AS NORTHERN CRISIS DEEPENS, MALI DRIFTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000364 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018 TAGS: ASEC PINS PINR ML SUBJECT: AS NORTHERN CRISIS DEEPENS, MALI DRIFTS REF: A. BAMAKO 00305 ¶B. BAMAKO 00325 ¶C. BAMAKO 00339 ¶D. BAMAKO 00357 BAMAKO 00000364 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) Summary: On April 10 President Amadou Toumani Toure's advisor on Tuareg issues, Acherif ag Mohamed, said the President was adrift following the failure of last week's talks in Tripoli with the Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) of Ibrahim Bahanga. Acherif said President Toure lacked the will to make either war or peace and that no one at the presidency was even discussing events in the north. He predicted that Algeria, angered by Libyan meddling, would let the situation in northern Mali fester for as long as three weeks before making any attempt to restart negotiations. Acherif also provided further details on the April 2 helicopter gunship attack on Bahanga's positions south of Kidal. He said the cease-fire negotiated last week in Tripoli was effectively dead and that future attacks were imminent barring some unforeseen intervention. End Summary. -------------- Libyan Detour a Dead End -------------- 2.(C) Acherif ag Mohamed told the Embassy on April 10 that peace talks in Tripoli between the Malian government and representatives of Bahanga's ATNMC failed to produce any agreement. Although Acherif is employed as an advisor to President Toure, he has been sidelined since the Alliance for Democracy and Change's (ADC) July 2006 attack on Malian military outposts in Menaka and Kidal. He maintains, however, close contact with ADC spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi. Once Mali's consul to Tamanrasset, Acherif is also in close contact with the Algerian Ambassador to Mali. Acherif felt that differences over cease-fire terms, Bahanga's demand for the drawdown of Malian military forces from northern Mali, and confusion over whether the two sides were expected to sign a side agreement to the Algiers Accords framework contributed to the Tripoli talks' failure. -------------- Adrift in Bamako -------------- 3.(C) Acherif described President Toure as "asleep," stating that the Malian government was interested in neither war nor peace with Bahanga. He reported that, to his knowledge, no one in the presidency has called any meetings on the crisis in the north or attempted to draw out any kind of action plan. Acherif said the level of inaction at the presidency was akin to firefighters deciding to sleep through alarm bells at the firehouse. Acherif said no one was advising President Toure on the north because the President was not seeking any advice. -------------- -------------- Helicopter Gunships Attacked Bahanga and Tuareg Rock Band -------------- -------------- 4.(C) Acherif confirmed that one Ukrainian or Russian pilot was killed in the April 2 helicopter attack on Bahanga about 20km south of Kidal (Ref B). He said the Malian in the damaged helicopter was wounded. According to Acherif, the helicopter pilots were as surprised to see Bahanga as Bahanga was to see them as they apparently came up on Bahanga's positions earlier than expected. 5.(C) Members of Tinawaren, the internationally-known Tuareg musical band that had been on the road from Kidal to Gao at the time of the attack, told Acherif that the gunships were so close that they could see the expressions on the pilots' faces. They could have, said Acherif, shot them with a pistol. In addition to running into Bahanga earlier than expected and finding themselves apparently at too short a range, the helicopters reportedly fired from smaller caliber machine guns mounted on the sides rather than from HIND-D's front mounted gun. Acherif said that two members of Bahanga's group were killed and only one vehicle was destroyed. 6.(C) When asked if the Malian military or Bahanga had won the engagement, Acherif indicated that the April 2 battle was a draw. He said the helicopters were intended as a diversion BAMAKO 00000364 002.2 OF 002 to allow a resupply column of more than 40 vehicles and 14 BRDMs to move from Anefis to Kidal. He noted, however, that the Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Malian column was a Tuareg who was afraid to engage Bahanga directly despite having more than a dozen armored vehicles. Acherif said that Mali was unlikely to use its HIND-Ds against Bahanga again now that Bahanga had damaged one and killed an Eastern-bloc pilot trainer. -------------- Cease-fire? What Cease-fire? -------------- 7.(C) The failure of talks in Tripoli has left uncertain the status of the cease-fire, proclaimed just on the third of April in Libya. Acherif reported that neither the Malian government nor Bahanga had any illusions about a cease-fire holding for long. While Bahanga's forces have apparently withdrawn from positions around Kidal, they are poised to prevent any attempt to resupply the Malian garrison in Tinzawaten. He said he did not believe Bahanga planted any land mines while positioned on the road between Kidal and Gao. He reported that ADC Spokesman Ahmada ag Bibi, who traveled to Kidal two months ago for what was intended to be a two week visit, is afraid to leave Kidal for fear that ADC fighters currently with him will defect to Bahanga the moment he returns to Bamako (ag Bibi remains there for now, but the ADC troops have now left Kidal, septel). 8.(C) Tuaregs are also concerned about Bahanga's deputy, Hassan ag Fagaga. Fagaga and the Mayor of Tessalit may have played a tangential role in the March 26 attack on Aguelhok that was orchestrated by a group of youth apparently without military training. Acherif said the plan was to take the commander of the Malian military detachment in Aguelhok hostage, but it failed because the Tuaregs who carried it out "couldn't even shoot a chicken." Acherif said there are rumors that other groups of youth are forming their own militias north of Kidal, either with or without support from Fagaga. -------------- -- Comment: Options Dwindling for President Toure -------------- -- 9.(C) Acherif's connections with other Tuaregs are solid, but he has been sidelined within the Presidency, and may have been intentionally left out of the loop--if there was one--on ATT's response to the crisis. Letting the situation in northern Mali fester could be a concerted policy response (although perhaps not a good one) by the Malian government as at least one presidential insider has told the Embassy that Mali was betting that if the situation got bad enough, Tuaregs would turn on Bahanga and take matters into their own hands. It seems more likely, however, that President Toure is simply running out of policy responses: his military is unable to match ATNMC on Bahanga's home-turf, the Libyans have failed twice in two months to cobble together any kind of lasting agreement, and the Algerians have suspended their facilitation. Like other Tuareg leaders grasping for a solution, Acherif also stressed the need to create and equip mixed special units including a blend of southern Malians, Tuareg loyalists, ex-ADC and ATNMC fighters (Ref C). Acherif said only the creation of these units could force Bahanga to back down. Recent discussions with President Toure and Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane, however, suggest that these units remain a long way from reality (Ref D). MCCULLEY