HOW HOT IS IT, ANYWAY?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001612 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: HOW HOT IS IT, ANYWAY? REF: A. BANGKOK 1567 (POLITICAL TENSIONS) ¶B. BANGKOK 1293 (LESSONS LEARNED) ¶C. 06 BANGKOK 5929 (THAILAND: DIVIDED) ¶D. 06 BANGKOK 3916 (WHAT'S THAKSIN UP TO?) ¶E. 06 BANGKOK 2991 (STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF THAILAND) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The current state of political deadlock is similar in many ways to the protracted statemate of 2006. Of greatest concern are the repeated references in the media and by contacts of a serious threat to the monarchy. This fear is based on the increase in criticisms of the monarchal institution in the media, internet and even from within the current government. All sides of the political conflict are trying to exploit the monarchy for their own ends, with the military issuing warnings that they should stop. On a deeper level, there is concern that some politicians, including Thaksin, would try to abolish the monarchy if they could, especially if they held power when the aged King finally dies. ¶2. (C) There has also been a sharp increase in discussion of the prospects of violent clashes between the contending political camps. The announcement that the former anti-Thaksin coalition will hold a demonstration on Sunday, and that the pro-Thaksin side is preparing for counter-demonstrations, has fueled anxieties and speculation that the military might again intervene if the political conflict turned violent. The press has identified the First Army commander and a well-known Palace insider as two key figures in the conspiracy; the intense scrutiny of these two resulting from this media speculation, however, would seem to make it harder for them to carry out such a plot, even in Thailand. There is also speculation that the government itself could be feeding coup rumors in order to justify a pre-emptive move by its own supporters within the military. Informed and reasonable interlocutors are extremely discouraged, and warn of an impeding conflict more serious than in 2006. It should be possible to resolve these conflicts through peaceful and rational means, but few politicians appear to be interested in trying. Unless this changes, we can expect the political turbulence to continue for the foreseeable future. END SUMMARY ¶3. (C) Thai politics have been in a state of tension for a long time, leaving nerves frayed and anxieties high. The extraordinary events of the past two years have made the Thai public expect the worst. Despite the transition to an elected government with a comfortable parliamentary majority, politically-aware Thais seem to have little confidence that there will be a stable political environment over the next year. It seems that every politician's speech, academic conference and editorial features dark prognostications about imminent political clashes. While the public is concerned about the economy, especially rising fuel and food prices, the sources of deepest anxiety and fear are not practical issues, but perceived threats to the country's unity and the monarchy. These same fears dominated the political conflict in 2006. The September coup was supposed to resolve those issues: its failure to do so has left Thailand pretty much back where it started in 2006. Then, a seemingly-intractable political stalemate led to the military coup that was accepted by many as the only way to break the deadlock and move forward. Now the same kind of statemate seems to be looming, and it is not clear that the Thai have yet figured out a better way to resolve it this time (ref B). THREATS TO THE MONARCHY -------------- ¶4. (C) The most dangerous element in the current conflict is the repeated claim that the monarchy faces a serious threat. These claims are based on several developments. One is the proliferation of anti-monarchy statements appearing on the internet, both on anti-royalist websites and on more mainstream ones. Senior military officials recently warned the government to do more to shut down or block such websites. The recent case of a young activist who refused to stand up to show respect when the royal anthem was being played in a movie theater has sparked a wave of violent emotion - both for and against -- including threats against the young man's safety (septel). The case of Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Jakrapob (septel) has caused special concern. Jakrapob's repeated public attacks on the "patronage system" and "feudalism," as well as on the King's BANGKOK 00001612 002 OF 004 advisor, Privy Council President Prem, do not seem (to us, at least) to violate the letter of the lese majeste law. However, "everybody knows" that Jakrapob is opposed to the monarchy, and his careful avoidance of direct, open criticism of the King has not helped him to avoid lese majeste charges and the suspicion that he would like to make Thailand a republic. ¶5. (S) Although the King is genuinely beloved and respected, he and the institution of the monarchy have been subject to criticism regularly over the years. Even academics from "good" families and universities have gotten into trouble for their "leftist," anti-royal views. Yet, there is a feeling that the situation is different, and more serious, this time. In the first place, the internet and other independent media make the spread of such views so easy. The discussion of the King's role in Thai politics has left the classroom and academic journal, and is accessible to anyone. This is dangerous both because it facilitates the gathering of support for these views, and it mobilizes opponents who are outraged to read such scandalous reports. Second, the King himself is old, frail and ill, and the monarchal institution is weakening with him. The love for the Thai king is very personal -- fostered by a concerted effort by the Palace for sixty years -- and does not extend, at all, to his son and presumed heir. Whoever controls political power when the King dies could be in a very strong position to sway the destiny of the country - to preserve the monarchy or to turn Thailand into a republic. For the military and the royalists, it is a cause of deep concern to have known anti-monarchists like Jakrapob in important government positions. Threats to the monarchy tend to provoke an irrational overreaction from the military. THAKSIN REDUX -------------- ¶6. (C) Which brings us back to former Prime Minister Thaksin. He has been keeping what, for him, is a reasonably low profile. However, his involvement in the ongoing political struggle is no secret, and his alleged attempts to set himself up as the King's rival are not forgotten. During the recent vote on the new House Speaker (ref A),Thaksin showed that he is still directly involved in politics by personally calling MPs to rally support for a candidate who is the father of one of his most loyal henchmen. His role in choosing the current ministers is also clear. Despite