THE THAKSIN RESTORATION: SAMAK SUNDARAVEJ ELECTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000282 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM KDEM KJUS TH SUBJECT: THE THAKSIN RESTORATION: SAMAK SUNDARAVEJ ELECTED AS THAILAND'S PRIME MINISTER REF: A. BANGKOK 276 (SAMAK BIO) ¶B. 07 BANGKOK 4734 (WARY FRONTRUNNER) BANGKOK 00000282 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The House of Representatives elected People's Power Party (PPP) leader Samak Sundaravej as Prime Minister on January 28, and he will likely receive his formal appointment by King Bhumibol in a few days, forming a cabinet soon thereafter. Samak received full support from all political parties except for the Democrat Party, which unanimously opposed his candidacy. The victory of Samak, an abrasive figure who could not have become Prime Minister without the active support of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the 2006 coup d'etat and the interim government installed by the coup leaders. Most politically aware Thais believe that Samak's principal agenda is to roll back the steps taken since the coup against Thaksin. We would not be surprised if he were to favor a new round of elections within 1-2 years, after opening the door to participation of disenfranchised former Thai Rak Thai officials and possibly overseeing constitutional reforms. So long as Thaksin continues to provide leadership and funding, we see no reason why the current coalition centered around PPP cannot remain united. The political environment makes it less likely that ongoing investigations of improprieties by Thaksin will bear fruit. End Summary. SAMAK WINS -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 28, the House of Representatives elected People Power Party (PPP) leader Samak Sundaravej as Prime Minister. (Ref A provides a bio of Samak.) Samak will formally assume the position of Prime Minister in coming days, after the King signs off on his appointment. After his formal appointment as Prime Minister, Samak will form a cabinet; we expect that most cabinet positions have already been determined during recent coalition negotiations. ¶3. (SBU) Samak was elected with 310 votes; the only other candidate, Democrat Party (DP) leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, received 163 votes. The vote was strictly along party lines; all Democrats voted for Abhisit, while all others voted for Samak. (The House has 480 seats; three members elected in recent re-run elections have not yet been certified, one member was absent due to illness, and Samak, Abhisit, and House President Yongyuth Tiyapairath abstained.) ¶4. (C) Samak's notoriously abrasive manner (see ref A) made him a highly unlikely candidate for Prime Minister before he assumed the leadership of PPP in August, at which time he openly acknowledged he was a "nominee" of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Given the substantial plurality that PPP won in December's election, it would have been mathematically possible but, in practical terms, highly difficult to block PPP from forming a government. PPP's plurality flowed from the party's effective political organization, the lingering genuine popularity of Thaksin in many rural areas, and dissatisfaction with the interim administration installed by the coup leaders. The construction of the PPP-centered coalition, however, reflected primarily the desire of party leaders to secure government positions for themselves and/or their lieutenants. Most political parties decided to throw their lot in with PPP despite (rather than because of) Samak's leadership. SAMAK'S AGENDA -------------- ¶5. (C) In August 2007, Samak privately told the then-Ambassador that he envisioned himself as a transitional BANGKOK 00000282 002.2 OF 003 figure who would help to pave the way for Thaksin's return to Thailand (ref B). Samak has publicly advocated an amnesty for the 111 members of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) executive board, including Thaksin, who lost their political rights for a period of five years following the Constitutional Tribunal's May 2007 dissolution of TRT. We would also expect that the authorities will soon move to release the funds of Thaksin's -- worth well over one billion USD -- that have been frozen since June 2007. While legal investigations into Thaksin-era corruption (including by Thaksin himself) may continue, the political environment is now hostile toward such probes; witnesses may prove reluctant to come forward, investigating authorities may find reason to drag their feet, and judges may be more inclined to give Thaksin the benefit of the doubt. ¶6. (C) We would expect many policies of the Samak administration to resemble those of Thaksin's. Samak was not affiliated with TRT -- in fact, he prevailed over one of Thaksin's closest associates, then-TRT Deputy Leader Sudarat Keyuraphan, in the race for Bangkok Governor in 2000 -- but former TRT figures form the core of PPP, which openly advocated continuation of Thaksin's populist policies. Samak told us in August that he would take a tough line toward secessionists in southern Thailand, and we expect little or no accountability for Thaksin-era human rights abuses in the southern border provinces (or elsewhere). PPP figures also have spoken publicly of reviving the Thaksin-era anti-narcotics campaign, which engendered violence but was popular in some quarters. It remains unclear whether Samak is likely to adopt a more accommodating stance toward the junta in Burma, as many had criticized Thaksin for doing. THE COALITION'S DURABILITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Thaksin and his agents have already achieved much by assembling a coalition that includes former staunch opponents and deserters from TRT, in the face of behind-the-scenes pressure from powerful enemies -- such as Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, who shared a mutual antagonism with Samak even before Samak joined Thaksin's camp. This coalition has already proven its worth by supporting the election of Samak as Prime Minister and of Yongyuth Tiyapairath -- one of Thaksin's most hard-nosed dirty tricksters -- as House President (commonly referred to as Speaker). House members have so far shown tremendous party discipline and, with the heaviest lifting already done, Thaksin appears to have the resources to keep the coalition together for the near future. Politicians who just emerged from a relatively long hiatus are unlikely to want to rush into another expensive campaign season. Also, the leaders of relatively new parties that performed relatively poorly in the December would likely worry that another election will further reduce their presence in the House. ¶8. (C) The source of greatest pressure for a new round of elections may be the desire of disenfranchised TRT executives, who play a role in nearly all parties represented in the House except for the Democrat Party, to return to the game. If they regain their political rights after an amnesty bill makes its way through the legislature, they may want an opportunity to win election to the House, although they may be satisfied with a reshuffle that provides them with cabinet seats. (Of all the cabinet members, only the Prime Minister needs to be an elected member of the House.) Many parties, including the DP, have expressed interest in constitutional reform, and the amendment process -- likely to take longer than an amnesty -- may presage widespread calls for new elections. ¶9. (C) While the above factors imply that the government either will enjoy a relatively smooth ride or dissolve itself in a voluntary or controlled manner, there are some foreseeable developments that could prove highly disruptive: BANGKOK 00000282 003.2 OF 003 - Samak has been sentenced to two years' imprisonment on defamation charges and is currently free on bail (ref A); he could lose his appeal(s) and be compelled to report for incarceration. - PPP's former Deputy Leader Yongyuth Tiyapairath remains under investigation for election improprieties, and a finding that he violated election laws could lead to Constitutional Court dissolution proceedings against PPP. (As noted in para five, however, the political environment seems not to be conducive to harsh measures against Thaksin's allies.) - The Election Commission has disqualified executives of the Chart Thai and Matchima Thipathai parties for election improprieties, leaving them vulnerable to a Commission request that the Constitutional Court dissolve the two parties. Dissolution would have dramatic repercussions, although by itself the dissolution would not deprive PPP of majority support in the House. - Some of PPP's junior partners are showing signs of significant internal factionalism. The party discipline displayed to date could weaken dramatically, with uncertain consequences. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Samak's election means that only a few pro forma steps need to occur before a democratically-elected government is in place. Samak's election clearly signals that Thaksin's return to influence is proceeding apace, in part because of Thaksin's political skills and access to wealth, but also because of a backlash against both the 2006 coup and the ineptitude of the interim government installed by the coupmakers. It remains to be seen whether the military intervention and its aftermath has either made Thaksin more humble (we doubt it),or -- more likely -- left segments of the elite and middle class too disheartened to support once again sizeable anti-Thaksin protests like those that took place in 2005-2006 and helped to legitimize the coup. JOHN