TUAREG REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI WANTS OVERHAUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000918 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018 TAGS: PINS PINR PTER PREL ASEC ML SUBJECT: TUAREG REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI WANTS OVERHAUL OF ALGIERS ACCORDS REF: A. BAMAKO 00901 ¶B. BAMAKO 00660 ¶C. 07 BAMAKO 00559 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary: During a November 24 meeting with the Embassy in Bamako, Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) leader Iyad ag Ghali provided a different spin on reports, emanating from the November 15-17 meeting of the Algiers Accords oversight committee in Kidal, of progress toward creating a mixed military unit and reducing Malian troop levels in the north. Ag Ghali dismissed recent discussions of mixed military units and troop re-deployments as premature and said Mali and Tuareg rebels first needed to reach consensus regarding the meaning of the Algiers Accords document. He said divergent readings of the text required a new round of negotiations to "relaunch" the Accords with a common interpretation of the document accompanied by a number of side agreements. These would include an implementation timeline, a promise by the Malians to replace the Governor of Kidal, and assurances of immunity from prosecution for all combatants. Ag Ghali said he envisioned a "post-war" truth and reconciliation process that would take into account hostilities that occurred after the signing of the July 2006 Accords. He added that neither this process, nor any discussion of mixed units or troop draw-downs, would succeed without the participation of Ibrahim Bahanga. After meeting with President Amadou Toumani Toure, ag Ghali flew to Kidal on November 27, reportedly to devise a new timeline for Algiers Accords implementation. End Summary. -------------- Ag Ghali Seeks to Revisit Algiers Accords -------------- 2.(C) On November 24 the Embassy spoke with Tuareg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali and National Assembly Deputy Alghabass ag Intallah in the empty living room of one of the many vacant villas Tuareg rebels and their retinues seem to use as urban safe houses when passing through Bamako. Ag Ghali was recalled to Mali a few days earlier, for the second time in the space of one month, by President Toure to discuss apparent ongoing efforts to win the release of four Malian military officers held captive by Ibrahim Bahanga. 3.(C) Ag Ghali described the November 15-17 meeting of the Algiers Accords oversight committee meeting in Kidal as pointless. "I was not in favor of that meeting at all," said ag Ghali. "It means nothing." This assessment stood in stark contrast to the relatively optimistic reports conveyed by meeting participants, including ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, who indicated that Mali, Algeria, and the ADC had reached tentative agreements on the reduction of Malian troop levels in the north and the creation of one mixed military unit by the end of December 2008 (Ref. A). Both ag Ghali and ag Intallah said Tuareg rebels were no where close to identifying potential mixed unit commanders. Ag Ghali insisted that Mali create at least four or preferably five mixed units at once, all with proper headquarters, resources and missions, and said continued meetings of the oversight committee or discussions about mixed units were pointless without what he described as "preliminary" steps to "solidify" the Algiers Accords and resolve divergent interpretations of the agreement's text. 4.(C) To reach a common reading of the Accords, ag Ghali advocated a new round of talks similar to those that produced the Accords in July 2006. Ag Ghali described these negotiations as a "post-war" process of reconciliation and truth-telling to incorporate post-2006 events into the Accords. Instead of producing a new document, this process would yield something akin to an Algiers Accords companion text, or editor's guide, to resolve various points of dispute left unsettled by the original document, attach a timeline for agreement implementation, and provide binding assurances of immunity for those suspected of committing post-2006 atrocities. Ag Ghali said this would absolve Malian soldiers of responsibility for the April 10 executions of ADC member Barka ag Cheikh and Mohammed ag Moussa in Kidal. It would also alleviate Tuareg concerns about a new counter-terrorism law passed by the Malian National Assembly earlier this year (Ref. B). Ag Ghali asserted that under the new law, autotheft is classified as a terrorist act. He predicted that Tuareg rebel fighters would not return to Kidal without formal assurances from the Malian government of immunity from future prosecution. BAMAKO 00000918 002 OF 003 5.(C) Ag Ghali said the revised agreement should also entail a specific commitment to replace the Governor of Kidal with an individual more amenable to Tuareg rebels. Many Kidal Tuaregs regard current Governor Al Hamdou ag Illyen as only half Tuareg and from a caste located among the lower rungs of Kidal's traditional hierarchy. Ag Ghali and ag Intallah said Tuareg rebels believed ag Illyen's removal was an implicit part of the Algiers Accords, even though no reference to such an agreement appears in the text. They also said Tuaregs hoped to clarify clauses regarding development, water resources, employment, youth reinsertion programs, and the authority to bypass the central government in negotiating directly with foreign donors for Kidal based development projects. "We are not asking for the sky," said ag Ghali. 