Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BANGKOK1778
2008-06-10 10:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, CULTURE AND RELIGION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001778 

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NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, CULTURE AND RELIGION
IN SOUTHRN THAILAND

REF: BANGKOK 00845 (INSURGENTS PUSH THE ENVELOPE)

BANGKOK 00001778 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge, d,Affaires a. i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001778

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, CULTURE AND RELIGION
IN SOUTHRN THAILAND

REF: BANGKOK 00845 (INSURGENTS PUSH THE ENVELOPE)

BANGKOK 00001778 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge, d,Affaires a. i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (SBU)Summary: On May 26 and 27, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff members Jonah Blank and Frank Jannuzi
traveled with Poloff to Narathiwat, Pattani, Hat Yai and
Songkhla in southernmost Thailand for discussions about the
root causes of the insurgency in Thailand's deep south, and
the potential for the conflict to take on a more Islamist
character. In meetings with NGO leaders, academics, clerics
and journalists, the delegation was told the conflict was
about ethnicity and Malay identity, and only about religion
in that religion could not be separated from Malay identity
in the deep south. Although Wahabism is a small but growing
influence in the region, its adherents seem to be more a part
of the solution than the problem. Contacts were ambiguous
about the security situation, consistently telling the
delegation that the number of attacks was down, but the
severity of attacks has increased. End Summary.


2. (SBU)In a late May trip to Thailand's deep south provinces
of Narathiwat, Pattani and Songkhla, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee professional staff members Frank Jannuzi and Jonah
Blank, accompanied by Poloff, spoke with Mission contacts
about the situation in the South and the root causes of the
conflict. This was Poloff,s first trip to the deep south
after the mid-March bombing of the C.S. Pattani hotel. Apart
from a heavy security presence at the airport in Narathiwat -
due to the arrival of some high level military commander -
the situation seemed the same as on previous trips.
Checkpoints along the main highway linking Narathiwat and
Pattani were manned, but relaxed. There appeared to be fewer
military patrols, either on motorcycle or in pick-up trucks.
Security at the C. S. Pattani hotel was heavier than on
previous trips. A vehicle barrier separated the front of the
hotel from the parking lot, and some 20 heavily armed police

officers provided security for teachers attending a
conference at the hotel. When the conference adjourned, most
of the police contingent departed along with the teachers.
Six of these officers stayed behind and were posted in front
of the hotel.


4. (C)There was no consensus among our contacts about whether
the security situation in the South is getting better or
worse. There was broad agreement, however, that although
there have been fewer attacks over the last two months, the
attacks are more violent. More casualties are resulting from
each attack. Chaiyong Maneepiluek, President of the Southern
News Papers Association of Thailand, cautioned us about
putting too much faith in the statistics about the violence.
He said the number of attacks reported was inaccurate, as was
any portrayal of the identity of the perpetrators. According
to Chaiyong, many attacks simply go unreported and very
rarely is a perpetrator ever identified. The newspapers
simply report the information the government gives them.
Zakee Pitakumpol of Prince of Songkhla University in Hat Yai
said people have grown accustomed to the violence so it is
difficult to say whether the situation is better or worse.
He agreed that the number of attacks was down but degree of
violence up, and questioned government assertions that all
violence is due to insurgents. He cited a recent example of
a killing of a local politician in Saba Yoi district in Yala.
The assailants used a Toyota truck - a vehicle in the South
universally equated with security forces. He said the
killing took place between two police checkpoints so he could
not understand how it could have been perpetrated by
militants.


5. (C)To set the stage for his trip south, Jonah Blank met
with Human Rights Watch analyst Sunai Phasuk. Sunai led off
with his trademark human rights briefing and told Blank that
although attacks were down, the insurgency is on the rebound
and more violent than before the C.S. Pattani was attacked.
Sunai cited the mid-March death in Army custody of an Imam in
Narathiwat province as an example of the types of incidents
the insurgents are able to leverage in order to maintain

BANGKOK 00001778 002.2 OF 003


support for the violence. He credited two NGOs, the Muslim
Attorney's Center and the Working Group on Justice for Peace,
as being two organizations trying to combat the atmosphere of
official impunity that feeds the violence. By trying to hold
officials accountable for their abuses in the South, "they
are trying to show that the system can work," said Sunai.


6. (C)Turning to questions about the root causes of the
insurgency, Sunai said it is a fight over identity and
nationalism, with the central issue being Malay culture and
identity. In his opinion, although the rule of law was
important to solving the problem, legal and judicial reform
alone would not end the conflict. According to Sunai, it is
difficult for non-Malays to be a part of the community
regardless of whether they are Muslim or not. Even with long
standing roots in the community, people who are not of Malay
descent are not trusted.


