LEADING DEMOCRAT LEGISLATOR COMMENTS ON THAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001392

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM TH BM
SUBJECT: LEADING DEMOCRAT LEGISLATOR COMMENTS ON THAI
POLITICAL STABILITY

REF: A. BANGKOK 1380 (SURAKIART ON SOCIAL CONFLICT)

B. BANGKOK 1370 (BURMESE PM VISIT)

C. BANGKOK 1290 (DINNER WITH THAKSIN)

D. STATE 45471 (FLAWED REFERENDUM)

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Leading Democrat Party legislator Sukhumbhand
Paribatra told us on May 7 that current media speculation
about a possible coup d'etat evoked earlier rumors that
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra might orchestrate a
seizure of power to undo the effects of the 2006 coup.
Sukhumbhand assessed that possibility as "far-fetched" but
said the military could conceivably intervene if
demonstrations relating to constitutional amendment processes
were to turn violent. We conveyed our strong opposition to a
coup and will continue making that point with other contacts
in coming days. Sukhumbhand believed the relationship
between Thaksin and Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej was poor;
he also discussed other political actors providing a check on
Thaksin's influence while conceding his own party was largely
ineffective. Sukhumbhand said that if a new election were
held in the coming months, the People's Power Party (PPP)
would win a majority in the House. Sukhumbhand also
discussed the Democrats' shadow cabinet, the disposition of
2006 coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin, and his pessimism
about Thai policy toward Burma. End Summary.

PRO-THAKSIN COUP "FAR-FETCHED"...
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2. (C) Deputy Polcouns called on Democrat Party (DP)
legislator Sukhumbhand Paribatra on May 7. Referring to
media speculation about a possible coup d'etat, we asked
whether Sukhumbhand was hearing private concerns about a
possible military move to seize power. Sukhumbhand said that
when Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej publicly mentioned in
March that a coup d'etat could take place against him,
members of the political class were speculating about a coup
engineered by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
According to the rumored scenario, Thaksin would orchestrate
a coup in order to undo everything that the 2006 coup leaders
had done, e.g., restore the 1997 Constitution, reverse the
Constitutional Tribunal ruling that dissolved the Thai Rak
Thai Party (TRT),and end pending legal cases against Thaksin
and his family. Sukhumbhand believed that Thaksin was
currently impatient with Samak and angry that Samak's
administration had not quashed the legal cases against
Thaksin. Nevertheless, Sukhumbhand said that he considered
the scenario of a Thaksin-engineered coup "far-fetched." We
said we hoped no coup would take place and explained the
highly negative consequences for the U.S.-Thai relationship
in the event of a military seizure of power.

... BUT ALL BETS OFF IN CASE OF STREET VIOLENCE
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3. (C) Sukhumbhand said the military appeared to have learned
from the 2006 coup and its aftermath that soldiers had
neither the legitimacy nor the capability to govern Thailand.
He did not believe that the military leadership was inclined
to launch another coup. However, he said the military might
intervene in the event of violent conflict in the streets.
Sukhumbhand cautioned that he anticipated significant tension
in the coming weeks, as debate over potential constitutional
amendment proceeds; demonstrations and counter-demonstrations
were likely. He added that many Thai fortune tellers
anticipated violence, and fortune tellers' prophecies could
often be self-fulfilling.

DEMOCRATS' VIEW ON THE CONSTITUTION
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4. (C) The DP had not finalized its policy on constitutional
amendment, Sukhumbhand said. A few points of consensus

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within the party included:

- The current constitution should be amended;

- The amendment process should include popular participation;

- Amendment should not be driven by the self-interest of any
party; and

- There should be a delay in implementing any provision that
could be seen as affecting the self-interest of any party.

CHECKING THAKSIN'S INFLUENCE
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5. (C) Sukhumbhand said pessimistically that the DP was
currently incapable of providing an effective check on
Thaksin and his loyalists (i.e., the bulk of the People's
Power Party -- PPP). Other key actors currently offsetting
Thaksin included:

- The People's Alliance for Democracy -- the group that led
anti-Thaksin protests in 2005-2006, and currently the most
vocal opponent of constitutional amendment;

- PM Samak. As noted above, Sukhumbhand believed there was
friction between Samak and Thaksin. (Ref C provides
Thaksin's perspective on this question, as related to the
Ambassador.) Sukhumbhand viewed Samak as a fairly isolated
"Lone Ranger" whose interests did not necessarily align with
Thaksin's, but who could not be dismissed lightly, because of
his authority to dissolve parliament and the powers that he
held under the Internal Security Act; and

- Army Commander Anupong Paojinda. Sukhumbhand remarked that
Anupong was currently positioned to be courted for support by
both Samak and Thaksin, and he praised Anupong's ability to
maneuver in such a way that no one in the political class
thought ill of him.

