ASSESSING BAHANGA'S ATTACK ON NAMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000960 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018 TAGS: ASEC PINS PGOV PINR ML SUBJECT: ASSESSING BAHANGA'S ATTACK ON NAMPALA REF: A. BAMAKO 419 ¶B. BAMAKO 463 ¶C. BAMAKO 932 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary. A band of Tuareg rebels led by Ibrahim Bahanga attacked the Malian military post in Nampala, in the northernmost portion of the central region of Segou, during the early morning hours of December 20. Fighting reportedly lasted for several hours. Estimates of Malian casualties, both military and civilian, remain hazy. Military contacts reported 20 soldiers killed and 11 others wounded. Malian government contacts have reported numbers nearly twice as high. There are also conflicting reports about whether Bahanga captured any Malian soldiers during the offensive. President Amadou Toumani Toure appeared on national television after the attack. Although evidently exasperated by Bahanga, Toure once again sought to defuse any simmering ethnic tensions by re-asserting Mali's commitment to peace in the north and portraying Bahanga as nothing more than a self-interested narco-trafficker. Possible explanations for Bahanga's attack on Nampala vary, with some speculating that Bahanga is trying to strengthen his negotiating position in advance of renewed meetings over the Algiers Accords in Kidal, and others believing that Bahanga is simply trying to provoke Mali and other northern actors into a full-scale rebellion. End Summary. -------------- Details of Attack in Nampala -------------- 2.(U) Tuareg rebels associated with Ibrahim Bahanga attacked the Malian military base in Nampala during the early morning hours of December 20. Nampala is the northernmost town in the central region of Segou, near Mali's border with Mauritania. On December 22 the Malian government newspaper l'Essor said the incident marked the first time Bahanga has attacked Malian forces outside his home region of Kidal. This is not, howver, the first time Tuareg rebels have attacked military outpost in the Segou region. On May 6, 2008, Tuareg rebels aligned with the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) attacked the military base in Diabali, a little more than 100KM south of Nampala along the road to Niono (site of the MCC irrigation project) and Segou (Ref. A). 3.(U) According to the l'Essor, the group that attacked Nampala had 16 4x4s carrying more than 50 individuals. Casualty numbers vary widely. The l'Essor reported 15 Malian soldiers killed and 13 others wounded. The l'Essor reported an unknown number of "bandits" killed or wounded, and claimed that Malian forces captured 2 attackers. The rebels took three Malian soldiers hostage. 4.(C) Casualty numbers provided by Malian officials are somewhat higher. Malian military contacts told the DATT's office that 20 Malian soldiers were killed and another 11 were wounded. Separate government sources, including Minister of Territorial Administration, General Kafougouna Kone, told the Embassy that casualties were closer to 50 or 60 individuals. Several Malian contacts said losses suffered by the Malian military were much greater than those incurred during the May 21 attack by the ADC in Abeibara, in the region of Kidal, which left perhaps as many as 30 Malian soldiers dead and several dozen captured (Ref. B). 5.(C) Initial reports indicated that some civilians living in the camp may have been among those killed or wounded. Malian officials have subsequently insisted that casualties were limited to Malian military personnel. On December 23 the Algerian DCM told the Embassy that he believed civilian casualties had occurred and that this marked the first time a Tuareg rebel attack has killed or wounded civilians. Information regarding potential hostages is also contradictory. Two government sources told the Embassy on December 21 that three soldiers were captured during the attack, including the Prefect or Sub-Prefect of Nampala. On December 23 military sources told the Embassy that reports of Malian soldiers captured by Bahanga in Nampala were incorrect. The Algerian DCM also said he did not believe any hostages were taken. Tuareg sources, on the other hand, have indicated the presence of new hostages. Tuareg contacts also report that two rebels were killed and an unknown number wounded. Bahanga may have transported his wounded to Fasalla, which is near Nampala but just inside the Mauritanian border. -------------- BAMAKO 00000960 002 OF 003 President Toure's Response -------------- 6.(U) A few hours after the Nampala attack, President Toure delivered remarks that were replayed on Malian television and RFI. In some respects President Toure's remarks were similar to those he delivered after the May 23, 2006, attacks by the ADC on military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. Both speeches defused simmering ethnic and regional tensions by urging Malians not to associate the vast majority of law-abiding, patriotic northern Malians with a small, marginalized group of Tuareg bandits. The Nampala attack, said Toure as quoted by l'Essor, was orchestrated by "an isolated band within the Tuareg and Kidal communities. This means it had nothing to do with ethnicity. There are Tuareg soldiers in the army. The group that committed this act doesn't even have any demands. The attack in Nampala was committed by a marginal group. We must not let a marginalized band destroy our reputation." 