AZERBAIJAN'S 2008 ELECTION: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000850 SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S 2008 ELECTION: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY REF: A. BAKU 00524 ¶B. BAKU 00764 ¶C. BAKU 00687 ¶D. BAKU 00730 ¶E. BAKU 00763 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Azerbaijani performance in assuring freedom of assembly has been positive from the standpoint of new legislation and presidential statements. The Venice Commission positively assessed Azerbaijan's revised law on freedom of assembly. From a legal and technical point of view, the law generally meets European standards. The Embassy and the Venice Commission believe, however, that implementation will be critical and in particular, the authorities need to demonstrate a presumption in favor of assemblies, rather than using the law as a mechanism for preventing lawful demonstrations. Since the law was approved by Parliament in May 30, there have been several small attempted rallies in areas explicitly off limits under the new law, which have not represented a sufficient test of the authorities' implementation of the law. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) This cable is part of a series on the broader political environment before the October 15 Presidential election. Septels will address the media freedom environment, religious issues, and the judiciary. What does the law say? -------------- ¶3. (C) The Azerbaijani law on freedom of assembly was amended on May 30 by the Parliament (ref a). The GOAJ worked closely with the Venice Commission during the drafting process. In most respects, the Venice Commission positively assessed the new law as consistent with international standards. The Venice Commission's final review of the draft law concluded, however, that implementation of the law will be key and in that regard, the GOAJ "must show a presumption in favor of assemblies," rather than using the law as a mechanism for preventing lawful demonstrations. ¶4. (C) The law outlines procedures for demonstration organizers, including the requirement to notify the local executive authority five days prior to the event. Local authorities in turn are required to respond to the notification at least three days prior to the event. According to the Azerbaijani Constitution, demonstration organizers are not required to seek government approval for a public rally, but the preceding notification process could in �A;practice serve as a de facto approval mechanism. The new law stipulates that public rallies or demonstrations cannot be held within 200 meters of government buildings. The new law allows authorities to restrict assemblies through a broad clause, which cites the "interests of national security and public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Since the authorities could use the preceding clause to restrict demonstrations -- citing the need to prevent "disorder" or protect "morals" -- the Embassy agrees with the Venice Commission's conclusion that implementation will be critical and local authorities' practice should illustrate they are not using the law as a tool for preventing demonstrations. ¶5. (C) During an August 5 Cabinet of Ministers' meeting, President Aliyev made several positive election-related commitments, including supporting the ability of presidential candidates to meet with their supporters, even in Baku (ref b ). It is unclear whether Aliyev's comments on candidates being allowed to meet with electors refers to a new-found GOAJ willingness to allow parties to peacefully conduct rallies or simply permitting candidates to meet with potential voters. Law Not Tested -------------- ¶6. (C) Since the law was amended, several small-scale protests have been attempted, but all failed to meet the conditions of the new law. These rallies do not represent a sufficient test of the new law as the protests were small and perhaps spontaneous or the organizers proceeded despite being denied permission for holding their rallies because their demonstration clearly violated the new law. The Musavat Party organized rallies on July 11 and August 1, but police disrupted both demonstrations. In both cases, the Baku Mayor's office denied Musavat permission to hold the demonstrations because the planned venue violated the law's restriction on holding rallies within 200 meters of a government building (refs c and d). ¶7. (C) There also have been several small protests in Baku linked to Russia's military operations against Georgia. In most or all of the cases linked to the Russia-Georgia conflict, the organizers failed to comply with the legal requirement to notify local authorities of the planned demonstration. On August 9, the Dalga youth group successfully organized a small pro-Georgian rally in front of the Georgian Embassy, according to IRFS. Photographs show this minor protest included less than a dozen participants; the police did not disrupt the action. On August 11, police disrupted two small demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy by members of several youth groups. On the same day, there was another small pro-Georgian demonstration outside of an Azerbaijani military recruiting station; it is unclear if police disrupted this gathering. Police also disrupted an attempted rally next to the Russian Embassy on August 13. Large Demonstrations Not Expected -------------- ¶8. (C) The new law cannot be seen in isolation from the broader political context and long-term societal trends. Many opposition and civil society actors are weak and lack the finances and institutional capacity to conduct large-scale demonstrations. These actors' general weakness stems from a mixture of government steps to weaken and discredit them; the opposition and civil society's infighting and inability to produce credible leadership; and the public's general political apathy, stemming from the Soviet period. Per ref e, the key opposition figures' recent decision not to participate in the election reinforces the sense that there will be no large rallies before or after the election. Based on recent conversations with the deputies of the Popular Front Party and Musavat, the opposition appears divided about the prospects for organizing and gaining permission to hold election-related rallies. ¶9. (C) The general public has little interest in participating in political rallies. For the overwhelming number of average Azerbaijanis, there is no incentive to take part in a rally -- particularly one linked to the presidential election. From the viewpoint of the general public, President Aliyev will easily win the election and the opposition is a spent force with no alternative political vision or platform. We have heard from local observers that segments of the general public have no interest in going to the polls on election day. Civil society activists also report that some swathes of the general public simply are not interested in the presidential election. ¶10. (C) In the run-up to the October 15 presidential election, Azerbaijan's domestic political landscape lacks credible alternatives to President Aliyev that could galvanize a generally apathetic population to go to the streets. While the Embassy does not rule out the possibility for pre-election demonstrations, they likely will be small and the government likely will retain its official and unofficial mechanisms for controlling such activities. The critical question is whether following the elections there will be large-scale demonstrations and the prospect for violence. While the opposition parties have reduced incentive and ability to bring demonstrators to the streets, the government also is hyper-sensitive about the risk of civil unrest because of the post-election problems in Georgia and Armenia. Moreover, there is a widespread belief in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia that stability is now a higher domestic priority. The government has in the past overreacted and was quick to resort unnecessarily to force against demonstrators. The Embassy regularly raises the need for restraint with government leaders, the heads of the security services, and opposition leaders. DERSE