FALL 2008 SEPQ RESPONSE-BAMAKO

S E C R E T BAMAKO 000787 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: ASEC SUBJECT: FALL 2008 SEPQ RESPONSE-BAMAKO Classified By: ARSO Christopher Brandt, Reason 1.5 (c and d) ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Bamako responses to the security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) are as follows: -------------- ¶2. (S) Political Violence -------------- DEMONSTRATIONS: ¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious groups in country that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American demonstrations? There are religious groups that could carry out demonstrations involving a few hundred individuals. In 2008 these groups held demonstrations to protest an attempt by the Malian National Assembly to abolish the death penalty. None of these demonstrations targeted Americans. Indeed, many leaders of this group noted that the U.S. supports the death penalty. The group Dawa al-Tabligh (also known as the Jamaat al-Tabligh movement) has a moderate presence in Bamako. Dawa al-Tabligh is an international Islamic religious organization whose focus is religious recruitment and the propagation of Islam. In Mali the Dawa are based at the Markaz Da'wa al-Tabligh center in Sogoninko, a residential area of Bamako. Worshipers meet there every Thursday and volunteers are sent on traveling preaching missions throughout Mali that can cover several days or several months. Internationally, the Dawa al-Tabligh has voiced anti-American sentiments. Malian Dawa, however, appear to be largely apolitical. Another group, the Islamic NGO Al Muntada, has previously expressed anti-American sentiments. Anti-American preaching has been known to occur at their headquarters which is located in ACI 2000, near the U.S. Embassy. Although these groups have the capability to carry out significant anti-American demonstrations, there is no indication at the present time that they have the intent of doing so. There is no present indication that there is a significantly anti-American sentiment among the local population. There is a moderate Lebanese presence in Bamako, and while anti-American sentiments cannot be dismissed entirely, the common perception is that they do not harbor negative sentiment towards Americans. The majority of Lebanese in Bamako appear to be Christian. The Lebanese community in Mali is known to be in an enviable financial position; many are successful business owners and merchants. Given their favorable position in the community, they are unlikely to �A;expose anti-American sentiments or carry out any acts against USG interests, owing to the adverse effects such actions could have on their business interests. ¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the country within the last 12 months? There have been no anti-American demonstrations in the last twelve months. ¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. Diplomatic facilities? N/A ¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? The last anti-American demonstration in Bamako occurred in 2006 and involved a few hundred individuals. ¶E. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by domestic issues? Anti-American demonstrations in previous years have been triggered by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, U.S. agricultural policies, and perceived support of military actions. ¶F. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Demonstrations are generally peaceful. The GOM provides robust police presence which typically dictates the tone of demonstrations. There were demonstrations in October 2006 and June, September, and October 2007 at the University of Bamako's Medical School. Several of these involved violence and tear-gas fired by police. There was also a demonstration at the University of Bamako's Law School in April 2008 that resulted in the serious assault of one professor and property damage. ¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG employees? No demonstrations in the last twelve months have resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to employees. There is a USG presence at the University of Bamako's Medical School campus as the National Institutes of Health has offices and laboratories at this facility. No NIH employees were injured and no USG property was damaged during demonstrations at the medical school in 2008. ¶H. If violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our perimeter security line? No demonstrators have penetrated the Mission's perimeter security line in the last twelve months. ¶I. Have there been any anti-government demonstrations in country within the past 12 months? Yes, several demonstrations have occurred, many centered on government related education issues and social legislation before the National Assembly. Additionally, merchants have protested a government crack- down on unauthorized street vendors, and commercial vehicles. ¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S. Diplomatic facilities? Yes, protests have taken place in the vicinity of the former USAID before a recent move to the New Embassy Compound NOX) in February 2008. The demonstrators were made up of civil servants and students protesting the low wages the GOM are paying public school teachers. These protests, however, were likely targeting the Prime Minister's Office which was next door to the old USAID building. In March 2008, a demonstrator in Bamako protesting raising food prices set fire to the mayor's vehicle. The demonstrators dispersed after the police used tear gas. This demonstration took place in close proximity to the EMR and DCMR. ¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government demonstration? Approximately 200-300 persons typically participate in these demonstrations. ¶L. