AZERBAIJAN: SENIOR OFFICIALS REACT STRONGLY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000447 SIPDIS FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC, EUR/ACE, DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: AJ PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: SENIOR OFFICIALS REACT STRONGLY TO U.S. COMMENTS ON DEMOCRACY AND MEDIA FREEDOM REF: A. BAKU 412 ¶B. BAKU 377 ¶C. BAKU 306 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior GOAJ officials have reacted unusually harshly to recent USG statements criticizing Azerbaijan's lack of political will to resolve its separatist conflict, its imprisonment of journalists and especially, comparing Azerbaijan's record on democracy unfavorably to that of Armenia. Government contacts who support strong relations with the U.S. are dismayed, saying that the unfavorable public comparison of Azerbaijan to Armenia, especially in the wake of Armenia's troubled elections, has angered President Aliyev. The government appears to be taking concrete steps to show its displeasure with the U.S. Although targeted thus far at USG election and democracy assistance, there are signs of possible fallout on other issues as well. END SUMMARY USG Criticism Hits a Nerve -------------- ¶2. (C) As reported reftels, relations with Azerbaijan have been tense since the USG voted "no" on March 14 on Azerbaijan's UNGA resolution on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. President Aliyev believed the USG would abstain, and many here, despite our repeated explanations of the reasons for the vote, maintain that it betrays a "pro-Armenian" bias, or at least, an unacceptable degree of ambiguity about USG support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. ¶3. (C) Against this backdrop, comments by the Secretary on April 15 at an American Turkish Council lunch that "the NK issue is one that could be resolved, and actually, with just a little bit of will, could be resolved relatively quickly," were received with disbelief in Baku as an oversimplification of a complex and, for Azerbaijan, a crucial, negotiation. President Aliyev believed the comments impugned his demonstrated commitment to finding a peaceful resolution, according to the Foreign Minister. ¶4. (C) In a statement on April 28 at a Peace Corps event that provoked significant negative attention in Baku, Secretary Rice reportedly said, ". . . the Caucasus . . . not so much Georgia, but Azerbaijan, to a certain extent Armenia, there is important work to be done there to bring that part of the Caucasus closer to the (democratic) standards that we thought they were once meeting. And it has been a disappointment." The GOAJ has long protested alleged western "double standards" in the treatment of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Senior Azerbaijani officials believe the USG downplayed the violence, killings and anti-democratic developments in the wake of Armenia's presidential election, although the Embassy has regularly provided them information on critical statements made by senior U.S. officials. ¶5. (C) When President Bush's statement on International Press Freedom Day May 2 correctly listed Azerbaijan as one of the top five jailers of journalists in the world, the dam broke. Senior Azerbaijani officials have told us that many in the government now believe the public criticism was a "plot" to weaken the government ahead of October elections. President Aliyev Reacts -------------- ¶6. (C) The UK Ambassador to Azerbaijan on May 7 said that President Aliyev had delivered a message clearly intended for the USG in a meeting with visiting UK Minister for Europe James Murphy. The UK Ambassador said that commenting that he was "telling you this because I know you are a close ally of the U.S.,8 Aliyev first explained at length to Murphy his longstanding unhappiness about the "double standards" applied to Azerbaijan, and argued that "there should be a more balanced approach." He said the Secretary,s remarks at the Peace Corps were the first time the USG has publicly compared democracy in the three countries, ranking Georgia first, Arenia second, and Azerbaijan third. Aliyev told Muphy this is "wrong, not diplomatic and contrary to our strategic partnership." ¶7. (C) Aliyev said comments like this "make it harder for me to advocate integration with Euro-Atlantic structures because we have an internal debate in the YAP (the ruling New Azerbaijan Party). People ask me, "if we are publicly attacked why are we doing this (pursue Euro-Atlantic integration)?" Aliyev told Murphy such remarks are "insulting" and "humiliating," and it is important to understand Azerbaijan's reaction from this "psychological" perspective. Aliyev said the "State Department" position is "strange" because he had a good meeting with President Bush two years ago and bilateral cooperation is excellent, including on energy, counterterrorism, security. So, Aliyev asked Murphy, "Why is Madam Rice doing this?8 Unprecedented Public Reaction -------------- ¶8. (C) Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev, almost certainly with clearance from the top, lashed back in a May 3 interview, targeting the Embassy's recent announcement of technical assistance to support free and fair elections. Mehdiyev said, "Personally, as a citizen of Azerbaijan, I see (U.S. election assistance) as interference in Azerbaijan's internal affairs." In the same interview, he said that "according to Condolezza Rice's logic, the February-March events in Armenia should be repeated in Azerbaijan before she can say anything positive about Azerbaijan." He added that President Bush's statement on the media in Azerbaijan was incorrect. ¶9. (C) Apparently reflecting a decision to walk back from the brink at least rhetorically, Mehdiyev curtly told the press at a ruling political party-sponsored international conference on May 7 that "relations with the U.S. are on a high level. Azerbaijan is a U.S. partner. Relations are developing and will develop further." The statement appears to have stemmed at least temporarily the government-inspired tide of public venom. ¶10. (C) Foreign Minister Mammadyarov told the Ambassador he was "stunned" by Dr. Rice's statements. Noting his "great respect" for the Secretary, he