ENGAGING NEW THAI FM SOMPONG AT UNGA: THE CURRENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002940 SIPDIS DOJ FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KDEM KJUS ETRD UNGA TH SUBJECT: ENGAGING NEW THAI FM SOMPONG AT UNGA: THE CURRENT U.S. AGENDA WITH THAILAND REF: A. BANGKOK 2882 (AMBASSADOR MEETS PM) ¶B. BANGKOK 2854 (THAI-CAMBODIAN DISPUTE) BANGKOK 00002940 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b, d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Newly-inaugurated Deputy Prime Minister Sompong Amornwiwat, who serves concurrently as Foreign Minister, will make a short visit to UNGA/New York, arriving late September 27 with meetings on September 29-30. Post recommends an appropriate USG high-level interlocutor meet with Sompong in New York, given the wide range of important matters on our agenda with Thailand, and in recognition of 175 years of US-Siamese/Thai relations, our oldest formal relationship in Asia. Issues which could be raised with Sompong include: the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout; the deployment of Thai troops to Darfur; pressing Thailand to support reform in Burma; protection of Lao Hmong in Thailand who seek refugee status; calming Thai-Cambodian tensions; Thailand's chairmanship of ASEAN; support for Thai democracy; and the southern separatist insurgency. We recommend U/S Burns or A/S Hill meet with DPM/FM Sompong; Attorney General Mukasey may wish to call Sompong on the Bout case, since the two talked during Mukasey's June 10-11 visit to Bangkok, when Sompong was Justice Minister. End Summary. BOUT EXTRADITION -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador stressed to new PM Somchai September 22 that one of our top bilateral priorities is the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, in Thai custody since March. In his August visit to Bangkok, President Bush raised this matter with then-PM Samak. Attorney General Mukasey discussed the Bout case with then-FM Noppadol and officials from the Office of the Attorney General in June. We are concerned by a Thai court's recent denial of our request for the extradition of Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian who conspired to illegally obtain controlled technology from the United States (ref A). We have noted our respect for Thai judicial processes but believe firmly that Thailand should extradite Bout, a notorious arms trafficker who had targeted Americans and supported terrorists, once the judicial review concludes. DARFUR DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) After the Thai pledged a battalion peacekeepers for UNAMID in October 2007, the RTG has been waiting for Sudanese government approval for Thai troops to deploy to Darfur. We understand that Sudanese government recently told the UN that Thai troops could deploy after Egyptian and Ethiopian infantry battalions deploy to Darfur. Both the MFA and the Peacekeeping Operations Center at the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters confirmed to us that they are planning to fulfill the pledge to UNAMID. With the long interim since the pledge was approved by the Cabinet, however, the RTG will need to allocate a budget for the deployment, and the Thai military will need to re-train troops. The latest estimate from the Thai military is that they would not be ready to deploy before February. (Note: Septel will provide further detail on this issue.) We have urged the RTG to begin preparations as soon as possible so that Thai troops are ready when authorization has been provided by Sudan and the UNDPKO. BURMA -------------- ¶4. (C) When the People's Power Party (PPP)-led governing coalition first formed an administration in February 2008, then-FM Noppadol advocated "neighborly engagement" with Burma, with which Thailand shares a long porous border, provides refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced BANGKOK 00002940 002.2 OF 003 persons and employment for up to 2 million other Burmese, and on which Thailand depends for a significant portion of its energy needs. Thailand currently appears unwilling to press the Burmese junta to carry out reforms, although in extreme circumstances (such as the repression of the Saffron Uprising last year) the Thais have been willing to criticize egregious acts of the GOB. Thailand also helpfully pressed the GOB to allow international aid for areas hit hard by Cyclone Nargis and served as a platform for U.S. and UN aid deliveries into Burma. ¶5. (C) The Thais are understandably concerned about the negative impact on the Thai jewelry industry of the JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act. Our hope is that Thailand will do more to join the effort to pressure the junta for change, and not simply see the Act as an unfair trade matter to be taken to the WTO. We should encourage Sompong to work with us towards a democratic transition in Burma, while understanding their challenges in managing a complex neighborly relationship and concerns about JADE Act implementation. LAO-HMONG -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Thailand has a long history of providing sanctuary to people from neighboring states who are fleeing persecution. In recent months, however, we have been concerned by the RTG's return to Laos of 1400 Lao Hmong awaiting screening