THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: CHARGES AGAINST PAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003059 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS ASEC TH SUBJECT: THAILAND POLITICAL CRISIS: CHARGES AGAINST PAD LEADERS REDUCED, SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION REF: A. BANGKOK 3042 ¶B. BANGKOK 3032 ¶C. BANGKOK 3020 ¶D. BANGKOK 3006 ¶E. BANGKOK 2882 BANGKOK 00003059 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The streets of Bangkok remained quiet October 9. The major development came in the courts, when the Appeal Court threw out the most serious charges (of insurrection/treason) against the nine leaders of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The two arrested PAD leaders then made bail, and the seven other PAD leaders announced they would turn themselves in. For his part, PM Somchai Wongsawat announced that he would set up two independent commissions to examine the October 7 violence and compensating the victims of the violence. ¶2. (C) Comment. While the Court's actions and Somchai's announcement may provide renewed space for a possible negotiated resolution to the conflict between the PAD and government, success should not be taken for granted. After the arrest warrants were first issued in late August, the PAD leaders announced their willingness to be arrested and named a slate of second tier PAD figures to continue leadership of the protest movement, keeping their goal of removing pro-Thaksin political forces from power intact. Other options to resolve the impasse, if only temporarily, include House dissolution/new elections, favored by many academics and the opposition Democrats, a coup, and intervention from the King, as in 1992. Final resolution of the deep fissures in Thai politics and society, however, will likely only be possible once King Bhumibol passes from the scene. End Comment and Summary. COURT THROWS OUT MOST SERIOUS CHARGES AGAINST PAD LEADERS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) The Appeals Court on October 9 annulled the warrants that had been issued for the arrest of nine core leaders of the PAD following the August 26 takeover of Government House and brief occupation of other buildings, including the headquarters of the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand (NBT). The court dropped charges of insurrection, plotting insurrection, and failure to comply with orders by authorities to disperse under Articles 113, 114, and 216 of the Constitution, ruling that there was insignificant 
justification for the charges. ¶4. (SBU) However, the Court upheld charges of inciting disturbances and causing a breach of the peace under Articles 116 and 215 of the Constitution and ordered the issuance of new arrest warrants for the seven leaders of the PAD still at large. Two other PAD leaders, Chaiwat Sinsuwong and MGEN (Ret.) Chamlong Srimuang, had been arrested October 3 and 5, respectively, but were released on bail October 9 following the Court's decision to drop the more serious charges. ¶5. (SBU) Speaking after the Appeal Court's decision, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul publicly announced that he and the remaining PAD leaders would report to the police in order to fight in the court. Somkiat Pongpaiboon, another PAD leader, confirmed to us that remaining leaders would soon turn themselves in. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO MANAGE FALLOUT FROM OCTOBER 7 -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) With accusations continuing to be traded over who was responsible for the October 7 violence, injuries, and deaths, PM Somchai publicly announced October 9 that he would set up two independent committees, one to investigate the violence, and the other to look into remedies for the victims. Somchai vowed that the committees would be non-partisan. FOUR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE IMPASSE BANGKOK 00003059 002.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶7. (C) With two days of mostly calm following the October 7 violence, speculation continues to focus on ways to resolve, if only temporarily, the ongoing political conflict. Four avenues appear the most plausible: 1) Negotiations succeed between the government and the PAD or opposition Democrats; 2) House dissolution with new elections; 3) royal intervention similar to that in 1992; or 4) a coup by the military. ¶8. (C) Negotiations: Prior to the October 3 arrest of PAD leader Chaiwat, many hoped that then-deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth would be able to negotiate some sort of accommodation between the PAD and the government; even PAD leaders told us they put faith in Chavalit's efforts, which had defused tensions. The arrests, the October 7 violence, and Chavalit's resignation squelched hopes for a negotiated solution, however. ¶9. (C) That said, PM Somchai has demonstrated the capacity to take a much more accommodative stance than former-PM Samak. He originally convinced the opposition Democrats to work with him to form a commission to examine constitutional amendments, another possible negotiated solution which could have undercut the PAD. In visiting injured PAD demonstrators October 8 and promising to set up independent commissions to look into the violence October 9, Somchai has taken positive steps. It remains to be seen, however, whether he will be able leverage these measures into more substantial actions that would move the country towards resolution of the long-term conflict, particularly since nearly everyone presumes the Somchai government will have a very short shelf-life. ¶10. (C) House dissolution: Democrats, many Senators, academics, and Army Commander Anupong favor dissolution with new elections. However, elections would almost assuredly return similar results, if anything strengthening the showing of whatever post-Thaksin political force competes; Thaksin confidently predicted a landslide to Ambassador September 23 (ref E). Such results would lead Thailand back into a balance of forces similar to the current one. Prasong Sunsiri, a co-leader with Chamlong of the May 1992 anti-military protests and the primary drafter of the 2007 constitution during the military-installed interim government, told the Ambassador in a October 9 meeting that the same "cast of characters" would return to power if a new election were held. ¶11. (C) Deus ex machina: Prasong suggested during the meeting with the Ambassador that, as in May 1992 following a violent military clampdown against anti-military demonstrators, intervention by King Bhumibol may be necessary in order to lift Thailand out of the current political stalemate. Prasong admitted that was it was very difficult to predict what would happen in the coming days and weeks but projected that an extraordinary event could likely be the only way out of the conflict. Others, citing Queen Sirikit's increasingly transparent patronage of the PAD cause, have suggested she too could send a signal to PAD to declare victory and vacate Government House; there is no indication she plans to do so. ¶12. (C) Coup: Despite RTA Commander Anupong's steady hand, rumors continue to swirl that there are some in the Army who advocate for military intervention. For instance, the English-language Bangkok Post cited Army sources October 9 to claim that colleagues of Anupong had recommended that the RTA do more to resolve the conflict. Pro-Thaksin firebrand Jakkraphob Penkair and his associates have repeatedly claimed to us that RTA Chief of Staff Prayuth is more inclined towards interventionism than his mentor Anupong. Set against this is reality: Prasong confirmed to Ambassador that he had heard from Army friends that the military had (again) learned post-September 2006 coup how difficult it was to run the country. PM Somchai, like PM Samak before him, clearly plans on taking few chances; he has asked Anupong to accompany him BANGKOK 00003059 003.2 OF 003 on a round of visits to ASEAN capitals, starting in Phnom Penh on October 13. JOHN