AZERBAIJAN: WORSHIPERS FRUSTRATED WITH CLOSURE OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000912 SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WORSHIPERS FRUSTRATED WITH CLOSURE OF ABU BAKR MOSQUE REF: A. BAKU 00779 ¶B. 07 BAKU 01067 Classified By: DCM Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Abu Bakr mosque, which is an important symbolic mosque in Azerbaijan's Islamic landscape and was attacked on August 17, is closed for prayers. On August 17, an unknown attacker threw a grenade into the mosque during prayers, killing three worshipers. The mosque ostensibly was closed because local residents raised safety and sanitation concerns, but no one knows the real reason or whether the GOAJ plans to reopen the mosque. A group of Azerbaijani Muslims who used to pray at the mosque told us they hope the authorities will quickly re-open the mosque, which they claimed serves as an intellectual counter to extremist doctrines. The Muslims also complained that while the GOAJ has the right to carry out an investigation, there are a rising number of forced beard shavings and detentions in Baku that include non-extremists. END Summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 15, Embassy officer met with approximately thirty Muslims who regularly prayed at the Abu Bakr mosque. The GOAJ closed the Abu Bakr mosque shortly after it was attacked on August 17 (reftel). The mosque ostensibly was closed in response to a letter from local residents to local authorities, requesting that the mosque be closed because it was unclean and unsafe. (NOTE: The letter, reportedly signed by 1,000 Baku residents, probably is not an authentic grass-roots effort. Former State Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) Chief Rafiq Aliyev said a similar letter had been prepared by either the Ministry of National Security (MNS) or the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the 2001-2002 timeframe, when the GOAJ previously was weighing the merits of closing the mosque down.) No one knows the real reason why the mosque was closed and if the GOAJ plans to reopen it. The meeting was held at the Lezgi mosque, located in Baku's old city, where most of the participants have begun regularly praying since Abu Bakr was closed. ¶3. (C) After the August 17 attack on the Abu Bakr mosque, the government appears focused on rounding up the attackers. Several of their steps have caused frustration among practicing Muslims, however. Local authorities prevented Muslims from praying outside of Baku's mosques, requiring Muslims to pray inside. (NOTE: During Friday prayers and Ramadan, several of Baku's most important mosques are filled to capacity and believers have to pray on the adjacent streets.) The authorities said the restriction is temporary and based on security concerns. In addition, there are a number of reports of local police detaining and shaving the beards of Muslims. (NOTE: Local law enforcement officials traditionally resort to this tactic after a terrorist threat, but this often occurs in Azerbaijan's regions -- especially in the north -- not in Baku.) There has been a spike in the number of calls the Embassy has received from Muslims alleging beard shavings or detentions over the past few weeks. ¶4. (C) Authorities in Baku and several northern regions have been rounding up suspects linked to the August 17 attack over the past weeks. According to a September 2 public statement from the MNS, the service detained thirteen suspects in late August/early September. The statement claimed two Azerbaijani citizens, Ilgar Mollachiyev and Samir Mekhtiyev, who are part of the "Forest Brothers," were linked to the attack. According to Interfax, the Russian services killed Molachiyev on September 7. The detentions coincided with several reported clashes in the Qusar area, including an MNS raid on September 6 that killed three reported militants. Participants' Deference to Jamiat Spokesperson -------------- - ¶5. (C) Throughout the meeting with the thirty Muslim believers, it was apparent the participants had an informal leader or spokesperson, Brother Ramin. It was also clear BAKU 00000912 002 OF 003 that Brother Ramin had consulted with the Abu Bakr's imam, Gamet Suleymanov, before meeting with Embassy officer. Ramin began the meeting by reiterating some of Suleymanov's primary talking points, specifically that President Aliyev is a "good leader" and the Abu Bakr mosque teaches the need to support the government, which is instated by Allah. (NOTE: Since opening in 1997, several groups of Muslims have left the Abu Bakr mosque. One of the reasons Muslims left was Suleymanov's unwillingness to adopt a political message and his argument that faithful Muslims need to support the