7.(U) Although President Toure's speech was not bellicose, it indicated that he has reached his limit in so far as Bahanga is concerned. "Enough is enough," said Toure as quoted by the l'Independant newspaper, "We will not cross our arms in order to count our dead. Those who committed this cowardly attack are the same ones who have distanced themselves from the Algiers Accords. I have tried everything to bring them back to the peace process. I am a partisan of peace. I work for peace, but I will never accept just any peace. Those who attacked Nampala and who claim to be fighting for the development of their region are enemies of the peace, without which there will be no development. I am telling you that 3 billion CFA are ready to be injected into the region of Kidal but, because of their aggression and the insecurity they are sowing in that part of our country, we are unable to boost Kidal's development." -------------- Why Nampala -------------- 8.(C) The Malian military was, once again, caught completely unawares and unprotected. This is strange since several days prior to the attack a number of sources signaled the presence of Bahanga's group with a dozen or more 4x4s near Timbuktu, which is a long ways from Bahanga's stomping ground of Tinzawaten along Mali's eastern frontier with Algeria. The road map for contemporary rebel attacks seems to be very similar to the one Tuareg rebels used in the 1990s. There is little creativity here: Tuareg rebels are attacking places they hit in the 1990s that also have military posts with significant quantities of weapons and equipment. Rebels attacked both Diabali and Nampala in the 1990s. Although both of these towns are in the central region of Segou, their proximity to the Mauritanian frontier provides rebels with relatively easy access. Other army posts hit in the 1990s that remaa.S~rgets due to their proximity to Mauritania are Nara in the region of Koulikoro and Nioro in the region of Kayes. Additional potential targets that were attacked during the 1990s include Goundam, Lere, and Lerneb. These three towns are in the region of Timbuktu, however, and attacking them could create complications with Malian Arab communities, something Tuareg rebels would presumably prefer to avoid. -------------- Impact on Algiers Accords -------------- 9.(C) Two ways of interpreting the Nampala attack have emerged. The previous wave of Tuareg rebel attacks - which included attacks against military installations in Diabali, Aguelhok, Abeibara, Ansongo and Tesslit - occurred in advance of July 2008 talks between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels in Algiers. These attacks seemed to signal an attempt by various rebel groups to reinforce their positions in advance of these negotiations. Bahanga's attack on Nampala could be his way of solidifying his power prior to upcoming talks in Kidal involving ag Ghali, Minister of Territorial Administration Kafougouna Kone, and others. 10.(C) A more disturbing analysis is that Bahanga is simply out to destroy the Algiers Accords process, draw other rebel factions - both Tuareg and Arab - into the conflict, and provoke the Malian military into responding with force. There is some reporting that Bahanga is interested in expanding the conflict through renewed attacks against the Malian military (Ref. C). 11.(C) The Algerian Embassy's DCM told the Embassy on BAMAKO 00000960 003 OF 003 December 23 that he did not believe the Nampala attack would seriously alter the Algiers process. However, he noted that the was the first time civilians were killed during an attack by Tuareg rebels and said Nampala likely presaged a turning point in Mali's policy toward Bahanga. -------------- Comment: Mission Bahanga -------------- 12.(C) President Toure's remarks following the Nampala attack likely defused, for the time being, any tendency among the Malian public to hold all Malian Tuaregs accountable for Bahanga's actions. Patience with Bahanga both within the Malian government and the general public, however, has run out. Politically Toure cannot single-handedly hold back the growing tide of resentment toward restive Tuaregs. At some point the public outrage over Bahanga's violence and Mali's apparent willingness to take each attack on the chin may overwhelm the President. Already many opposition leaning newspapers in Bamako are calling for Mali to declare war on Bahanga. It is difficult to see how President Toure can afford not to respond given the brazenness of Bahanga's attack in Nampala and the number of casualties inflicted. The challenge for Toure and the Malian military is crafting a response that pinpoints Bahanga without dragging other Tuareg rebel factions, which remain committed to the Algiers Accords, back into the fray. Since this is likely what Bahanga has in mind, the Malians need to carefully weigh their options and plan accordingly in order to avoid a repeat of previous failed efforts to engage Bahanga militarily. MILOVANOVIC