for claims of refugee status. The RTG claimed these individuals returned voluntarily, and that the vast majority of the Hmong do not meet international criteria as refugees, but the procedures the RTG used did not meet UNHCR standards for voluntary movements. There was no independent third party monitor to ensure that returnees sign affidavits of voluntariness and had an opportunity to change their minds. A closed government screening process to identify those who might face persecution has been similarly opaque. While thanking the Thais for their traditional hospitality to neighboring populations, we have stressed the need for transparency and proper third-party monitoring in any return of Lao Hmong, as well as in the vetting process undertaken without UNHCR involvement. TENSION WITH CAMBODIA -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In July and August, Thai-Cambodian tension rose substantially after the inscription of the Preah Vihear temple on UNESCO's World Heritage list. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that the temple is situated in Cambodia, a decision Thailand respects, but the two countries dispute control of the surrounding territory, and the Thais felt that the inscription provided recognition of Cambodian claim to the area. With opposition forces in Thailand seeking to put pressure on the RTG, and with elections approaching in Cambodia, the issue became highly politicized in both countries, and both governments built up their military presence in the border area. Bilateral talks and the passage of time helped reduce the tension, and both sides drew down their forces at Preah Vihear, but focus has now shifted to two other temples elsewhere along the border: Ta Kwai and Ta Muen (see ref B). We have continually reminded the RTG that we urge a bilateral diplomatic resolution to this ongoing dispute. THAI CHAIRMANSHIP OF ASEAN -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Thailand assumed the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July. If the ASEAN Charter is ratified by all members and comes into force, Thailand will hold the chairmanship until the end of 2009. During this transition period for ASEAN, Thailand can play a more critical than usual in leading on key regional issues, such as the Southeast Asian policy toward reform in Burma, BANGKOK 00002940 003.2 OF 003 establishing an ASEAN human rights body, and empowering civil society throughout ASEAN, not just in its leading democracies. Thailand's domestic political turmoil has limited its ability to launch its term as ASEAN Chair with vigorous leadership, but we have nevertheless frequently voiced our support for Thailand's chairmanship. THAI DEMOCRACY - A SOCIETY DIVIDED -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The current coalition has been challenged by a group of ardent protesters, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD),which originally formed in 2006 to push for the ouster of then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. (Thaksin is currently in the U.K., having chosen to flee abroad rather than to face court proceedings relating to alleged abuse of power.) The PAD resumed its protests over the Samak government in May in the wake of the Preah Vihear controversy. PAD protesters stormed Government House, the formal seat of government, August 26, and have been ensconced there ever since, despite Samak stepping down September 9 after a conflict-of-interest court decision. The RTG has been reluctant to use force to evict the protesters, fearing a violent clash, which could prompt calls for military intervention in politics. Despite widespread Thai appreciation for democracy, there is also significant sentiment favoring the use of undemocratic means to block Thaksin and his allies from power or restructure the nature of Thai elected government. We have consistently called for the standoff between the RTG and PAD to be resolved peacefully, within the framework of the constitution and the rule of law, and, when appropriate, reminded interlocutors that we would strongly oppose any military intervention in politics. THE SOUTHERN INSURGENCY -------------- ¶10. (C) An ethno-nationalist separatist insurgency by Malay Muslims in Thailand's far south remains perhaps the country's primary security challenge. Since January 2004, over 3000 people have been killed in the conflict; the violence is having a growing influence on the local economy as tourism, cross border trade, and investment have declined. The RTG maintains the situation in southern Thailand is a purely domestic issue and is wary of any outside involvement, particularly from the U.S. Although there have been inquiries from disparate RTG entities regarding assistance and training specifically for the south, these appear to not have been coordinated at the national level. The RTG has been somewhat successful in managing the violence in the southern provinces through more professional actions by security forces, but we have no indication the RTG is ready to address the core social justice issues or to offer concessions necessary to end the insurgency. We remain concerned about continuing allegations of human rights abuses. Our message has been one of willingness to help when asked, but understanding of Thai concerns about outside involvement. JOHN