FORMER DPM SURAKIART WORRIES ABOUT SOCIAL CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001380 SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM TH BM SUBJECT: FORMER DPM SURAKIART WORRIES ABOUT SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THAILAND REF: BANGKOK 1370 (BURMESE PM VISIT) BANGKOK 00001380 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Former Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai told the Ambassador in a May 2 meeting that harmful divisions persisted in Thailand. Surakiart worried that former Prime Minister Thaksin would generate instability by pushing for speedy amendment of the constitution; he also complained of efforts by those in Thaksin's camp to undermine the monarchy and the Privy Council. He suggested the formation of a national unity government -- an idea we do not believe will gather momentum in the near future. He also asked the USG view on a prospective coup d'etat. The Ambassador explained the severe adverse reaction and negative ramifications of another coup. The Ambassador expressed dismay over some recent public comments Prime Minister Samak made on Burma; Surakiart expressed broad pessimism over the RTG's policy toward Burma and its potential to generate meaningful accomplishments as ASEAN Chair. Surakiart disputed rumors that Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda suffered a serious fall, saying he suffered only from bronchitis. End Summary. SERIOUS SOCIAL DIVISIONS REMAIN -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador called on former Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai at his Siam Premier law firm on May 2. Surakiart expressed concern about political conditions in Thailand, noting the post-election persistence of extreme social divisions generated by the controversial Thaksin administration. Surakiart explained pessimistically that Thaksin -- whom Surakiart clearly viewed as retaining significant influence -- continued to heed the advice of hawkish figures such as Yongyuth Tiyapairath and Newin Chidchob, who had advocated a violent confrontation with anti-Thaksin demonstrators prior to the 2006 coup d'etat. ¶3. (C) There was substantial uncertainty in Thai politics, Surakiart noted. He highlighted the prospective dissolution of the People's Power Party (PPP),based on an Election Commission ruling that Yongyuth, when a Deputy Leader of PPP, had committed electoral improprieties. Another important factor was the possibility of an appeals court ruling upholding a libel case against Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, rendering him ineligible to hold a seat in the House of Representatives or to serve as Prime Minister. ¶4. (C) Surakiart believed that Thaksin primarily focused on securing his assets and protecting his family against legal charges. He believed Thaksin would seek to advance his goals by pushing from behind the scenes for a fast constitutional amendment process that would eliminate the legal basis for the Asset Examination Committee (AEC) and the cases that body built against him. A rushed amendment process would energize Thaksin's opponents and lead to demonstrations, Surakiart worried. Should amendment prove impractical, Thaksin or his backers might try to upend the current government and seize power through extraconstitutional means, although Army Commander Anupong Paojinda and others in the military would not support this approach. (Surakiart stressed that his belief in this scenario flowed from his analysis of political conditions rather than from "intelligence" on Thaksin's intentions or activities.) ¶5. (C) Surakiart also complained of a continuing "movement" to attack the monarchy. He understood this movement as targeting the monarchy both directly, especially on internet websites, and indirectly, through critical comments about the Privy Council. Surakiart noted that the general public would not be able to distinguish between attacks on the Privy Council and attacks directly on the monarchy. Such attacks were unnecessary, as the royal family and civilian politicians had different roles, and neither should be BANGKOK 00001380 002.2 OF 003 threatened by the success of the other. Relating that he had met Thaksin for breakfast in London approximately two months ago, Surakiart said he had urged Thaksin not to fight publicly with Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the 2007 election had failed to resolve serious conflicts between Thai social groups. Nevertheless, the Ambassador viewed Thais as fundamentally democratic and capitalistic in outlook, providing a certain degree of stability, despite the political uncertainty. The Ambassador suggested that both pro- and anti-Thaksin factions shared responsibility for the country's current situation; Thaksin generally sought to dominate his opponents, rather than compromise with them. The Democrat Party, meanwhile, criticized Thaksin but failed to offer a clear alternative to his policies. ¶7. (C) Surakiart concurred with the Ambassador's view on the Democrat Party's failure to credibly challenge the PPP. He said pessimistically that he saw no other viable challenger to the pro-Thaksin forces: the Motherland Party, which he had previously supported, was "too small," and Suwit Khunkitti, the Party Leader, "can go both ways on any issue." Surakiart dismissed the Chart Thai Party (Thailand's third largest), saying its Party Leader, Banharn Silapa-Archa, was the product of a bygone era, and he no longer merited serious consideration. Other parties were negligible. SURAKIART'S SUGGESTED WAY OUT -------------- ¶8. (C) Considering the various factors weighing on Thailand, Surakiart said the best way forward would be for all key actors to set aside personal conflicts and to stop attacking each other (and, specifically, to avoid attacks on the Privy Council and Monarchy). Surakiart several times advocated the formation of a government of national unity, including all political parties, which would allow more "professionals" to hold key positions. Surakiart hoped that this new government, with a new Prime Minister, could remain in place for at least a year, during which time a constitutional amendment process could proceed at a moderate, thoughtful pace. Surakiart lamented that he did not know of a senior figure with sufficient status to broker such an arrangement; he suggested the Ambassador might help advocate this course of action. (The Ambassador did not address that suggestion.) ¶9. (C) Surakiart indicated he was uncertain about the degree of unity in the Thai military. He also asked how the USG would react if another coup d'etat were to take place. The Ambassador explained that the USG would immediately impose restrictions on military assistance and would likely seek even harsher measures. Another coup would erode confidence in the U.S.-Thai alliance, the Ambassador said, and it was difficult to envision how it would serve either Thai or U.S. interests. FOREIGN AFFAIRS -------------- ¶10. (C) Turning to international affairs, the Ambassador noted that Prime Minister Samak had recently made some unhelpful public comments on the situation in Burma (reftel). Surakiart said he, too, had been displeased by Samak's tone on Burma. Given the PPP-led administration's early tone, Surakiart found it hard to envision that Thailand would generate any meaningful accomplishments as ASEAN Chair, after assuming that role this coming July. PREM'S HEALTH -------------- ¶11. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, the Ambassador asked whether Surakiart was aware of Privy Council President Prem's state of health. (Prem, in his mid-80's, was recently rumored to have suffered a serious fall at his residence.) Surakiart echoed public statements by Prem's associates, saying Prem was "OK" and merely suffered from bronchitis. BANGKOK 00001380 003.2 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Other Thai politicians have at times suggested forming a national unity government, but Surakiart -- whose current degree of influence is unclear to us -- is the first to suggest this idea since Samak's cabinet's inauguration. Forming a national unity government would allow the government to draw on a reasonably sized pool of talent associated with the Democrat Party, but it would not necessarily enhance political stability, because at present the Democrats are not agitating effectively against PPP. In fact, given widespread complaints that Thaksin was able to dominate Thai politics because of weakened checks and balances, ONE could reasonably argue that Thailand's system of governance would benefit more by having a capable opposition party than by having an all-inclusive governing coalition. ¶13. (C) Surakiart's main goals appear to be slowing Thaksin's reacquisition of political power, and establishing a modus vivendi between Thaksin and the Palace. Since the December election, events have favored Thaksin, and his foes appear uneasy with the current state of affairs. It is unclear whether Surakiart's raising the possibility of another coup might imply that some political figures would advocate such a course of action -- we have not seen evidence of planning along this line -- but the Ambassador's comments were quite clear that the USG would take a highly negative view of military interference in political processes. JOHN