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? Generally peaceful; the local police are quite adept at dispersing crowds that have violent intentions. ¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to USG property? No recent anti-government demonstrations have resulted in damage to USG property. -------------- ¶3. (S) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS -------------- ¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or intrastate conflict (this may include battles between organized and violent drug cartels)? Yes, violent clashes occur in the northern regions of Mali and have resulted in loss of life. Remnants of the 1990's Tuareg rebellion still reside in northern Mali. In May 2006, an attack by rebel Tuareg elements on Malian military outposts in Kidal and Menaka resulted in several deaths and significant loss of military assets. The revolt led to the subsequent signing of a peace accord between the Tuaregs and the GOM. Since these accords were signed there have been two clashes, both in October 2006, between Tuareg rebels and the Algerian based terror group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Several Tuareg and AQIM members were killed during these clashes. During the second skirmish some Tuaregs were captured by the GSPC/AQIM and then later released. In late August 2007, a dissident group of Tuaregs led by Tuareg rebel Ibrahim Bahanga took approximately 30 hostages in northern Mali near Tinzawaten. The hostages included Malian military and civilian officials. After negotiations brokered by Libya, the hostages were released in March 2008. Bahanga took several dozen more Malian soldiers hostage just weeks later. Tuareg rebel groups attacked Malian military and gendarme bases in Diabali, Ansongo, Abeibara and Tessalit during the year. In August the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and Mali resumed negotiations via Algerian mediation. The ADC released all of the Malian military members it was holding in August 2008. Bahanga was initially a party to these negotiations but soon broke with the ADC to pursue his own discussions with Libya. On September 10 Bahanga released 44 Malian soldiers. He is believed to still hold at least four Malian soldiers. ¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is limited to a specific region or a countrywide civil war? Current indications would suggest such incidents are localized to the northern region of Kidal. ¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. Diplomatic facilities located in this region? No U.S. Diplomatic facilities are located in this region. USAID Mali has contractors in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. Peace Corps has volunteers in and around the town of Gao. An American Corner, supported by the Embassy's Public Affairs Office, is located in Gao. ¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American orientation? No strong anti-American sentiment has been observed but recent reporting indicates that the AQIM may be seeking to target Westerners in Mali, particularly in northern Mali. -------------- ¶4. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES -------------- ¶A. Are host country law enforcement agencies professional and well trained? Law enforcement training does not approach U.S. standards. Although specialized units may be adequately trained, the majority of local law enforcement agencies are poorly trained and ill-equipped of resources to be sufficiently effective. Low pay, poor training, minimal resources and a lack of adequate supervision lends to the overall unprofessional image of Malian law enforcement. Mali has a civil security apparatus numbering approximately 16,000 members, a relatively small contingent compared to the vast geography and long porous borders. ¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? Yes, the training provided by the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) has been effective, albeit with limited effect within the core of agents that have participated in the ATA courses. The GOM has yet to effectively apply the ATA training precepts to the civil protection infrastructure as a whole. The DOS and DOD have continued to sponsor training with the hopes of bolstering Mali's security capabilities. The ATA has continued its commitment to Mali in this regard. Invariably, Malian National Police would greatly benefit from U.S. training assistance in all areas, and any training provided would be a valuable contribution to their efforts in maintaining law and order. Efforts are underway to facilitate Mali's inclusion for additional training opportunities under the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) and the FBI National Academy (FBINA). ¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside of their agencies? Yes, corruption remains a problem throughout all levels of the Police ranks. With low salaries and generous freedom, the temptation to augment their low income is difficult to resist. Police are known, for example, to routinely solicit daily bribes from local bus drivers. This is done openly and is common knowledge. ¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of deterring terrorist actions? The GOM intelligence services are limited in their capability of detecting, deterring and responding to a terrorist attack. ¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with the U.S. Embassy's request for information and support? Yes, to the extent of their limited capabilities, GOM intelligence and security services have been very cooperative in rendering assistance to the Embassy. ¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in recent years, have host country security services been able to score any major anti-terrorism success? In recent years, the GOM asked several radical Pakistani Imams to leave the country. The GOM was highly instrumental in the release of 14 European hostages held by the Group Salafist for Preaching and Combat (GSPC/AQIM) in 2003. The GOM's willingness to combat AQIM has been offset by a severe lack of resources and difficulties involved in securing inhospitable and vast swaths of the Sahara. Despite these problems, the GOM scored some victories against AQIM. A Malian army patrol that encountered