SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: CHAVALIT REENTERS GOVERNMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003033

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: CHAVALIT REENTERS GOVERNMENT
WITH A PLAN, EXITS QUICKLY WITH EMPTY HANDS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2977 (AMBASSADOR - FORMER PM SAMAK)

B. BANGKOK 2871 (PEACE TALKS IN INDONESIA)

C. BANGKOK 2808 (MEDIATOR HAS GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (B, D)


Summary and comment:
--------------

1. (S) Then-deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyuth told
Ambassador on October 1 that his primary focus in returning
to government was to bring resolution to the conflict in
southern Thailand. He outlined an approach that focused on
achieving buy-in from community representatives in the south
at a planned October 11 meeting, establishing a limited peace
zone to build confidence and trust, and aiming for greater
cultural space and some form of self governance for the
insurgency-affected provinces. Chavalit stated that his
efforts were completely separate from an odd PULO-associated
initiative sponsored by former Army Commander Chetta, recent
talks hosted by Indonesian Vice President Kalla, or the
secret dialogue facilitated by the Henri Dunant Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC). Chavalit resigned October 7, as
a close aide predicted to us he would, claiming Chavalit felt
undercut by PM Somchai and security officials.


2. (C) Comment: Chavalit's southern plan appeared to have
little support elsewhere in Bangkok. Ironically, the
insurgents apparently feared Chavalit's initiative would have
seriously undercut their support and cover within southern
communities. While Chavalit brought welcomed political focus
to the conflict in southern Thailand after seven months of
neglect under former PM Samak, his plan suffered from a
serious lack of support by Thai security forces. RTARF
Supreme Commander General Songkitti Jaggabartra severely
downplayed Chavalit's importance during an October 7 meeting
with the Ambassador. End Summary and Comment

Chavalit,s Strategy: Dokmai lai sii
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador paid a courtesy call on the then-DPM
Chavalit on Oct. 1 at his residence in suburban Bangkok. In
describing his approach on the southern conflict, Chavalit
offered an alternative version to the standard centralized
Thai identity based on nation, religion, and monarchy. He
favored a policy of "dokmai lai sii," or Thailand as a flower
of many colors, in this case, cultures. There were three
conditions that could form the basis of a workable agreement:
an understanding that the south was part of Thailand, not to
be separated; establishing a policy of "Bumiputra," which
Chavalit described as a concept of social conditions/Malay
identity that Mahatir had promoted; and allowing the southern
provinces some form of autonomy, under the Thai Constitution,
similar to what Bangkok and Pattaya now enjoy - including
some rights of self-taxation. (Note: Chavalit was not clear
on how establishing a policy that favored one race/ethnicity
such as "Bumiputra" would enable reconciliation. End note.)


4. (C) Chavalit said there would be a big meeting in southern
Thailand October 11 that would include representatives from
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani provinces, along with 200 - 300
key leaders from the military, police, and civilian
government and civil society - perhaps 3000 attendees in
total. Chavalit had planned to go to watch and serve as
honorary chair.


5. (C) A cornerstone of the efforts to be launched October 11
was a proposed peace zone of six districts, two each in Yala,
Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces, where there would be no
insurgent violence for 30 days. In return, security forces
would not initiate operations. During the first month,
there would also be discussions of social and economic
development for the region. If the confidence building
measure succeeded, the plan would be extended to all three
provinces the second month, aiming towards a general peace
announcement by the King,s birthday on December 5.


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6. (C) Chavalit told the Ambassador he had engaged PM Somchai
on this approach September 30. Somchai had agreed that
Chavalit should be in charge of the government's south
policy, but thought it better if the government did not start
the initiative. Chavalit said he insisted that there wasn't
time; national interests dictated the need to move forward.
Eventually, he said, Somchai agreed.

Lack of support, possible exit from government?
-------------- ---


7. (C) Shortly after Ambassador's meeting with Chavalit,
however, it became apparent that Chavalit enjoyed little
support among key actors in Bangkok. A subsequent October 1
meeting between Chavalit and Army Commander Anupong did not
go well, Chavalit,s right hand man, MGEN (ret) Sornchai
Montriwat told us October 2. According to Sornchai, when
Chavalit laid out his "plan for peace," Anupong did not
agree, indicating he favored a tougher approach to the
situation. Deputy Principal Private Secretary Krit
Garnjana-Gooncgorn was also dismissive of Chavalit,s plans.
In a conversation with the Ambassador late on October 1, he
said there was no political support in Bangkok for
Chavalit,s efforts.


8. (C) RTARF Supreme Commander General Songkitti Jaggabartra
was visibly dismissive of Chavalit's efforts to address the
situation in the South in an October 7 meeting with
Ambassador. Songkitti stated that PM Somchai had delegated
authority for the South to General Anupong through the Army
Commander's role as the Deputy Director of the Internal
Security Operations Command. Anupong would continue to lead
the government's activities in the South, while the Deputy PM
would be free to contribute ideas. Songkitti maintained that
Anupong's role was much more important, as he was responsible
for coordinating the activities of the Army, the police, and
other governmental agencies working through the Southern
Border Provinces Administrative Center and for implementing
policy on the ground. Songkitti expressed confidence that
the RTG would succeed in improving the situation in the South
through an integrated approach to the insurgency.


