PROPOSALS ON BURMA FROM ASSK CONFIDANT DE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000297 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR LIZ PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPAO KDEM BM TH SUBJECT: PROPOSALS ON BURMA FROM ASSK CONFIDANT DE RIEDMATTEN REF: 2007 BANGKOK 5736 BANGKOK 00000297 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Leon de Riedmatten (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue representative and former International Committee of the Red Cross head of delegation in Burma during which he acted as a liaison between ASSK and SPDC) viewed the prospects for change in Burma as growing weaker every day unless the international community - in coordination with those working inside Burma - considered a new, proactive approach. In his view, India and China were not willing to play the influential role many Western countries hoped for. While de Riedmatten praised U.S. efforts to keep alive Burma's story, he presented options the USG and others could support and that focused on regionally-driven initiatives. These included an advisory committee formed earlier this month by the Indonesian government, and the assignment of support staff in Rangoon for UN Special Envoy for Burma Ibrahim Gambari that operated independently of the UN country team in Burma. END Summary. -------------- BURMA GOING NOWHERE -------------- ¶2. (C) During a mid-January meeting with Embassy officer, de Riedmatten described the situation in Burma as at a standstill, with the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) once again having proven that it was completely intolerant of any form of protest and that leader Than Shwe had no plans to begin a genuine dialogue towards reconciliation and democratization. The protests of last September demonstrated that change would not come from within Burma or as a result of international criticism of the SPDC, but only by way of a concerted, coordinated effort between the two. In de Riedmatten's view, as the ruling generals and their cronies continued to amass wealth via flagrant abuse of their power, they gained greater incentives to retain this power through any means necessary, regardless of the rights and well-being of their citizens. He remarked that it appeared easier than ever for Burmese to obtain new passports, permitting those with the means to depart Burma, and ultimately leaving behind only those without the skills or the ability to effectively oppose the junta, much less govern the country should a transition ever occur. ¶3. (C) While much of the international community was focused on pressuring India and China to use their influence with the SPDC, de Riedmatten viewed both countries as having little interest in creating waves inside Burma. China in particular was hesitant to do anything to disrupt the upcoming Olympic Games. Therefore, de Riedmatten believed that the international community needed to begin examining alternatives. De Riedmatten had several suggestions for new diplomatic initiatives that the USG and other governments could undertake to try to begin moving things forward in Burma. -------------- -------------- INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZES HIGH LEVEL ADVISORY GROUP -------------- -------------- BANGKOK 00000297 002.2 OF 004 ¶4. (C) De Riedmatten described the formation of a high level committee in Indonesia whose purpose was to analyze regional options to reach out to the ruling junta and address the situation in Burma. This Indonesian Burma study group included Burma experts such as de Riedmatten and Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian President Yudhoyono foreign affairs advisor Dino Djalal, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, director for International Security and Disarmament at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Desra Percaya, and current Indonesian legislators. Although this committee had yet to be announced publicly, they have had at least one meeting in Jakarta that de Riedmatten attended. As of December 2007, the committee had hoped to take advantage of Burmese PM Thein Sein's visit to Indonesia scheduled for January 14-15, although that visit was subsequently postponed due to the illness of former President Suharto. While Indonesia demonstrated the initiative in organizing the group, it planned to include others in the region in any future efforts, particularly Vietnam and Thailand. ¶5. (C) De Riedmatten explained the group's interest in including Vietnam was due to that country's own experiences with substantive economic reform and offering a way out to recalcitrant leaders. In addition, Vietnam could point to its previous difficult relationship with countries like the U.S. and describe how a little effort on the part of both countries brought about what was today a politically productive relationship that was also economically mutually beneficial. At the same time, Vietnam was in constant competition with China, economically and in terms of regional standing for influence. Vietnam viewed its membership in ASEAN as a valuable counterweight to China and therefore recognized the importance of supporting