SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, CULTURE AND RELIGION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001778 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, CULTURE AND RELIGION IN SOUTHRN THAILAND REF: BANGKOK 00845 (INSURGENTS PUSH THE ENVELOPE) BANGKOK 00001778 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge, d,Affaires a. i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU)Summary: On May 26 and 27, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members Jonah Blank and Frank Jannuzi traveled with Poloff to Narathiwat, Pattani, Hat Yai and Songkhla in southernmost Thailand for discussions about the root causes of the insurgency in Thailand's deep south, and the potential for the conflict to take on a more Islamist character. In meetings with NGO leaders, academics, clerics and journalists, the delegation was told the conflict was about ethnicity and Malay identity, and only about religion in that religion could not be separated from Malay identity in the deep south. Although Wahabism is a small but growing influence in the region, its adherents seem to be more a part of the solution than the problem. Contacts were ambiguous about the security situation, consistently telling the delegation that the number of attacks was down, but the severity of attacks has increased. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU)In a late May trip to Thailand's deep south provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Songkhla, Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional staff members Frank Jannuzi and Jonah Blank, accompanied by Poloff, spoke with Mission contacts about the situation in the South and the root causes of the conflict. This was Poloff,s first trip to the deep south after the mid-March bombing of the C.S. Pattani hotel. Apart from a heavy security presence at the airport in Narathiwat - due to the arrival of some high level military commander - the situation seemed the same as on previous trips. Checkpoints along the main highway linking Narathiwat and Pattani were manned, but relaxed. There appeared to be fewer military patrols, either on motorcycle or in pick-up trucks. Security at the C. S. Pattani hotel was heavier than on previous trips. A vehicle barrier separated the front of the hotel from the parking lot, and some 20 heavily armed police officers provided security for teachers attending a conference at the hotel. When the conference adjourned, most of the police contingent departed along with the teachers. Six of these officers stayed behind and were posted in front of the hotel. ¶4. (C)There was no consensus among our contacts about whether the security situation in the South is getting better or worse. There was broad agreement, however, that although there have been fewer attacks over the last two months, the attacks are more violent. More casualties are resulting from each attack. Chaiyong Maneepiluek, President of the Southern News Papers Association of Thailand, cautioned us about putting too much faith in the statistics about the violence. He said the number of attacks reported was inaccurate, as was any portrayal of the identity of the perpetrators. According to Chaiyong, many attacks simply go unreported and very rarely is a perpetrator ever identified. The newspapers simply REPORT the information the government gives them. Zakee Pitakumpol of Prince of Songkhla University in Hat Yai said people have grown accustomed to the violence so it is difficult to say whether the situation is better or worse. He agreed that the number of attacks was down but degree of violence up, and questioned government assertions that all violence is due to insurgents. He cited a recent example of a killing of a local politician in Saba Yoi district in Yala. The assailants used a Toyota truck - a vehicle in the South universally equated with security forces. He said the killing took place between two police checkpoints so he could not understand how it could have been perpetrated by militants. ¶5. (C)To set the stage for his trip south, Jonah Blank met with Human Rights Watch analyst Sunai Phasuk. Sunai led off with his trademark human rights briefing and told Blank that although attacks were down, the insurgency is on the rebound and more violent than before the C.S. Pattani was attacked. Sunai cited the mid-March death in Army custody of an Imam in Narathiwat province as an example of the types of incidents the insurgents are able to leverage in order to maintain BANGKOK 00001778 002.2 OF 003 support for the violence. He credited two NGOs, the Muslim Attorney's Center and the Working Group on Justice for Peace, as being two organizations trying to combat the atmosphere of official impunity that feeds the violence. By trying to hold officials accountable for their abuses in the South, "they are trying to show that the system can work," said Sunai. ¶6. (C)Turning to questions about the root causes of the insurgency, Sunai said it is a fight over identity and nationalism, with the central issue being Malay culture and identity. In his opinion, although the rule of law was important to solving the problem, legal and judicial reform alone would not end the conflict. According to Sunai, it is difficult for non-Malays to be a part of the community regardless of whether they are Muslim or not. Even with long standing roots in the community, people who are not of Malay descent are not trusted. ¶7. (SBU)In response to questions about religion, Sunai said the majority of people in the South are Sunni who generally subscribed to the Shafi school of Islamic thought, but overlay it with Malay history and culture. Militants who are involved in the insurgency come from