FOREIGN MINISTER: RUSSIAN INVANSION SENDS MESSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000812 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 TAGS: AJ ENRG GG PREL RS SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER: RUSSIAN INVANSION SENDS MESSAGE THAT "WE'RE BACK;" AZERBAIJAN SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador August 26 that the Russian invasion of Georgia was primarily intended to send a message to the U.S. that Russian power in the region "is back." He warned that Russian insistence on buffer zones in Georgia around the conflict areas will affect key energy infrastructure assets, including rail lines, the Baku-Supsa pipeline and the Azeri-owned Kulevi oil terminal. He argued that Armenian President Sargisian will be under strong pressure to take advantage of the opening provided by Russia's actions in Georgia with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh. He added that a serious USG signal with respect to territorial integrity and Nagorno-Karabakh is needed to ensure Armenia and Russia do not use the Georgia conflict to exacerbate the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Underscoring that Azerbaijan is also a country under threat, he said Azerbaijan seeks the same level of political support as Georgia. He suggested that agreement to establish a "mechanism of strategic dialogue," including agreement to "consult on various issues of mutual concern" could be a "positive outcome" for the Vice President's visit, if proposed by the U.S. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In an August 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said, "(The Russian invasion of Georgia) was aimed at you (the Americans),not at us. It was a messag that 'we're back.'" He predicted that in the long term that the Russians would be the losers for their actions. He said that in the short term, however, there are costs and dangers to address. The United States should directly ask the Russians what they want out of all this. "They will ask a price." Continued engagement is important "to stop" further deterioration of the situation. ¶3. (C) The Foreign Minister said that Georgian President Saakashvili made a "huge mistake" by mismanaging this conflict. "Saakashvili is very emotional. A politician cannot be emotional," Mammadyarov continued. Concerns about Pipelines -------------- ¶4. (C) Concerning the buffer zones or "zones of responsibility" Russia is establishing in Georgia, the Foreign Minister thought that the Russian position was particularly troubling. He commented that the same tactic had been used during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict -- the creation of buffer zones that were then never returned. The current buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia include key ports, energy infrastructure assets (including the Azerbaijan-owned Kulevi oil terminal),railroads and energy export routes. He said that the Russians are shooting themselves in the foot by asserting that the Georgian port city of Poti is in their sphere of influence, however. ¶5. (C) When asked whether he believed the Russians intentionally targeted the pipelines, he said, "I think they are still smart. Had they attacked the pipelines, this would have been a whole different level of conflict. They did not want to interfere with our interests." At the request of the Azerbaijani Government, the Russians also did not attack ethnic Azeri communities near Gori and in Kaspi, a position Mammadayarov said he "had to appreciate." He continued that the Russians don't want additional troubles. They could have done more on the pipelines. With the train attack, for example, the Kazakhs have made a decision to shift away from rail transport through the Southern Corridor and instead are putting their oil through the Novorossiysk Russian pipeline. SHOULD NOT BE A PRECEDENT FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH -------------- - ¶6. (C) Mammadyarov said that the main issue in the immediate term for Azerbaijan is whether the Armenian reaction to the Georgian crisis will be responsible. He indicated that the Armenians have so far been quiet, but there should be a strong signal that warns them against taking advantage of the Georgian developments with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh. "The reaction of the international community, particularly the U.S. and EU, will be important," he added. ¶7. (C) The Foreign Minister said that Russia wants to make clear their ability to enforce their will in the South Caucasus. "I don't think the Russians will press (Armenian President Sargisian). He's more responsible than Saakashvili, but he will be under great pressure from the Dashnak parties." He did believe that the Russians were seeking to send a message by using their base in the Armenian city of Gyumri to launch planes that bombed civilians, ports and railroads. He said that they could have easily accomplished the same missions from Russian bases but they chose to use this base in Armenia. ¶8. (C) Mammadyarov urged that the U.S. and Russia, having now disagreed about Kosovo and Georgia, stop the spiraling conflict and agree to settle Nagorno-Karabakh. He stressed that the way to do this would be for both countries to pressure Armenia to settle on the basis of territorial integrity. A "very serious signal that this must stop" is needed in the form of a strong USG statement on territorial integrity and NK. "After Georgia, the rhetoric should be that conflicts should be resolved on the basis of territorial integrity, as a very serious signal to Sargisian not to escalate." ¶9. (C) Saying he was "just brainstorming," he suggested that a new document on the level of the Helsinki Final Act is needed to ensure no one has "aspirations or the temptation to use Kosovo as a precedent . . . Russia does not accept that Kososvo is sui generis . . . if there is no harsh reaction (to recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) Russia will continue and we're next in line. We have to be very careful not to provoke or irritate. It is a question of survival for Azerbaijan." We want to be Treated like Georgia -------------- ¶10. (C) The Minister said that "if you do not support us, Russia will feel they can do whatever they like, that they can do the same thing with us." Russia's actions in Georgia are a "very serious signal" in this regard. Azerbaijan is under threat, and needs and requests the same level of political support and attention as Georgia. The USG, in fact, should simply replace the word "Georgia" with the word "Azerbaijan" in its statements and actions. ¶11. (C) The Minister suggested that one of the "positive outcomes" of the Vice President's visit could be the establishment of a "mechanism of strategic dialogue." He noted that the U.S. and Azerbaijan already engage as "strategic partners" on a range of issues. Saying that "we need to do more within these talks," including "consultations on various issues of mutual concern," he suggested that a strategic dialogue could be a "very important element" for intensified engagement. He said that Azerbaijan seeks "political support" with respect to security concerns. A strategic dialogue could, for example, provide political support for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and political protection of the South Caucasus energy corridor. The Minister indicated Azerbaijan would welcome such a proposal from the U.S. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The Foreign Minister's comments are consistent with those of the President and other senior leaders. They see a clear Russian effort to intimidate countries on their border with the aim of reasserting Russian dominance in the region, with bitterness towards Saakashvili for falling into the Russian trap and providing Russia the opportunity, endangering everyone's interests. The focus on the repercussions for Nagorno-Karabakh is also a frequent refrain, with the clear hope that the U.S. drumbeat on the territorial integrity of Georgia will translate into greater sympathy and support for the Azerbaijani position on Nagorno-Karabakh. Mammadyarov's comments on a possible "strategic dialogue" echo President Aliyev's to Senator Lugar that we "need to elaborate a mutually agreed and predictable format of relations . . . that treats the three South Caucasus countries equally," with "a unified USG approach to us and others (septel)." DERSE