a group of AQIM members in May 2008 in northern Mali captured valuable information. In August 2008 Malian security forces captured three Mauritanian AQIM members along with a significant quantity of explosives, weapons and other items. ¶G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness, and allocation of resources) to embassy requests for protective security? Yes, though issues of stipends and provisions for fuel and maintenance of vehicles are standard overheads for such requests. Any request for police manpower assistance or escorts requires the understanding that these payments must be made. ¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major airports in the country? Poor, airport security services are poorly trained and equipped. Passenger, luggage and cargo screening are minimal by international civil aviation security standards. Loose access controls and a perceived ambivalence are a common theme. ¶I. How effective are customs and immigration controls agencies? Customs and Immigration control agencies are ineffective. While the local customs and security services are making improvements, they remain poorly trained and equipped. Their ability to track persons entering and exiting the various border entry points are severely limited. Much of the data-processing is still paper-driven and there is no real-time system for tracking incoming or outgoing passengers. Most all records are paper and the filing system is rudimentary. There are no central computer databases to historically track persons entering or exiting Mali by air or land borders. It is therefore easy to enter and depart Bamako by air and Mali by land undetected. In October 2007 allegations of bribe solicitations from Embassy personnel arriving at Senou International Airport (Bamako) were addressed to the customs chief at Senou Airport. ¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? Border patrol forces are ineffective. Most borders are unpatrolled and uncontrolled. The vast size of Mali's borders, a border control contingent that is under-manned and poorly trained, along with widespread corruption, makes effective border control unrealistic. Moreover, border control personnel lack the basic resources and professionalism to effectively perform their work. -------------- ¶5. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS -------------- ¶A. Are there any indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in country? None are known or verified. ¶B. If yes, how many? Please name groups. N/A ¶C. Have groups carried out an anti-American attack within the last 12 months? N/A ¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? N/A ¶E. Have groups attacked U.S. Diplomatic targets? N/A ¶F. Have groups attacked U.S. businesses, U.S. military, or U.S. related targets? N/A ¶G. Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions or do they operate countrywide? N/A ¶H. If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S. Diplomatic facilities located in these regions? N/A -------------- ¶6. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS -------------- ¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not anti-American) in country? Possibly, but not organized. ¶B. If yes, how many? N/A. ¶C. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? N/A. ¶D. Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? N/A. ¶E. Have any Americans been killed or injured in these attacks? N/A. -------------- ¶7. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS -------------- ¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a presence in country? Yes, the Algerian based AQIM, formerly known as the GSPC. ¶B. How does post assess this presence? Is it an operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell? AQIM has operational and financial cells targeting the Algerian Government and Western interests/entities. Recent reporting suggests that AQIM, may be seeking to target American interests in northern Mali. AQIM has recently attacked western interests in the region, outside of Mali. In September 2006 the GSPC made a public statement affirming it ties to Al Qaeda; the group official changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. Since then, AQIM has made public remarks that Westerners will be targeted in the region. ¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? No, the GOM is not supportive of AQIM. ¶D. Are there suspect Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? Possibly, but not confirmed. ¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country that are sympathetic to these groups? Yes, there are ethnic groups engaged in traditional smuggling that have benefited financially by working in collaboration with AQIM. ¶F. How does post assess the level, intent and scope of hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, Sudan, Et. Al.) in country relative to potential anti-American terrorist acts? The threat of hostile intelligence exists but is not considered serious relative to the threat of a potential terrorist attack. There is a visible Libyan presence within Bamako. A complex of GOM buildings is being funded by the Libyan government. The Chinese diplomatic mission in Mali has grown and is also quite visible. The Government of CUBA has supplied the GOM with medical doctors to help expand the reach of medical care in Mali. ¶G. How does post assess the availability of weapons and explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile terrorist elements? It is widely acknowledged that unknown quantities of weapons (military rifles, handguns, explosives) are available on the black market in Bamako and there has been a rise in armed robberies utilizing handguns. Mali's borders are porous and poorly controlled, enabling the easy transit of weapons smuggled from neighboring nations. ¶8. (S) Based on the current security threat information available, post recommends no change to current SETL threat ratings for Bamako. ¶9. (U) Please direct inquiries to ARSO Christopher Brandt, (223) 270-2366. LEONARD