SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NOT IN SATUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003407 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: NOT IN SATUN BANGKOK 00003407 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 ( B) AND (D) Summary and comment: -------------- ¶1. (C) In early October, we traveled to Satun province in southern Thailand to assess the security environment in relation to the rest of the deep south. The vice governor in charge of security affairs, the provincial chief of police, and local Muslim leaders all described a province separated by history, language differences, and geographical boundaries from the rest of the deep south and the violence associated with it. They also described a robust system used by local officials to resolve local grievances and to monitor the movement of outsiders to ensure those entering the province were not connected to insurgent elements. While portraying the province as prosperous and peaceful, the officials admitted that insurgents had attempted to make inroads into the area, but had been rebuffed by the local population. One senior official acknowledged that contraband and illegal immigrants easily enter and exit Satun given the amount of boat traffic passing through its small port, along with the easy access to Malaysia from Satun. ¶2. (C) Comment: There has been little, if any, insurgency related violence in Satun since the violence in the deep south began to spike in early 2004; the insurgency has left Satun physically untouched. Historical and cultural differences have set Satun apart from the provinces historically associated with the Sultanate of Pattani (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and some districts in Songkhla); Satun's population has more in common with Andaman Sea provinces to the north such as Trang, Krabi, Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Phuket. Local residents abhor the separatist violence and appear willing to work with security officials who take a no nonsense approach to individuals they suspect of trying to involve Satun in the unrest. Regardless, Satun,s proximity to the violence, provincial officials' tendency to overlook activities that do not appear to be upsetting the peace, and easy transportation links to Malaysia and INDONESIA give Satun the appearance of an inviting potential safe haven for insurgents looking for a little respite from the heat of the fight next door. ¶3. (SBU) Comment Continued: Based on this assessment, Post has decided to lift official travel restrictions to Satun province, and is in the process of amending the Consular Information Sheet to reflect our current analysis of the security environment in that provinces. End summary and comment. The Deep South's Peaceful Province -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In Early October we traveled to Satun province in Thailand's deep south to assess the security environment in relation to the violence prone neighboring provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Satun province has not been affected in any large measure by the violence gripping the rest of the deep south. While traveling in Satun we observed no security check points or road blocks common to the provinces affected by the insurgency, and no visible military or paramilitary presence. The physical infrastructure appeared to be in good shape, with roads, bridges, and the port facility comparable or better than those in the other three southern-most provinces. Separated by History, Geography -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Our initial meeting was with Major General Seri Wilailak, commander of the Satun provincial police, and Vice Governor (now Governor) Chasuk Manichayangkun. Seri told us that the real reason Satun was unaffected by the insurgency was history. Historically Satun was always on the periphery, and never the center of a state; before Satun was incorporated into Thailand, it had been part of the Sultanate BANGKOK 00003407 002.2 OF 003 of Kedah, in what is now Malaysia. Kedah was the center of power, Satun a minor outpost. Although Satun eventually became a minor sultanate itself, the residents continued to look to Kedah for guidance. When Thailand incorporated Satun, the Sultan of Satun was successfully co-opted by the Thais and retained some power in the province; the population did not feel like they were being forcibly assimilated into the Thai cultural zone. In contrast, emphasized Seri, the Sultanate of Pattani had seen itself to be a power in its own right, and its leaders could not be co-opted by the central Thai government. ¶6. (SBU) Seri cited other reasons for the lack of historical ties to the Sultanate of Patani, such as geographical boundaries. The people of Satun tended to travel more along north-south routes, not east-west. Few people in Satun speak Yawi, the language of the rest of the deep south. There are few, if any, pondoks; locals send their kids to public schools. Neighborhood Watch -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Seri acknowledged that militants from the other three provinces in the extreme south have on several occasions attempted to involve Satun in the violence. He said the first time he was aware of was two or three years ago when a group of "religious teachers" entered the province and began to use extremist rhetoric in their preaching against the Thai state. He said residents quickly reported to the police that the teachers were trying to recruit young people into the separatist struggle; the teachers were detained and "sent back to the deep south." He said there had been other more recent approaches as well, with extremists usually posing as merchants or business men while trying to recruit local youth into separatist groups. According to Seri, officials and residents in Satun cooperate extensively to keep Satun out of the violence. He said every month there is a meeting between the police, the provincial administration, the Ministry of Interior, and local officials to discuss developments in the province, and report on the activities of new comers. Anyone intent on causing trouble is quickly identified and expelled from the area. Economics: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Beyond -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Chasuk Manichayangkun, now Governor of Satun, is primarily focused on economic development and is putting most his energy into developing the tourism sector. He told us 74 percent of the 280,000 people in Satun are Muslim, and that most of the province's residents were born there. He believed that Satun is economically more prosperous than the rest of the deep south, and that this prosperity was helping to keep the insurgency at-bay. (Note: Chasuk could substantiate this assertion about Satun,s economic prosperity, and statistics appear to run counter to his belief. According to Thailand in Figures for 2008, Satun ranked 58 out of the 76 provinces for Gross Provincial Product, while Songkhla ranked 9, Yala 45, Pattani 53, and Narathiwat 38. End note.) ¶9. (SBU) Chasuk said he had big plans for the province and described a project, recently funded by the Ministry of Interior, to build an expanded tourist port. He said plans were also on the table for a deep water cargo port; Satun was a major gateway to Malaysia and could also provide easy access to points in Indonesia. He boasted that some 700,000 tourists passed through Satun last year on the way to Langkawi in Malaysia and other near-by islands. He admitted that Satun had a problem with illegal immigrants and, acknowledging the heavy boat traffic running through the provinces small port, said provincial officials really do not know who was on the boats. He believed they were a mix of nationalities, some legal and some not, mostly associated with the fishing industry. According to Chasuk, provincial authorities have a tendency to leave them alone as long as they did not cause trouble. Regarding cooperation with Malaysia on border enforcement, he said they have no formal BANGKOK 00003407 003.2 OF 003 agreement in place, but the police had a very good informal working arrangement with their Malaysian counterparts. Religious Harmony -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ibrahim Adam, the chairman of the Satun Islamic Committee, told us that that Islam was not a dividing force in Satun, as it could be in the rest of the deep south. He said that although the majority of Satun's residents were Malay-Muslims, the Islam they practiced lacked the nationalist streak that ethnic Malay-Muslims in the other southern provinces used to define themselves. According to Ibrahim, a continuing dialogue between Buddhists, Muslims, and Christians in Satun kept friction down between the groups. They manage to settle disputes before they manifest themselves as "problems." Ibrahim said that, generally speaking, Satun residents had no issues with the central government. When problems arose, he said, it was seldom about a particular policy, but usually about government officials who abused their positions or have negative attitudes about Muslims and the South. JOHN