said he and others simply can not understand "why this is happening." According to Presidential International Relations Advisor Novruz Mammadov on May 2, President Aliyev called him in and grilled him. "I have a good relationship with President Bush. Azerbaijan is the partner who cooperates with the U.S. in many areas successfully, on which the U.S. can count for the future." Azerbaijani Punitive Steps -------------- ¶11. (C) We see worrying signs that the government's unhappiness since the UN General Assembly vote on Nagorno-Karabakh, exacerbated by the recent public statements, is having a negative affect on our broader interests. Most actions thus far are targeted at USG election and democracy assistance programs, which in previous meetings had been favorably received by the GOAJ, including by Mehdiyev. For example, in addition to Mehdiyev's allegations of USG "interference in internal affairs," President Aliyev and Mehdiyev in separate meetings both protested alleged direct USG financing of the opposition ("our enemies") through its assistance programs. On April 15 the presidential staff shared a list of programs they claimed unacceptably finance the opposition. The list, largely an objective account of USG programs here, provides no substantiation for the claims, which we have relayed to the Presidential staff and the Foreign Ministry. ¶12. (C) On April 28, the USAID-supported Election Monitoring Center (EMC),which the Ministry of Justice had just registered in February after two years of applications, received notice that the Ministry of Justice had filed a sudden court case to revoke its registration and dissolve the organization on the basis of minor technical problems (reftel A). As the largest domestic monitoring organization, the EMC planned to field thousands of monitors for the October polls. ¶13. (C) In an April 15 meeting with visiting Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) President Jeff Gedmin, President Aliyev first provided a strong statement on Nagorno-Karabakh and then an unrepentant message on media freedom. Aliyev rebuffed Gedmin's criticism of the media situation, claiming Azerbaijan has "no problems" on media and slamming Radio Liberty for reporting allegedly slanted toward the opposition (reftel B). To date RFE/RL continues to operate unimpeded, but pressure on other journalists continues. ¶14. (C) The GOAJ's ire may be spilling over into other areas of the relationship not related to democratic reform. After months of close collaboration that resulted in the signing of a lease on March 14 for a New Embassy Compound, the GOAJ has gone radio silent with respect to the final steps to finalize the transfer of the property to the USG, refusing to answer phone calls, letters or requests of meetings, without explanation. After the Minister of Defense approved the requisite number of troops for the first-ever joint U.S.-Azerbaijan military exercise in Azerbaijan in spring 2009, Operation Regional Response, the Presidential Apparat told the Defense Minister on April 28 that the President's final approval of the exercise would be withheld until after the October elections. Signs of an Internal Battle -------------- ¶15. (C) In separate recent discussions, the Foreign Minister, Presidential International Relations Advisor Novruz Mammadov and Presidential Legal Advisor Shahin Aliyev, all supporters of a strong U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship and Azerbaijan's Euro-Atlantic orientation, expressed dismay. They made clear the President has taken the USG comments personally, and that they have raised again in his mind the spectre of a USG plot to weaken him in an important election year (as he believes we did in 2005). Moreover, these contacts say the public criticism following on the heels of the UNGA flap has strengthened the hand of government hardliners who argue against Azerbaijan's western orientation in internal GOAJ debates. ¶16. (C) Foreign Minister Mammadyarov told the Ambassador on May 1 that the disparaging public comparison of Azerbaijan to Georgia and Armenia, especially after difficult elections in the latter two this year, convinces even U.S. supporters in the GOAJ that "no matter how good our elections are, we're screwed." Asserting that democracy is very important for Azerbaijan and that he strongly believes "Azerbaijan is not worse than Georgia or Armenia," Mammadyarov said negative public comparisons of Azerbaijan to Georgia and Armenia are "not helpful" to those trying to advance reform in Azerbaijan. The U.S. should realize that "there are some working against you," seeking to plant suspicions and negative thinking about USG actions and intentions in the mind of the President. ¶17. (C) International Relations Advisor Mammadov told the Ambassador May 2 that problems in the relationship that began with the UNGA vote are multiplying. Those who want to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Azerbaijan are taking advantage of the flare up on Nagorno-Karabakh and the sensitivities of an election year to mount a campaign against the U.S. They are succeeding, and confidence in the U.S. is being eroded. Mammadov added, "Many in the government and the President himself feel that USG criticism, while merited, is not balanced." Aliyev has been convinced that "there is a deliberate formula the USG uses, one for him, one for Georgia, and one for Armenia," Mammadov said. Aliyev believes, however, that of the CIS countries, Azerbaijan is the partner that cooperates most successfully with the U.S. in many areas, he added. In this context, the President does not understand "unbalanced" USG criticism. Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) The GOAJ's harsh reaction reflects a combination of longstanding sensitivity to being compared unfavorably to its neighbors, especially Armenia, President Aliyev's conviction that the USG had sought to foster a color revolution in the 2005 election and lingering unhappiness about our recent stance on Nagorno-Karabakh at the UNGA. As a result we are on a negative trajectory at present with Azerbaijan. Septel will explore suggestions for how we might get relations back on track and promote our considerable interests against this backdrop of hostility. DERSE