AZERBAIJAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES RUSSIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000945 SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: AJ AM ENRG GG PGOV PREL RS SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES RUSSIA, IRAN, NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE ROAD AHEAD Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Over dinner October 1 with the Deputy Secretary, key Azerbaijani foreign policy thinkers discussed the role of Russia and Iran in the Caucasus, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and efforts to intensify the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship. Participants highlighted Azerbaijan's difficult geopolitical setting, which has been further complicated by Russia's invasion of Georgia. In light of the current political issues influencing Azerbaijan, these contacts underscored the need for more tangible results from the U.S.- Azerbaijan relationship, particularly in the economic sphere and on Nagorno-Karabakh. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador hosted a dinner October 1 for Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte. Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza and D staff joined. Azerbaijan's Deputy Foreign Minister Hafiz Pashayev, former Presidential Adviser Vafa Gulazade, current Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov, and IMF Country Director for Azerbaijan Koba Gvenetadze were guests. RUSSIA AND IRAN ¶3. (C) The dinner's participants quickly engaged in a heated conversation about Russia's recent aggressive actions in Georgia. Gulazade and Mammadov in particular expressed concern that Russia may become more aggressive against Azerbaijan, similar to the way Moscow confronted Georgia. Further, they expressed concern that Russia might decide to utilize economic tactics to gain broader control over Azerbaijan, especially in terms of energy production and transport. ¶4. (C) Gulazade argued that peace in the Caucasus was not in Russia's best interest. Furthermore, he reminded the group that Azerbaijan was in a precarious location, sandwiched between Russia and Iran. He said that both countries were currently vying for further power in the region. Mammadov supported Gulazade's claims - noting that both Russia and Iran wanted to prevent further Azerbaijan integration with the West. He explained that the GOAJ needed to weigh its decisions carefully given the unpredictability of its neighbors. He noted recent pressure by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki citing Medvedev's warning to the GOAJ to stop its strong support for re-reversal of Ukraine's Odessa - Brody pipeline. GEORGIA INSTABILITY CREATES PROBLEMS FOR AZERBAIJAN ¶5. (C) Despite strong U.S. support following the invasion, Pashayev said that Georgia lost more than it gained. Given his belief that the pro-Azerbaijan "U.S. lobby" was weak, he reasoned that Azerbaijan would not receive the same level of U.S. aide should they suffer a similar fate. As a result, Azerbaijan had to tread carefully against Russia. ¶6. (C) Pashayev highlighted Russia's ability to re-establish military bases in Georgia's sovereign territory as the worst outcome of the Georgian conflict. He pointed out that Russia now had military bases in 2 of the 3 Caucasus countries, Armenia and Georgia, and that Russia was unlikely to scale back in the Caucasus over the longer term. Russia, he maintained, had devised customized strategies for dealing with each of the Caucasus countries to promote instability and to re-establish Moscow's control in the region, including over energy exports and broader integration with the West. The other participants at the dinner agreed. NAGORNO-KARABAKH ¶7. (C) In a discussion regarding Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), everyone agreed with Mammadov that Russia had fueled the unstable situation in NK. He thought that Russia would agree to a partial settlement, as agreed to in the Basic Principles, which ultimately would be accepted by Yerevan. Mammadov suggested that Azerbaijan and Armenia should agree on the return to Baku of the 7 occupied territories, and BAKU 00000945 002 OF 003 allow the final status of NK to remain ambiguous, (marking a welcome return to accepting "constructive ambiguity" on NK,s status, which is at the heart of the Basic Principles). Mammadov speculated that Moscow was behaving constructively for two reasons. First, in light of the recent events in Georgia, Russia wanted to prove to the world that it was a peace-seeking country. Second, Armenia desperately needs economic improvements and open borders. In order to facilitate a deal, Mammadov said that he believed that GOAM and GOAJ needed direct communication with one another. ¶8. (C) Gulazade, who was the most outspoken and radical during the discussion, did not believe that Russia would accept half a settlement and would want to stop any deal. Nor did he believe that Armenia would be willing to try and create a settlement on their own, since their