NEW ELECTION?
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6. (C) Sukhumbhand said the DP would be unprepared for an
election in the near future. "Our coffers are empty," he
admitted. He projected pessimistically that if an election
were to take place under the 1997 (single-member district)
system, the DP's presence in the House would shrink
significantly. Sukhumbhand estimated that, in the event of a
new election, a pro-Thaksin party would win an absolute
majority of at least 300 seats; most other political parties
created in the wake of Thai Rak Thai's dissolution either
would be unable to find financing or would be absorbed into
PPP or any new party might take PPP's place as the
pro-Thaksin successor to TRT. He said the best situation for
the DP would be for Samak to remain in office for a couple of
years, allowing the party time to prepare for elections, but
Sukhumbhand doubted Samak's administration would last that
long. He foresaw a new election taking place either
immediately after a constitutional amendment process, or
earlier, if political pressure on Samak were to lead him to
dissolve the House.

SONTHI: WHERE IS HE NOW?
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7. (C) We remarked that the National Legislative Assembly
(created by the 2006 coup leaders) seemed to have blundered
in passing the Internal Security Act just prior to the 2007
election. Sukhumbhand said most of the blame for that
legislative push fell on 2006 coup leader Sonthi
Boonyaratglin, who miscalculated the election outcome. Up
until the last moment, Sukhumbhand related, Sonthi believed
he would be able to forge a governing coalition consisting of
all parties except for PPP and backing Sonthi's selection as
Prime Minister: Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana Party Leader
Chettha Thanacharo, a former Army Commander.


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8. (C) We asked whether Sonthi remained active in political
circles. Sukhumbhand said he thought not; he believed Sonthi
had reached an agreement of sorts with Thaksin -- "no war, no
peace." Sukhumbhand also guessed that Sonthi was currently
"enjoying his wealth," saying he believed Sonthi had become
significantly wealthier after the coup.

DP SHADOW CABINET
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9. (C) We asked Sukhumbhand's assessment of the DP's shadow
cabinet. (The shadow cabinet, formed in early 2008, is a new
innovation for Thailand; Sukhumbhand is the DP's shadow
Foreign Minister.) Sukhumbhand said that it was too early to
assess the shadow cabinet's efficacy. The shadow cabinet met
each week on Thursday mornings; it had not yet been able to
garner significant media attention for its positions.
Sukhumbhand lamented that the DP lacked the staff and data to
support the work of the shadow ministers.

BURMA
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10. (C) Drawing on ref D, we explained the USG perspective on
Burma's constitutional referendum. Sukhumbhand said he had
been dismayed by what he perceived as the current Thai
administration's overly accommodative stance toward Burma.
He expected Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama to take an
approach similar to that which prevailed during Thaksin's
administration. Samak's recent statements (ref B) were also
cause for concern, Sukhumbhand said. Samak added that the
MFA bureaucracy would not push for reform in Burma. He
assessed MFA Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul as
"sympathetic" toward Burma. Sukhumbhand related that when he
(Sukhumbhand) became Deputy Foreign Minister in 1997,
Virasakdi was Director General for Asian Affairs; at that
time, Virasakdi privately echoed the Burmese regime's
position that the 1990 election in Burma was meant only to
elect members of a constitution drafting assembly, even
though most governments believed the elected candidates had
won seats in a fully-empowered legislature.

COMMENT
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11. (C) There has been a notable increase in the amount of
public speculation about a possible coup d'etat, although we
think such a development unlikely. Sukhumbhand is a credible
interlocutor, and we found his perspective on the matter to
be relatively balanced, as he neither ruled out the
possibility nor saw it as likely. We will contact numerous
interlocutors in coming days to continue sounding out views
on this issue and express strong USG opposition to any
prospective extraconstitutional seizure of power.
JOHN