Thaksin's repeated claims that he was done with elected office, other stories circulating cause many to doubt his claim. As one example, a retired advisor to the Ministry of Finance - a "Bangkok elite" -- told us a story recently: Thaksin was trying to persuade a local lawyer to charge Thaksin less for his legal services. Thaksin reportedly told the lawyer to accept a lower fee now, but promised that when Thaksin returned to power he could give the lawyer a good government position as a reward. Stories like this cannot be verified, but they are easily repeated and widely believed. The current plan to amend the 2007 Constitution, led by the pro-Thaksin People's Power Party, is particularly seen as part of the larger strategy to pave the way for Thaksin's return (ref A). BLOOD IN THE STREETS -------------- ¶7. (C) Another dangerous theme reprised from 2006 is the visceral fear of violent confrontation between the two political camps. This prospect evokes for many Thai the traumatic events of 1992, which resulted in dozens, if not hundreds, of deaths when the security forces shot protesters. Just like in 2006, there are repeated warnings in the media that there will be bloodshed when the rival political forces finally clash openly (ref C). In 2006, the coupmakers tried to justify the coup in part by saying that they had acted to prevent imminent violence, an excuse that was met with skepticism from many quarters. Respected military analyst Dr. Panitan Wattanyagorn told the press earlier this month that this time the military will wait "until there is a bloodbath. ...I have heard some senior generals say: "This time we should let them clash for a while and allow bloodshed to happen. Then we will come out." ¶8. (C) This particular fear has been fanned this week by the announcement that the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) will hold a large rally this Sunday against BANGKOK 00001612 003 OF 004 the planned constitutional amendments. A human rights NGO source told us that a pro-Thaksin group will hold their own event on Saturday, to test and see how big a crowd they can turn out in preparation for confronting the PAD - maybe this weekend, maybe another time. Interactions between the PAD and pro-Thaksin demonstrators have already been more heated than during the remarkably orderly protests of 2006, with the two sides throwing projectiles at each other during a March rally. Even if the leadership on both sides tries to exercise restraint, large crowds will be hard to control, perhaps harder than in 2006; the mood is just uglier now than it was then. WHO COULD POSSIBLY BE DUMB ENOUGH TO TRY THIS? -------------- - ¶9. (C) Press speculation has already identified some likely culprits in a coup scenario. First Army commander Prayut Chan-ocha is regularly named as the soldier most likely to putsch the government. This is probably in part just because the First Army has the resources in or close to the capital that would be needed to pull the coup off. Prayut supported the 2006 coup, and he, like Army Commander and former coupmaker Anupong, is formerly of the Queen's Guard and believed to be close to the Queen. (Prayut is close to the Anupong as well, but virtually all sources, public and private, believe that Anupong is trying to keep the military out of politics, at least for now.) ¶10. (C) Speculation also links Palace insider Piya Malakul to the coup plot (ref D). Piya appears to be quite close to the Queen, and was a very vehement opponent of Thaksin, although one who remains somewhat behind the scenes. Piya's involvement in the September 06 coup is not clear. In July 2006, however, Piya told us that the military might intervene if the political confrontation at that time was not otherwise revolved. (Comment: In our limited experience with him, Piya appears to be a very odd character who could well be screwy enough to be drawn into a misadventure of this kind. End comment.) WHO COUPS? -------------- ¶11. (C) Even in Thailand, it seems like a bad idea to have your coup plotting regularly discussed in the daily papers. The prevalence of public commentary, and the resulting close scrutiny of the First Army, would seem to have a deterrent effect on successful coupmaking. Like in 2006, however, there is also some speculation that the government itself might be looking for an excuse to use military forces loyal to its side to stifle opposition and safeguard its position. In such a case, the constant drumbeat of coup warnings could ultimately benefit the current government, perhaps giving a justification for a military intervention (declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, for example) in support of the government. If the process of amending the constitution is yet further tangled up and bogged down (ref A),some kind of "auto-coup" might be one of the few ways to put a stake through the heart of the 2007 Constitution, allowing the government to return to the 1997 charter, or something like it. In this scenario, the persistent reports of threats against the monarchy could be used by the government as a further excuse to justify a state of emergency. (Note: In 1976, a bloody assault on a university by right-wing paramilitaries was provoked in part by false reports that the students had hanged the Crown Prince in effigy. This kind of manipulation of alleged threats to the monarchy is not new here. Neither is the "auto-coup" - a tactic that was employed in 1971 in response to a somewhat similar time of political deadlock and tensions. End note.) COMMENT - NO EXIT, AGAIN -------------- ¶12. (C) This is a society in desperate need of reconciliation and a political leadership willing to put the people's interests first. Both these commodities are in short supply. Politicians on all sides continue to play politics with the monarchy, engaging in dangerous and destabilizing brinksmanship. Smart, moderate contacts are inclined to a striking pessimism, casting the current crisis as even more serious than 2006. One told us that the 2006 coup was just a preliminary round and the coming clash will be a "once in 50 years event." In Dr. Panitan's interview (para 7),he warned BANGKOK 00001612 004 OF 004 that, "If there is a military coup again, there will be a more serious crisis. This time, things are far more serious than last time." ¶13. (C) We will continue to warn senior contacts of the disastrous effect another coup or military intervention would have, but these decisions will probably not, in the end, be driven by rational calculations. Personal ambitions - particularly the interests of senior military officers and politicians contending for the top jobs -- will play a role. But the political dynamic is driven more by a deep-seated fear that, depending on how this conflict plays out, it could change the very nature of Thailand. Unless the country's leadership finds a way to achieve some kind of political truce, at least, we can expect the current turbulence to persist for the foreseeable future. JOHN