previous attempt resulted in the Parliamentary assassinations. All participants believed that these assassinations were a message from Moscow to further unilateral action by the GOAM. ¶9. (C) Mammadov believes that Moscow needs conflicts to justify their presence in the region. Both Gulazade and Mammadov agreed that if there is a settlement, both GOAM and GOAJ would look West, and potentially to NATO membership. Thus, any complete settlement of NK would be a lose/lose situation for Russia. ¶10. (C) In response, DAS Bryza asked if the GOAJ would be interested in the U.S. facilitating better communication, behind-the-scenes, with the GOAM and GOAJ. He caveated this offer, by stating that it was imperative that some semblance of the Minsk Group be kept up, because otherwise Russia's role might not be constructive. Mammadov agreed with DAS Bryza's proposal. U.S.- AZERBAIJAN RELATIONSHIP ¶11. (C) Towards the end of the discussion, the conversation switched to how to improve the U.S.- Azerbaijan relationship. IMF Country Director Gvenetadze (a Georgian national) urged the U.S. to appreciate the precarious position of Azerbaijan. He said that if the U.S. were to ask for a military base in Azerbaijan, it would only put the GOAJ in a difficult position. He commented that developments in Georgia would likely indicate the direction of U.S.- Azerbaijan relations. Should the situation in Georgia improve, Gvenetadze contended that the GOAJ would be more comfortable with a pro-western attitude. Should the Russian occupation continue, the GOAJ may feel more comfortable siding with Russia. ¶12. (C) Pashayev said that one concrete step would be U.S. assistance with a Trans-Caspian pipeline. Mammadov added that any assistance on projects like the Trans-Caspian pipeline or the Nabucco project would further strengthen the relationship, but that the GOAJ could not take the lead because of the message it would send to Russia and Iran. As a result, Mammadov asked that if the U.S. could take a lead role in initiating such projects. Furthermore, he recommended the EU or U.S. create a document which all participatory countries could sign, describing the role of each country. In such an agreement, the GOAJ would gratefully participate. ¶13. (C) DAS Bryza then raised the intent of the Foreign Minister of Hungry, Kinga Goncz, to invite Azerbaijan's President Aliyev to Budapest in January 2009 to discuss the Nabucco deal. In this meeting, DAS Bryza said that Goncz intended to demonstrate the support of Heads of State for the project. Mammadov said that he did not believe that Aliyev was ready for such a meeting, and suggested that there be a few more preparatory meetings prior to agreeing to such a gathering. ¶14. (C) Pashayev said that he thought the relationship between GOAJ and the U.S. was strong. He said that the visit by both Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary Negroponte were extremely well received. In addition, he reiterated that U.S. support for a Trans-Caspian pipeline would further BAKU 00000945 003 OF 003 strengthen a good relationship. ¶15. (C) The Deputy Secretary then asked about Azerbaijan's economy. Gvenetadze said that economic reforms needed more support. Growth is dominated by oil and is not sufficiently diversified. He noted the need to improve the environment for businesses before the economy would expand, especially with regard to corruption and transparent business practices. Besides oil and gas, Gvenetadze said that once the business environment improved, Azerbaijan's economy could expand into sectors like agriculture, construction, tourism, trade and telecommunications. ¶16. (C) Mammadov suggested that the U.S. focus its foreign relations in this region on Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, because it was a pivotal time in Eurasia. If these countries could successfully integrate with the West, Mammadov was convinced that the Central Asian countries would follow suit. ¶17. (C) At the end of the dinner, Mammadov gave the U.S. some advice on dealing with Azerbaijan. He reminded U.S. diplomats that Azerbaijan was "an oriental country with an oriental, sensitive mindset." He suggested that when the U.S. wanted to comment on an event in Azerbaijan, that the U.S. should start its statement with praise for Azerbaijan for its successes, and conclude the statemen with areas for improvement. Mammadov said whenstatements are issued in the opposite format "th sensitive Azerbaijani mindset" takes offense an the message might not be properly heard. COMMEN ¶18. (C) This was an informal, free flowing diaogue, where our interlocutors were speaking off the cuff. This discussion highlighted Azerbaijani concern regarding possible Russian aggression and the perceived threat from their neighbors. Furthermore, in their view, the Georgian invasion plays a key role in defining the Eurasian landscape for the future. Azerbaijan is looking to the U.S. for more tangible results from the relationship, particularly in the economic sphere and on NK. ¶19. (U) DepSec staff has cleared this cable. DERSE