6.(C) Ag Ghali warned that no progress could occur without the participation of Ibrahim Bahanga. He said Bahanga was unlikely to release the four Malian military officers still in captivity since Bahanga had already released several dozen others and had no incentive to liberate the final group of four. When asked if Bahanga was now committed to Libyan, as opposed to Algerian, mediation, ag Ghali said that while there was no viable alternative to Algerian mediation, Algeria needed to be more engaged in the Algiers Accords process and Bahanga was simply trying to identify other potential partners. 7.(C) Ag Ghali also said Algeria needed to increase its engagement in regards to economic reinsertion payments for Tuareg ex-combatants and Kidal youth. He belittled the USD 2 million set aside by Algeria and Mali for these payments as enough only for 15 development projects, stating his view that Kidal required at least three times this amount. He also faulted Mali's program to reintegrate Tuareg ex-combatants into the Malian military as inadequate, noting that Malian recruitment quotas fixed a limit of 200 individuals from the region of Kidal for 2007 and another 200 recruits for 2008 (Ref. C). -------------- AQIM Strategy -------------- 8.(C) Turning to AQIM and the October 31 liberation of the Austrian tourists, ag Ghali said he had no first hand knowledge that a ransom had been paid but said he was convinced AQIM would have never released the Austrians without compensation. Ag Ghali said Yahia Djouadi, who he referred to as Abu Alam, would have lost too much respect within AQIM had he agreed to release the Austrians without receiving something in return. He said AQIM and Djouadi were aware of what he described as a UN Security Council resolution that was introduced by Algeria and directed Mali to attack AQIM. Although some of the details were slightly off, ag Ghali seemed to be describing the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee's July 2008 approval to include Djouadi and other AQIM leaders on the list of individuals subject to targeted sanctions. 9.(C) Ag Ghali said he believed AQIM was changing tactics in Mauritania but did not know if this was due to Mauritania's recent coup, an influx of Mauritanian AQIM members, or some other factor. He did not think AQIM had changed tactics in Mali or southern Algeria, and noted that AQIM refrained from carrying out attacks in either area, preferring to use these zones instead for logistical purposes in advance of attacks planned for northern Algeria. If Mali were to attack AQIM, ag Ghali continued, AQIM would respond by targeting Timbuktu, oil prospecting operations, and tourists in Mali. -------------- Internal Tuareg Divisions -------------- 10.(C) At the end of the meeting National Assembly Deputy Alghabass ag Intallah said Tuareg rebels in Kidal were divided into four camps: members of the ADC; Bahanga and his followers; Tuareg rebels who are former Malian military officers; and Tuareg youth. Ag Intallah and ag Ghali said they fell into the first category as members of the ADC and believe that no solution to the crisis in Kidal has yet been found. Ag Intallah said Bahanga's faction was interested first and foremost in the withdrawal of Malian military personnel from Kidal and Bahanga's home area of Tinzawaten in particular. Ag Ghali complained that by trying to plant a Malian flag in Tinzawaten following the signing of the Accords in 2006, the Malian government sought to portray itself as the victor and Bahanga as the vanquished. This is a situation, said ag Ghali, that Bahanga could never accept. BAMAKO 00000918 003 OF 003 11.(C) Ag Ghali also cautioned that the lines between Bahanga and the ADC were not as clear as one might think, and said there were a fair amount of people moving back and forth between the two groups. He dismissed any statements issued by Bahanga's Paris-based father-in-law Hama ag Sid'Ahmed as little more than comic relief for "real" Tuareg rebels on the ground in Kidal. Ag Ghali joked that he could not even remember the latest acronym - the ATNMC for Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change - invented by Sid'Ahmed for Bahanga's group. He also said Sid'Ahmed's claims about linkages between the ATNMC and Tuareg rebels in Niger were fictitious. 12.(C) Ag Intallah said the third category of Tuareg rebels - former Malian military officers - was most interested in the creation of mixed military units. The remaining group, Tuareg youth, cared only about economic opportunities and promises to fund various small enterprise projects in Kidal. -------------- Comment: Ag Ghali In, Ag Bibi Out -------------- 13.(C) Following his November 24 meeting with the Embassy, ag Ghali met at least once more with President Toure, then flew to Kidal on November 27. ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, meanwhile, remains in Bamako. Ag Bibi's name did not come up once during our meeting with ag Ghali and ag Intallah - an omission providing further evidence that ag Bibi is not really running the ADC. On November 27 ag Intallah, who also did not travel with ag Ghali to Kidal, told the Embassy that while he was not present during ag Ghali's most recent meeting with President Toure, he believed the president had invested ag Ghali with the authority to begin hashing out a new timeline for the implementation of the Accords. Ag Ghali's statements regarding the need to revisit the entire Accords document seem, at least for the moment, to represent the personal views of only ag Ghali. MILOVANOVIC