKGROUND ON PALLOP) ¶G. 07 BANGKOK 15 (ASCRIBING BOMBINGS) ¶H. BANGKOK 3425 BANGKOK 00003426 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason: 1.4 (b and d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) A pre-dawn explosion at the Government House compound on November 20 killed an anti-government protestor and wounded at least 20 others. The explosion is the latest in a long string of politically motivated bombings in Thailand, although some of the earlier attacks appeared primarily symbolic. It is unclear whether the perpetrators of this bombing intended their device to be lethal, but both pro- and anti-government figures have been arming and spoiling for a fight. Some Thais suspect that former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is stoking POLITICAL tensions, which appear likely to increase as a result of this most recent attack. ¶2. (C) Comment: Bangkok enjoyed a pause in POLITICAL strife during the mourning period associated with the late Princess Galyani Vadhana's cremation rites, which concluded November ¶19. The lethal November 20 bombing clearly marks the end of that respite. A renewed cycle of protests and counter-protests could distract from the celebrations surrounding the King's December 5 birthday, Thailand's National Day, which customarily becomes the focus of public attention. End Summary and Comment. EARLY MORNING EXPLOSION -------------- ¶3. (SBU) An explosive device detonated at the Government House compound in the pre-dawn hours of November 20, killing one person and wounding at least 20 others. The only visible sign of the explosion during a mid-afternoon walkthrough of the Government House compound was a gash in the overhead canvas, reportedly made as the device fell to the ground. The anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protestors, who took over the official seat of government on August 26, continue to occupy the Government House compound. ¶4. (SBU) A Royal Thai Police official told ARSO that the explos
ive device was an augmented "flash-bang" grenade (see Ref H for more details). PAD personnel at Government House did not allow police investigators to access the scene, however; RELATIONS between the PAD and police have been particularly strained since the October 7 violence. PRECEDENTS AND ESCALATION -------------- ¶5. (C) As detailed in ref G, numerous small-scale bombings in Bangkok took place during the Thaksin administration. The perpetrators, who invariably remain unidentified, seem to use such attacks to send a POLITICAL message. Several such bombings took place during the Surayud administration, with the December 31, 2006 bombings (ref G) being by far the most lethal and notable. In late October, small explosive devices detonated at the homes of two royalist judges (ref C). (Note: these types of bombings in Bangkok appear unconnected to the insurgency in southern Thailand, although some of the devices used in Bangkok and in the South have been similar.) ¶6. (SBU) Incidents of bombings and reports of armed PAD personnel increased noticeably in the wake of October 7 violence between police and PAD supporters, who used firearms and improvised weapons in the clashes (ref E). According to media reports, from October 30 through November 19, six small bombs exploded in or around the Government House compound, causing some injuries to PAD suporters but no fatalities. BANGKOK 00003426 002.2 OF 002 During the same period, there have been three shooting incidents, either by or at PAD guards (see ref B, for example). There also have been several incidents in which the police arrested PAD sympathizers for carrying firearms or explosives. POLITICAL FIGURES THREATENING, RALLYING -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Pro-government figures have recently intensified their warnings to their opponents. Leaders of the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) have warned that they will fight against any soldiers who launch a coup. A former high-ranking police officer threatened to forcibly evict PAD from Government House (ref D). Most recently, Major General Khattiya "Sae Daeng" Sawatdiphon -- a rare high-ranking soldier who speaks out aggressively on behalf of the current pro-Thaksin administration, in defiance of the military command's position to stay out of politics (ref D) -- predicted ominously that further bombings of the PAD-occupied compound would take place after the funeral rites of Princess Galyani if PAD refused to decamp (the final ceremonies ended November 19). Khattiya also made offhand threatening remarks about the possible "disappearance" or mistreatment in custody of the PAD co-leaders, according to media reports. ¶8. (SBU) Khattiya has publicly associated himself with retired General Pallop (phonetic: Panlop) Pinmanee -- a self-described assassin (ref F) who in the fall of 2006 appeared to be one of the most ardent foes of then-Prime Minister Thaksin. In a stunning reversal, Pallop recently traveled abroad to play golf with Thaksin; after returning to Thailand, he adopted a belligerent tone toward the PAD, noting that, were it up to him, he would use authorities in the Internal Security Act to clear the PAD from Government House. ¶9. (C) The PAD has focused its concerns on former Prime Minister Thaksin, and both PAD sympathizers and relatively neutral Thais may well surmise that Thaksin, or allies trying to further his interests, orchestrated the November 20 and previous attacks, no matter who is actually behind them. As reported in ref A, Thaksin is currently adrift (in both geographic and marital terms) and appears increasingly determined to shape Thai POLITICAL developments. He has promised to address by phone a large rally of his supporters on December 13. For its part, PAD leaders have called for a large rally of their own November 23 to protest the November 20 attack and efforts to re-write the constitution. JOHN

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