9. (S) Ironically, the insurgent field commanders behind most
of the southern violence greatly feared Chavalit's
initiative, according to Michael Vatikiotis, Southeast Asian
representative for HDC, which acts as facilitator for secret
talks between insurgents and Thai government representatives
(ref c). Vatikiotis told us October 1 that the insurgents
fear Chavalit could use his Wadah network and cooperation
with Malaysian Special Branch police to undermine their
political top cover among mid-level local leaders; Chavalit
alone among Thai national politicians successfully understood
the South, in their view (Chavalit had bragged to the
Ambassador that he had kept in contact with all the key
actors involved for 30 years). Vatikiotis also saw Anupong
as taking an increasingly harder line towards the South, now
that more accommodationist ex-PM Surayud had retreated from
an active role. This had allowed more conservative army
leaders associated with the Queen's Guard to reassert
themselves and push Anupong back to his more natural
position, in Vatikiotis' view.


10. (C) Chavalit aide Sornchai told us October 2 that
Chavalit was discouraged by being undercut in his efforts on
the south, and by the lack of seriousness in the rest of the
cabinet. Sornchai lamented that Chavalit, as DPM, did not
have standing to compel the Army to follow his lead; only the
PM or Defense Minister did, but Somchai, who held both
portfolios, was too weak to force the Army to follow
Chavalit,s policy leadership. Worse, Somchai had stated
publicly that he as PM was in charge of dealing with the
South, despite his private delegation of the matter to
Chavalit.

Nature of insurgency groups, Malaysia connection?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Chavalit claimed to the Ambassador that, there was a

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nine man Politburo representing BRN-C and four or five other
organizations active in the South, controlling the ground
actions by RKK and the United Front, with Spe-ing the overall
coordinator. He claimed the BRN-C leaders stayed in
Malaysia, and maintained contact with Malaysian Prime
Minister Badawi and Defense Minister Najib, whom, he said,
also knew them very well. Chavalit claimed Malaysian leaders
did not want the insurgents to cause problems with Thailand
and wanted them to lay down arms. However, they did not
quite know what to do with them, beyond giving the insurgents
a place to stay, and thus were able to exercise "some
control" over them.


12. (S) Vatikiotis was doubtful that Chavalit's efforts would
succeed on their own, particularly given the reality of a
mass-based insurgency taking on a life of its own. The
insurgents involved in the HDC-hosted talks admitted they
could only control about 80 percent of the violence, and some
of the Muslim on Buddhist attacks were occurring out of a
professed hatred of Thais - a much stronger sentiment that
had been in play previously. Vatikiotis mused that symbols
mattered more than reality to both sides; he cited the
freedom of Thai (Muslim Malay) Imams to deliver Friday
sermons in the South without preclearance from security
officials, and Yala Islamic College's open propagation of
Wahhabist ideology, as greater cultural-religious space than
existed across the border in Malaysia itself.

What was going on in Bogor? A second look
--------------


13. (C) Democratic Party MP Samai Chareonchang, the Muslim
chairman of the House Standing Committee on Social Welfare
and former Head of the Bangkok Islamic Committee, claimed to
us during a POL-hosted iftar dinner September 25 that DPM
Chavalit was behind the "peace talks" hosted by Indonesian VP
Kalla in Bogor, Indonesia September 20-21, an allegation we
had heard previously (ref b). Samai claimed that the lead
southern representative in the talks, Dot Wan, was a known
long-time Chavalit associate via the Wadah political faction.



14. (S) In contrast, Chavalit claimed to Ambassador October 1
that the Bogor talks were "Samak,s effort, along with Privy
Councilor Palakorn," and involved a BRN-C figure, but "not
someone in control." Noting multiple channels being opened
"by my friends" to try to solve the problems in the South, he
asserted that none were coordinated - Chetta's deal with a
PULO element, the Bogor talks, his own initiative, or the
HDC-hosted secret peace process (ref c).


15. (S) Jakarta-based HDC rep Vatikiotis told us October 1
that he believed the publicity and confusion surrounding the
Bogor talks was the result of tension between the offices of
the Indonesian President and Vice President. Presidential
adviser Dino Djalal thought that the President, not Kalla,
should take credit, and issued a preemptive press statement.
Notwithstanding a pledge to the Thai parties involved to keep
the talks low-key, Kalla then called in news agencies and
cameras to record the session. Vatikiotis' key MFA contact,
Desrah Pachaya, confessed to him later that the MFA had no
idea what was going on. Pachaya told Vatikiotis that the
Indonesians thought the Thai "government representative,"
retired General Kwanchart, represented a Deputy Prime
Minister, but were not sure which one, and they did not
realize Kwanchart was already retired. Vatikiotis told us
that the insurgents involved in the HDC talks were irritated
by free-lance efforts like Chetta's and at Bogor because the
publicity confused their people on the ground in southern
Thailand and led to internal second-guessing.
JOHN