present government.) During the meeting, Ramin appeared nervous about representing participants' concerns, while also not directly criticizing the government. When other participants were able to speak, they were decidedly less restrained in their criticism of the government's handling of the bombing investigation and subsequent closure of the Abu Bakr mosque. These participants blamed "the authorities" or "people around President Aliyev." All participants emphasized they were true Azerbaijani "patriots," but also practicing Muslims. ¶6. (C) Ramin told us the participants were concerned that the mosque's temporary closure would drag on indefinitely. Since the new restrictions on praying in outdoor spaces next to mosques, some Muslims reportedly have had difficulty finding a mosque to pray at. Ramin also said participants were concerned that in the wake of the attack on the mosque, the authorities were indiscriminately targeting extremists and non-extremists. Ramin noted several examples of pressure against Muslims in Baku since the attack, including beard shavings, detentions, and loss of employment. Several freshly-shaved participants claimed that Baku police officers had recently forced them to shave their beards. Others complained about veiled women's inability to wear a headscarf for passport photographs and the difficulty in traveling abroad to foreign countries for Islamic education or pilgrimage. Mosque Closure Increases Prospects for Radicalization -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Participants argued that the Abu Bakr mosque's closure plays into the hands of Islamic extremists, who regard Suleymanov as an infidel and want to eliminate moderate Islamic teaching in Azerbaijan. While complaining that there are limited opportunities for practicing, non-extremist Muslims to learn more about Islam, participants referred to Abu Bakr as the "key center of Islamic science in Azerbaijan" that teaches Muslims to counter extremists' arguments. Several participants claimed that extremists sometimes attempt to recruit theologically untrained attendees at Abu Bakr, but many well-educated Muslims attend the mosque and are able to counter their arguments. GOAJ's Side of the Story -------------- ¶8. (C) Aside from MNS public statements, GOAJ interlocutors outside of the MNS do not appear to have much information. On September 16, SCWRA Chief Hidayat Orujov told us he could not comment on who attacked the Abu Bakr mosque until the government finished its investigation. Orujov said he was optimistic the mosque eventually would be reopened, but said it may take some time for the repair work and the investigation to be completed. When asked about the increased number of forced beard shavings in Baku, Orujov demonstrated only a minimal conceptual understanding that having a beard did not necessitate intellectual assent to radical theological or political positions. Comment -------------- ¶9. (S//NF) There has been a disturbing number of attempted or planned terrorist operations which have included Azerbaijani citizens over the past two years. The majority of these operations appear to be fairly amateurish, but the level of Azerbaijani involvement in these operations is a dangerous trend. The GOAJ battle against religious extremism includes the difficult balancing act between legitimate security demands and respecting a citizen's rights to BAKU 00000912 003 OF 003 practice a religion of their choice. The pattern of the authorities throwing an overly broad net to catch any real or suspected extremist -- alongside the forced beard shavings -- is a typical Azerbaijani reaction. ¶10. (C) The Embassy's chief concern is the GOAJ lacks a long-term strategy for countering Islamic extremism. The GOAJ is fairly capable of picking up people off the street, but there appears to be little ability or political will to distinguish between a practicing Muslim and an extremist. There also appears to be little governmental thinking about creating indigenous, authentic Islamic actors and institutions that are best positioned to counter the theological arguments of extremists. The chief complaint the Embassy hears from practicing Muslims is that the GOAJ is still working from a Soviet-era playbook that relies on the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) to administer Islam; the growing interest in Islam -- especially among Azerbaijani youth -- far exceeds the CMB's capacities. Our contacts report that the CMB has little or no legitimacy among practicing Muslims and the GOAJ should open up the playing field for more authentic, credible Islamic institutions (ref b). The short-term danger with this suggestion is that externally-financed extremists could seek to fill the vacuum. DERSE