SOUTHERN VIOLENCE IN THAILAND: VIEWS OF THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003142 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE IN THAILAND: VIEWS OF THE MALAYSIAN MISSION IN BANGKOK REF: A. BANGKOK 02808 (MEDIATOR HAS GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS) ¶B. BANGKOK 02871 (PEACE TALKS IN INDONESIA) ¶C. BANGKOK 3033 (CHAVALIT ENTERS EXISTS) BANGKOK 00003142 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 ( B) AND (D) Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) In a rare meeting with representatives from the Malaysian embassy to discuss southern Thailand, Minister Counselor Roslan A. Rahman told us in late September that Malaysia saw the multiple tracks of negotiations for a resolution of the conflict in southern Thailand as a positive development. He said Malaysia was not involved in any of these efforts, and would only become involved if it was convinced the Thai government was serious about resolving the conflict. Rahman acknowledged that Task Force 2010 was Malaysia's vehicle for involvement in southern Thailand, but he insisted that TF 2010 was primarily involved in economic development, education, and vocational training. ¶2. (S) Comment: The official Malaysian presence in Bangkok is not usually an enthusiastic interlocutor on southern Thailand, and we were surprised at Rahman's willingness to discuss the situation in the South. Rahman, though less than forthcoming on the important issue of Malaysia's activities in southern Thailand, appeared to be well versed on the overall situation and left the door open for future engagement. Michael Vatikiotis, our contact on the secret Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) track of peace talks, however, has repeatedly been dismissive of Malaysian attempts to play a part in peace negotiations and has described Malaysian efforts in the South as meddlesome. However, the porous nature of the border between Thailand and Malaysia, the presence in Malaysia of retired and exiled insurgent leaders, and ethnic, religious, and family connections between Malayu Muslims in southern Thailand and Malaysians in Kelantan, argue that any resolution of the conflict will need to involve Malaysia on some level. End Summary and Comment. Malaysian Embassy views on peace tracks -------------- ¶3. (C) In a meeting in late September to discuss the violence in southern Thailand and Malaysia's ability to affect the situation, Roslan A. Rahman, Minister Counselor from the embassy of Malaysia, told us that Malaysia currently had no role in any of the negotiating tracks now underway to resolve the insurgency in southern Thailand. Countering arguments that the seemingly multiple tracks of negotiations now underway were counter-productive, he said it was an encouraging sign that multiple parties were reaching out for a solution to the problem. ¶4. (C) Malaysia, Roslan emphasized, was not involved in any of these talks, and would only get involved in negotiations when there was a clear commitment from the Thai government that it was interested in resolving the conflict. At that point, he said, Malaysia could act as a facilitator, not a mediator. They would offer a venue, guarantee security, etc., but not be involved in the negotiations themselves. He said the Thais needed to decide if and how they would like negotiations proceed before any peace process would be successful. He said he does not believe the Thai government was currently serious about resolving the conflict. Bogor effort -------------- ¶5. (C) Moving on to the Bogor track of peace talks (ref b-c), Roslan told us the negotiations were sanctioned by the Thai government through former Prime Minister Samak, but he said he did not know the extent to which Prime Minister Somchai had embraced them. He told us that his understanding was that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was BANGKOK 00003142 002.2 OF 002 purposefully not informed of the negotiations because they were intended to be secret - although he acknowledged it was odd that the Indonesian Ambassador to Thailand, Mohammad Hatta, was involved without his Embassy being aware. Roslan said the concept grew out of Samak,s trip to Indonesia and an interest among high level Indonesian officials in brokering a solution. Roslan said he was unable to comment on whether the separatists involved in these talks had any ability to control developments on the ground in the South. He said the insurgents groups in the South are very disparate; they needed some kind of new political organization or umbrella group to organize around. He speculated that these negotiations may be able to provide that. The Bogor negotiations represented an attempt at forward movement, he said, and thus were positive even if they received little official backing. HDC process -------------- ¶6. (S) Roslan ended the meeting by making unsolicited comments about the secret Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) brokered peace negotiations. He said HDC was trying to broker talks and forge reconciliation, but he did not think the primary actors in the insurgency in the South, the BRN-C, was truly involved. He said the BRN-C saw the talks as an intelligence gathering operation, and would not show themselves. Roslan claimed that he did not know what was being discussed in the HDC sponsored track, but said he was reasonably certain independence was not on the table. He said this reflected his understanding that the insurgents were not fighting for independence: "They are not talking about independence. They are looking for cultural rights and probably autonomy." Malaysian efforts in the south: Task Force 2010 -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Speaking briefly about Task Force 2010, Roslan admitted that it was Malaysia's vehicle for involvement in southern Thailand, but he insisted that TF 2010 was primarily involved in economic development, education, and vocational training. It was not involved in establishing a channel for negotiations. (Note: According to Thai and Malaysian press, Task Force 2010 was formed by Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi in early 2007 as a vehicle to bring peace to southern Thailand. Sporadic press reports have indicated TF 2010 has been involved in various attempts to broker negotiations in the South. End note.) ENTWISTLE