RESPONSE TO ACTION REQUEST ON UPDATED P5+1 PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001997 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO ISN/RA, RICHARD NEPHEW AND NEA/IR, ROLAND MCKAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IR TH SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO ACTION REQUEST ON UPDATED P5+1 PACKAGE FOR IRAN REF: STATE 064530 Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Having previously provided copies of the updated P5 1 package for reference, PolCouns and Poloff met with Counselor Dao Vibulpanich and First Secretary Pimpiree Pyramarn (Iran desk officer) of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of South Asian, Middle East and African Affairs and Third Secretary Pakawat Srisukwattana of the Peace, Security and Disarmament Division of the International Organizations Department on June 25 and made the points in reftel. ¶2. (C) Vibulpanich was sympathetic to the efforts of P5 1 to re-engage Iran and commented that the updated P5 1 package coupled with Iran's May 2008 proposal were auspicious signs and evidence of goodwill among the countries for future negotiations. In contrasting the two packages, Vibulpanich suggested that whereas the P5 1 package depicted Iran as requiring the assistance of the international community on various socioeconomic and other issues, Iran's proposal demonstrated Iran's view of itself as a global player. Vibulpanich contended that aspects of the P5 1 proposal had the potential to be interpreted by the Iranians as condescending. ¶3. (C) Having carefully analyzed both the June 2006 and June 2007 P5 1 proposals, Vibulpanich noted her impression that there were few significant differences between the two proposals. Nevertheless, Vibulpanich expressed support for the renewed efforts to engage Iran and find a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. Vibulpanich reiterated Thailand's support for Iran's right to civilian nuclear power and seemed to favor the position that Iran should not be singled out and subjected to additional safeguards and protocol under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ¶4. (C) While sympathetic to the P5 1 efforts, Vibulpanich indicated that Thailand had no plans to become more actively or directly involved in the issue. Srisukwattana noted that Thailand was not an active member of the IAEA and added that Thailand's term at IAEA would end in September 2008. ¶5. (C) When queried for their impressions about the success of the updated incentive package, Vibulpanich and Pyramarn referred to an editorial in the Tehran press which acknowledged the opportunity the proposals represented in terms of negotiations, but criticized the lack of difference from the June 2006 version. Vibulpanich inquired about the U.S. outlook for the success of the dual track approach, background on why the proposal was introduced, and Iran's response to date. Vibulpanich also inquired about cooperation between the United States and Europe on sanctions against Iran and implications of former Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton's prediction of a possible Israeli strike against Iran and press reporting that the State Department was considering establishing an interests section in Tehran. Post drew on reftel and previous guidance where possible to respond to their questions. ¶6. (U) Embassy Bangkok's point of contact is Political Officer Lisa Kaleczyc. JOHN