RESPONSE TO ACTION REQUEST ON UPDATED P5+1 PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001997

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO ISN/RA, RICHARD NEPHEW AND NEA/IR, ROLAND
MCKAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IR TH
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO ACTION REQUEST ON UPDATED P5+1 PACKAGE
FOR IRAN

REF: STATE 064530

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Having previously provided copies of the updated P5 1
package for reference, PolCouns and Poloff met with Counselor
Dao Vibulpanich and First Secretary Pimpiree Pyramarn (Iran
desk officer) of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Department of South Asian, Middle East and African Affairs
and Third Secretary Pakawat Srisukwattana of the Peace,
Security and Disarmament Division of the International
Organizations Department on June 25 and made the points in
reftel.


2. (C) Vibulpanich was sympathetic to the efforts of P5 1 to
re-engage Iran and commented that the updated P5 1 package
coupled with Iran's May 2008 proposal were auspicious signs
and evidence of goodwill among the countries for future
negotiations. In contrasting the two packages, Vibulpanich
suggested that whereas the P5 1 package depicted Iran as
requiring the assistance of the international community on
various socioeconomic and other issues, Iran's proposal
demonstrated Iran's view of itself as a global player.
Vibulpanich contended that aspects of the P5 1 proposal had
the potential to be interpreted by the Iranians as
condescending.


3. (C) Having carefully analyzed both the June 2006 and June
2007 P5 1 proposals, Vibulpanich noted her impression that
there were few significant differences between the two
proposals. Nevertheless, Vibulpanich expressed support for
the renewed efforts to engage Iran and find a peaceful
solution to the ongoing conflict. Vibulpanich reiterated
Thailand's support for Iran's right to civilian nuclear power
and seemed to favor the position that Iran should not be
singled out and subjected to additional safeguards and
protocol under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).


4. (C) While sympathetic to the P5 1 efforts, Vibulpanich
indicated that Thailand had no plans to become more actively
or directly involved in the issue. Srisukwattana noted that
Thailand was not an active member of the IAEA and added that
Thailand's term at IAEA would end in September 2008.


5. (C) When queried for their impressions about the success
of the updated incentive package, Vibulpanich and Pyramarn
referred to an editorial in the Tehran press which
acknowledged the opportunity the proposals represented in
terms of negotiations, but criticized the lack of difference
from the June 2006 version. Vibulpanich inquired about the
U.S. outlook for the success of the dual track approach,
background on why the proposal was introduced, and Iran's
response to date. Vibulpanich also inquired about
cooperation between the United States and Europe on sanctions
against Iran and implications of former Ambassador to the
United Nations John Bolton's prediction of a possible Israeli
strike against Iran and press reporting that the State
Department was considering establishing an interests section
in Tehran. Post drew on reftel and previous guidance where
possible to respond to their questions.


6. (U) Embassy Bangkok's point of contact is Political
Officer Lisa Kaleczyc.
JOHN