RECOMMENDING GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH AZERBAIJAN

S E C R E T BAKU 000499 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR D, P, EUR A/S FRIED, DRL A/S KRAMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG MOPS KDEM PBTS AJ SUBJECT: RECOMMENDING GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH AZERBAIJAN REF: BAKU 447 Classified By: Anne E. Derse, for reasons 1.5 (b,c,d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Azerbaijan is an increasingly important partner for the United States. A Muslim country bordered by Russia and Iran, it is a firmly secular, pro-American partner in a region beset by radical Islam. Our security cooperation is excellent and growing, and could take on still more importance. Azerbaijan is a leader in efforts to export new Caspian gas reserves to Europe. Azerbaijan is also an aspiring democracy, but experiences all the difficulties inherent to democratic reform in the former Soviet states. Azerbaijan's massive new oil wealth and rising regional influence make it a stronger partner, but also more confident, desirous of "respect" and less amenable to policy prescriptions. Serious, sustained and balanced USG engagement is increasingly necessary to maintain the strong relations that currently support important US interests, and to promote the reform necessary for Azerbaijan's continued stability and stronger partnership with the US. ¶2. (C) Summary Continued: Senior Azerbaijani leaders, however, increasingly believe that Azerbaijan is not fully embraced by the United States as a serious partner, particularly as evidenced by our stance on Azerbaijan's top policy issue, Nagorno-Karabakh, and by what many here see as "unbalanced, if merited" criticism of Azerbaijan's democratic record. There are hints of a sharp debate within President Aliyev's inner circle with respect to Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation in response to what some perceive as a failure by the United States to reciprocate the degree of cooperation that Azerbaijan has extended to the U.S. Greater and more nuanced engagement with Azerbaijan will help to ease these concerns and ensure continued progress on our security, energy and reform objectives. End summary. SECURITY COOPERATION -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Azerbaijan is a long-standing partner in the war on terrorism. It has 150 troops in Iraq and recently announced plans to increase its military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, including 90 troops, PRT contributions, and new training programs for Afghan security forces. It grants unlimited overflight and landing rights for Coalition aircraft bound for Iraq and Afghanistan, and is working to bring its own armed forces up to NATO standards through its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Just this month, NATO has completed a two year process to certify yet another company for NATO multinational operations. Georgia and Ukraine's desire to join NATO is prompting Azerbaijan to think seriously about its own NATO aspirations. While there are many hurdles to cross before Azerbaijan will be in a position for a serious NATO bid, President Aliyev and his Foreign and Defense Ministers have made clear, privately, to us and to other NATO partners, that this is the goal. Our bilateral intelligence relationship is excellent and growing, with substantive and growing cooperation targeted against al-Qa'ida-affiliated and Iranian-sponsored extremists. Azerbaijan has indicated it is willing to do still more on Iran. Azerbaijan's continued cooperation in the war on terror and as a partner on Iran supports critical U.S. security goals. ENERGY COOPERATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Azerbaijan has been a leader in regional efforts to diversify energy sources and transportation routes. It is the most viable, near-term supplier of large gas volumes that could allow Europe access to alternative sources other than Gazprom. As both a gas and oil producer and a major transit country, it is the key to the success of the southern energy corridor, carrying Caspian resources west. With the successful launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus Pipelines in 2006, Azerbaijan is now poised to further develop and expand the east-west energy corridor through the development and transit of new Caspian gas resources. With full-scale development of the massive Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan could become a major gas exporter. Its gas could potentially contribute to both the Nabucco and Turkey-Greece-Italy pipelines, but President Aliyev must take decisions that Russia and Iran will strongly oppose in order to produce this gas and meet the demands of investors. Azerbaijan is working with Turkey and European nations to develop the necessary transit routes and supply agreeemnts, and at the same time, is working quietly with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to encourage them to turn to the West, rather than Russia, for the export of their considerable energy resources. Azerbaijan has consistently supported Georgia in resisting Russian energy pressure, reinforcing Georgian independence, and by next year, will be Georgia's major gas supplier. Azerbaijan's continued cooperation on energy is essential to advancing the USG's goal of diversified sources of energy supply in the region and in Europe. ¶5. (C) Azerbaijan's Western orientation and cooperation with the U.S. and the West on energy and security attracts opposition and pressure from both Russia and Iran. This pressure is growing, and Azerbaijani officials have been increasingly blunt in noting that in resisting such pressure, Azerbaijan is "alone. . . not only without an umbrella, but out in the rain." The GOAJ has made clear that Azerbaijan seeks a path to a closer relationship with the U.S. which will provide greater assurance of U.S. support for Azerbaijan's independence and security, and per President Aliyev, "is willing to go as far as the US wants to go" (septel). POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -------------- ¶6. (C) Azerbaijan, a majority Shi'a Muslim country, is a firmly secular, pro-American aspiring democracy in a region beset by radical Islam. Through its membership in the OSCE and Council of Europe, its partnership with the EU, NATO and its WTO aspirations, Azerbaijan has pledged to make the far-reaching, systemic political and economic reforms needed to ensure its long-term stability and prosperity. Azerbaijan has the potential to become a model of secular democratic