this group. He said they have a strong belief in magic and the use of talisman for protection, similar to the amulets popular among Buddhist - things that are anathema to the more conservative Wahabist elements in the South. To illustrate his point, he spoke about Ustad Soh, the purported leader behind the Krue Sae Mosque attack in 2004. He described Soh and his followers as "crazy." On one wrist, they wear a cloth talisman that is supposed to protect them from harm. On the other wrist, they were prayer beads. He said the Shia community in the South is very small and generally aloof from the violence as is the Sufi community. ¶8. (SBU)In Narathiwat, Jannuzi and Blank met with Dr. Srisomphop Chitphiromsri from Prince of Songkhla University. Dr. Srisomphop agreed with Sunai,s comments that there were fewer but more violent attacks, but disagreed with the premise that the violence was getting worse. In answering questions about who the insurgents are, he said he divided Muslims in the South into two "schools," a new school and an old school. He said the new school was more Wahabist in orientation. This new school, though conservative, was not radical. He said these new school Muslims were primarily focused on education, and worked with the Thai government to end the violence. He credited Ismail Lutfi, rector of Yala Islamic University, as being a central pillar in this effort. Srisomphop described the old school as being more nationalistic and more focused on Malay identity and the Sultanate of Pattani. He associated the violence with this old school. Going on, he said the conflict was about cultural identity first, then national identity, and only then religion. ¶9. (C)Ahmad Somboon, President of the Thailand Center for Muslim and Democratic Development and former member of the National Reconciliation Committee, spoke primarily about the government's failures. He believes the problems in the South are born out of government indifference and failed policies. Starting with education, he said students from Pattani's public schools consistently test among the lowest in Thailand. Because the public institutions are not serving the needs of the population, people are justifiably turning to private Islamic schools. Although there is a plan for social and human resource development, he said no part of it has ever been implemented. He believes the government is too focused on security and stability as defined by the military, has not provided justice, and is ignoring issues of equality under the law. He believes the National Reconciliation Report was not widely distributed because former Prime Minister Thaksin had no intention of doing anything with it. Should the government attempt to work with the document now, it would likely go along ways towards solving the problems of the South. ¶10. (SBU)Dr Shukree Langbu-te, Dean of Political Science at Yala Islamic University (YIU),did not talk about the ethnic BANGKOK 00001778 003.2 OF 003 origins of the conflict, but focused the discussion on YIU's role in southern Thailand. He acknowledged the layered historical problems facing the deep south and the inability of southerners to take part in the administration and governance of the region because they lacked the skills and education. Beyond offering a venue at YIU for students to learn secular subjects in an Islamic environment, he is concerned with reconciliation and development. He said he was tired of trying to identify bad actors in the conflict and was now trying to identify "peace actors," or people who could play an active role in bringing peace to the provinces. He said every incoming student and staff member, prior to being hired or enrolling, gives an oath that they will not take part in "terrorist activities". In describing the YIU's core curriculum, he said that besides Islam, every student was required to take peace studies. When asked about his funding, he said all funds coming into YIU from outside donors must pass through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He included funds from governments like Saudi Arabia, individual donors residing outside the country, and NGOS. ¶11. (SBU)In separate meetings, Wisoot Binlateh, the chief of Academics and Foreign Affairs at the Songkhla Islamic Committee and Zakee Pitakumpol of Prince of Songkhla University in Hat Yai echoed previous themes that the issues in the South were those of identity and injustice. Wisoot said the Thai authorities have treated the southern Thai Malay Muslims badly. The Thai government has tried to take away their history, language and culture. Wisoot said southerners must be allowed to regain their culture and be equal citizens. According to Zakee Pitakumpol, all children in Thailand are taught from childhood that to be Thai is to be Buddhist - which leaves Muslims caught in a crisis of identity. When quizzed about the influence of Wahabism, Zakee said he sees no influence of radical Islam in the South. He said, "Our Wahabi is not radical." The insurgents are adherents to the form of Islam traditionally practiced on the Malay peninsula, not the stricter form of Islam practiced by the Wahabists. ¶12. (SBU) Comment: We heard two recurring themes on this trip. The first was that the security situation in southern Thailand continues to be tense; attacks have grown more violent, with fewer incidents causing more casualties. The second involved the contextual background to the daily violence: the conflict is about identity, culture, and religion, and where ethnic Malays fit in the Thai state. Although conservative Wahabist Islam has a following in southern Thailand, its adherents appear, at this point, to be more a part of the solution than the problem. ENTWISTLE