7. (SBU)In response to questions about religion, Sunai said
the majority of people in the South are Sunni who generally
subscribed to the Shafi school of Islamic thought, but
overlay it with Malay history and culture. Militants who are
involved in the insurgency come from this group. He said
they have a strong belief in magic and the use of talisman
for protection, similar to the amulets popular among Buddhist
- things that are anathema to the more conservative Wahabist
elements in the South. To illustrate his point, he spoke
about Ustad Soh, the purported leader behind the Krue Sae
Mosque attack in 2004. He described Soh and his followers as
"crazy." On one wrist, they wear a cloth talisman that is
supposed to protect them from harm. On the other wrist, they
were prayer beads. He said the Shia community in the South is
very small and generally aloof from the violence as is the
Sufi community.


8. (SBU)In Narathiwat, Jannuzi and Blank met with Dr.
Srisomphop Chitphiromsri from Prince of Songkhla University.
Dr. Srisomphop agreed with Sunai,s comments that there were
fewer but more violent attacks, but disagreed with the
premise that the violence was getting worse. In answering
questions about who the insurgents are, he said he divided
Muslims in the South into two "schools," a new school and an
old school. He said the new school was more Wahabist in
orientation. This new school, though conservative, was not
radical. He said these new school Muslims were primarily
focused on education, and worked with the Thai government to
end the violence. He credited Ismail Lutfi, rector of Yala
Islamic University, as being a central pillar in this effort.
Srisomphop described the old school as being more
nationalistic and more focused on Malay identity and the
Sultanate of Pattani. He associated the violence with this
old school. Going on, he said the conflict was about
cultural identity first, then national identity, and only
then religion.


9. (C)Ahmad Somboon, President of the Thailand Center for
Muslim and Democratic Development and former member of the
National Reconciliation Committee, spoke primarily about the
government's failures. He believes the problems in the South
are born out of government indifference and failed policies.
Starting with education, he said students from Pattani's
public schools consistently test among the lowest in
Thailand. Because the public institutions are not serving the
needs of the population, people are justifiably turning to
private Islamic schools. Although there is a plan for social
and human resource development, he said no part of it has
ever been implemented. He believes the government is too
focused on security and stability as defined by the military,
has not provided justice, and is ignoring issues of equality
under the law. He believes the National Reconciliation
Report was not widely distributed because former Prime
Minister Thaksin had no intention of doing anything with it.
Should the government attempt to work with the document now,
it would likely go along ways towards solving the problems of
the South.


10. (SBU)Dr Shukree Langbu-te, Dean of Political Science at
Yala Islamic University (YIU),did not talk about the ethnic

BANGKOK 00001778 003.2 OF 003


origins of the conflict, but focused the discussion on YIU's
role in southern Thailand. He acknowledged the layered
historical problems facing the deep south and the inability
of southerners to take part in the administration and
governance of the region because they lacked the skills and
education. Beyond offering a venue at YIU for students to
learn secular subjects in an Islamic environment, he is
concerned with reconciliation and development. He said he
was tired of trying to identify bad actors in the conflict
and was now trying to identify "peace actors," or people who
could play an active role in bringing peace to the provinces.
He said every incoming student and staff member, prior to
being hired or enrolling, gives an oath that they will not
take part in "terrorist activities". In describing the
YIU's core curriculum, he said that besides Islam, every
student was required to take peace studies. When asked about
his funding, he said all funds coming into YIU from outside
donors must pass through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He included funds from governments like Saudi Arabia,
individual donors residing outside the country, and NGOS.


11. (SBU)In separate meetings, Wisoot Binlateh, the chief of
Academics and Foreign Affairs at the Songkhla Islamic
Committee and Zakee Pitakumpol of Prince of Songkhla
University in Hat Yai echoed previous themes that the issues
in the South were those of identity and injustice. Wisoot
said the Thai authorities have treated the southern Thai
Malay Muslims badly. The Thai government has tried to take
away their history, language and culture. Wisoot said
southerners must be allowed to regain their culture and be
equal citizens. According to Zakee Pitakumpol, all children
in Thailand are taught from childhood that to be Thai is to
be Buddhist - which leaves Muslims caught in a crisis of
identity. When quizzed about the influence of Wahabism,
Zakee said he sees no influence of radical Islam in the
South. He said, "Our Wahabi is not radical." The insurgents
are adherents to the form of Islam traditionally practiced on
the Malay peninsula, not the stricter form of Islam practiced
by the Wahabists.


12. (SBU) Comment: We heard two recurring themes on this
trip. The first was that the security situation in southern
Thailand continues to be tense; attacks have grown more
violent, with fewer incidents causing more casualties. The
second involved the contextual background to the daily
violence: the conflict is about identity, culture, and
religion, and where ethnic Malays fit in the Thai state.
Although conservative Wahabist Islam has a following in
southern Thailand, its adherents appear, at this point, to be
more a part of the solution than the problem.
ENTWISTLE