a strong ASEAN, which Burma threatened. When pressed for indications that Vietnam would be interested in participating in this committee, de Riedmatten conceded that as of yet he had no evidence that Vietnam would go along with Indonesia's plans, but offered that it was an idea worth exploring. ¶6. (C) De Riedmatten stated it was clear Thailand was content with the status quo vis-a-vis Burma and that the interim government had been satisfied to use the excuse that without a clear leadership to craft foreign policy, the MFA would continue to take a back seat in any regional discussions about Burma. He believed that the newly elected government would also be willing to continue sucking natural resources out of Burma for its own use, and allowing Burmese workers to illegally enter Thailand with substantial benefits to the Thai economy. (Comment: Overall, de Riedmatten did not make a clear distinction between the interim and the incoming governments' policies towards Burma. Until the new Foreign Minister and other cabinet officials are in place, it is not clear to us just how the RTG will approach Burma.) But regardless of these complacent positions, the reality was that the RTG would have to actively engage in any regional efforts regarding Burma, due to its geo-strategic relationship with Burma, the Thais' upcoming presidency of ASEAN, and because former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan currently holds the position of ASEAN Secretary General. At the same time, however, de Riedmatten did not view Surin as a man of action and expected Surin to do very little of substance about Burma. He described Surin as a man of words, which had served Surin well as a diplomat but which would prevent Surin from bringing the necessary pressure on ASEAN to get members to act on Burma. BANGKOK 00000297 003.2 OF 004 -------------- INDEPENDENT SUPPORT STAFF FOR GAMBARI -------------- ¶7. (C) Contacts inside Burma told de Riedmatten that many in Burma believed that Gambari's trips to the country accomplished nothing except for earning him gifts from the junta upon his departure. De Riedmatten added that many of his sources inside and outside Burma described Gambari as having no credibility with the junta, with the opposition, or with the ethnic groups. De Riedmatten believed that the moment Gambari allowed the junta to take him hostage in Nay Pyi Taw during his November 2007 visit, Gambari lost any remaining standing among all dialogue partners. de Riedmatten did not view Gambari as committed to the resolving the situation in Burma, unlike his predecessor Ismail Razali, but rather viewed Gambari as committed to maintaining his UN position and all the generous trappings that followed with it. Now that the UN had funded Gambari's budget for the coming year, de Riedmatten said that Gambari would settle in to his routine of making the rounds of the Asian capitals and attending relevant meetings under the guise that he was making progress on Burma, but without any real accomplishments. When de Riedmatten met with Ban Ki-moon in Dili a few weeks ago, the UNSYG indicated that he planned to continue supporting Gambari's efforts as the UN could not allow the SPDC to return to the status quo. De Riedmatten told us that he replied to the UNSYG that it was already too late, as the junta had done worse than return to the status quo -- the junta had taken several steps backward. ¶8. (C) De Riedmatten acknowledged that he did not see any chance for Gambari being replaced in the near future. Therefore, he believed that the USG and the international community must examine how best to use Gambari and his position. De Riedmatten supported the idea of establishing staff inside Burma that could act as a small antenna on the ground for Gambari. However, he believed that this liaison must have first-hand knowledge of Burma and carry some weight inside the country as well as with the international community. The advantage of appointing such a person was that he/she would have a greater likelihood of obtaining the trust and credibility necessary to lay the substantive groundwork to make Gambari's subsequent visits to Burma worthwhile. De Riedmatten disagreed with proposals that this new position be co-located with the UN country team in Rangoon. In his view, the very nature of the UN in Burma is apolitical, as its focus is on humanitarian assistance. Gambari's representative must be perceived as independent of these humanitarian efforts and move about the country accordingly, meeting with a variety of people. De Riedmatten viewed three people as capable of taking on such an assignment: - Charles Petrie - although de Riedmatten acknowledged that Petrie's removal from Burma in December 2007 meant this was not a likely option; - Richard Horsey - former ILO representative currently working out of Bangkok; although de Riedmatten told us Horsey had applied for a Burmese visa three times in recent months and the SPDC had denied him all three times; - Leon de Riedmatten himself - had performed this role in the past, although it was not clear he would be welcomed back by *********************** * Missing Section 004 * ***********************