development in a Muslim country. Azerbaijan, however, is experiencing all the difficulties in democratic reform inherent in former Soviet states. Azerbaijan's democratic and economic reform record remains poor, hamstrung by an entrenched Soviet-era bureaucracy, endemic corruption and weak democratic institutions. Developments around elections in Armenia and Georgia and the example of Russia have reinforced anti-reform attitudes and provided a handy excuse for hardliners to slow or try to reverse reform. ¶7. (S/NF) The government's delay in meeting its many democratic commitments, including allowing substantive political debate, fully respecting human rights and more rapidly developing its institutions, threatens our broader strategic interests and could lay the groundwork for Islamic extremism to take root over time. This is an increasingly contentious issue in an otherwise very good relationship. Promoting change requires serious and sustained engagement in the context of a relationship in which the benefits of implementing difficult reforms, in terms of Azerbaijan's key national interests, are clear to the GOAJ. A GROWING UNEASE -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Senior Azerbaijani officials - including President Aliyev - increasingly believe that Azerbaijan is not fully embraced by the United States as a serious partner. In the wake of the United States and the other OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs' "no" vote on Azerbaijan's UNGA resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories, we have heard strong messages from senior leaders questioning our true intentions with respect to Azerbaijan (reftel). Azerbaijan's position on the UNGA resolution was an attempt to shift the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in favor of Azerbaijan's position using sentiment over Kosovo as a lever; President Aliyev also told us that the UNGA resolution was an attempt to exploit Russia's hypocritical position of having supported Serbia's territorial integrity, but now appearing to show less support for Azerbaijan's. GRPO reporting indicates, however, that some within President Aliyev's inner circle - including Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev - are actively promoting the notion that recent USG actions including the UNGA vote demonstrate that the United States will not help on Nagorno-Karabakh, does not value Azerbaijan as a regional partner, and is working to undermine its leadership. ¶9. (S/NF) In the conspiracy-minded Caucasus, a series of U.S. public statements - rightfully critical of Azerbaijan's poor human rights record - appear to have strengthened the hand of Mehdiyev and others who advocate distancing from Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation (reftel). They argue that pressure for change and criticism from the U.S. on democracy and human rights is not balanced by appreciation for Azerbaijan's contributions in advancing shared security and energy objectives, by a correct understanding of the progress Azerbaijan has made on reform despite serious obstacles, or by support for Azerbaijan's red lines in the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh. GROWING HUBRIS -------------- ¶10. (C) Buoyed by burgeoning oil revenues and sky-high growth rates in the past few years, the GOAJ also has become more confident and activist in its foreign policy, reflected in a high volume of foreign visits, the large number of new Azerbaijani diplomatic missions opening abroad, increasing GOAJ activism in attracting international events in Baku, and in public and private statements by GOAJ officials underscoring Azerbaijan's growing regional influence. ¶11. (C) Reflecting this trend, senior officials, including the President, now regularly relay to international interlocutors their expectation that Azerbaijan will be treated with greater "respect" and as "an equal," reflecting its greater economic and political clout. The GOAJ is also increasingly resistant to Western policy prescriptions, and has hardened it attitudes with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, reflecting the GOAJ's belief that it can use its new clout to achieve its goals. RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Given the breadth and importance of our interests in Azerbaijan, we believe, as we recommended after the March 14 UNGA vote, that high-level USG outreach to the GOAJ is needed now to ease immediate tensions before they harden further, ensure continued progress on our broader interests and help re-establish a climate in which we have influence to elicit progress on democracy and human rights in a sensitive election year. In particular, we need to reassure President Aliyev of our continued interest in making progress in all aspects of our relations. In the personality-driven Caucasus, and especially Azerbaijan, where senior leaders from Russia and Iran regularly visit and telephone to extend their influence, personal contacts are key. We believe that the Secretary's May 28 call to President Aliyev will go far in reassuring Aliyev of USG intentions with respect to our relationship. ¶13. (C) More sustained and serious engagement with Azerbaijan going forward is also key, however, given growing pressure from Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan's heightened potential as a partner in advancing key U.S. interests and the growing need to provide incentives as well as pressure for reform. ¶14. (S/NF) We again urge Washington to conduct as soon as possible a high-level review of our overall relations with Azerbaijan in light of developments in the region and Azerbaijan's rapid transformation to a more influential regional actor. We need to determine what other steps we can take now, before elections in both countries this fall, to underscore the value we attach to Azerbaijan's continued cooperation on energy, security and counterterrorism in the face of strong Iranian and Russian pressure and to illustrate how real progress on reform will benefit Azerbaijan in terms of U.S. support on its key interests, security and Nagorno-Karabakh. ¶15. (S/NF) We also hope that the Secretary, P and Assistant Secretary Fried will consider visits to Azerbaijan in conjunction with any travel to the region (the GUAM Summit is one possibility),and that the Deputy Secretary will reschedule the visit planned earlier this spring. The visit of Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor David Kramer is key to giving new momentum to our dialogue on democracy and human rights,a nd we urge that it take place as soon as possisble. DERSE