AZERBAIJAN'S INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY TOWARD NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000044 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2025 TAGS: PREL MARK MASS PBTS NATO AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY TOWARD NATO REF: A. BAKU 1408 ¶B. BAKU 1384 ¶C. BAKU 1383 ¶D. BAKU 1382 Classified By: Charge Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Azerbaijan (GOAJ) has not publicly defined its ultimate goal with respect to NATO membership, nor do we expect it to do so. Azerbaijan's NATO policy appears to be movement toward the organization while intentionally remaining silent on the question of ultimately seeking NATO membership. This policy of intentional ambiguity toward NATO is consistent with Azerbaijan's broader foreign policy of regional balance, which favors Euro-Atlantic integration, while at the same time seeking to maintain good relations with Russia and Iran. While, in some respects, Azerbaijan has been successful in moving closer to NATO, the GOAJ's reluctance to disclose the content of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) has prevented the true purpose and utility of NATO integration from being fully understood by the general public. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict further complicates Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO, leading many to believe that Azerbaijan will never be able to join NATO until the conflict is resolved. Georgia's accelerated NATO membership plans have sparked intense interest from Azerbaijani officials and, if successful, could cause them to rethink their current, intentional ambiguity toward NATO. End summary. PARSING THE GOAJ RHETORIC -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOAJ's policy toward NATO can be most accurately described as one of intentional ambiguity. GOAJ statements on Azerbaijan's relations with NATO tend to focus on movement toward and integration with the alliance organization, but Azerbaijan's intended end goal seems to be deliberately vague -- and often contradictory -- in public statements. In a typical, recent example, Deputy Prime Minister Yaqub Eyyubov told the press on November 20 that Azerbaijan "plans to join the alliance." Eyyubov's statement was then flatly contradicted by Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev who, in widely reported remarks at the CIS Defense Ministers, conference, on 27 November said that Azerbaijan has "no intention" to join NATO. The Foreign Minister recently told the Ambassador behind closed doors that Azerbaijan's goal is eventually to join NATO. He has never, however, voiced this position publicly. Working-level MFA and MOD officials in both official and unofficial conversations regarding potential NATO membership often quickly dismiss the idea as something that is neither necessary nor important for Azerbaijan. ¶3. (C) The public statements of Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, one of the strongest GOAJ proponents of Azerbaijan's engagement with NATO, reflect the GOAJ's unwillingness to clarify its intentions toward the question of whether Azerbaijan seeks NATO membership. In public statements carried by Interfax in December, Azimov emphasized the themes of cooperation and integration, while skirting the membership issue. Azimov observed that "Azerbaijan is one of the nations most actively cooperating with NATO and we are ready to continue our activity in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration," while remaining elusive about membership: "Whatever or positive assessment of NATO, if this membership does not correspond to our interests, we shall not advance toward it. On the other hand, if we see that it corresponds to our interests and in fact our membership in NATO will contribute to the solution of potential Azeri problems, then a different situation will emerge." ¶4. (C) President Aliyev, who regularly affirms that Azerbaijan's overall foreign policy goal is Euro-Atlantic integration, in his public comments has firmly cast Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO as that of partnership. In February 2007 comments about possible NATO membership, Aliyev said, "It is clear both to us and to NATO that our country is not yet prepared for this. Therefore, we need to continue working as partners." Aliyev's apparent unwillingness to publicly declare a more clear position on NATO membership reflects Azerbaijan's broader goal of pursuing a balanced approach in its foreign policy. Aliyev and his closest advisors regularly tell us that Azerbaijan's geopolitical location requires it to pursue a foreign policy of balance that allows the GOAJ to protect its interests vis-a-vis its more powerful neighbors, Russia, Turkey and Iran. At the same time, this need for balance -- particularly with regard to Russia and Iran -- makes Euro-Atlantic integration, albeit within certain bounds, a priority for Aliyev's government. GEORGIA ENVY -------------- ¶5. (C) Georgia's changing relationship with NATO could prove a catalyst for Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO. In the past, Azerbaijan has viewed Georgia's "all in" approach toward NATO, the EU, and the WTO with a great deal of skepticism, accusing the Georgians of intentionally pursuing a provocative approach toward Russia, which will yield little result. The more cautious Azerbaijanis, who actively seek stability and balance in their foreign policy, say that they "do not want to be like Georgia" and that while this may be "fine for Georgia" it is not a good policy for Azerbaijan. In general, GOAJ officials seem to believe that Georgia's reforms have moved too fast, too soon and that the subsequent disruption of political stability is something that Azerbaijan will not accept. GOAJ officials say that they desire to keep their relations with Russia, at the very least, on a cordial and non-confrontational basis, a factor that most certainly affects Azerbaijan's approach toward NATO. ¶6. (C) Yet Georgia's recent decision to pursue accelerated NATO membership seems to be promoting at least some Azerbaijani officials to rethink their approach toward NATO. Some Azerbaijani officials appear to have a confused view of NATO's position toward Georgia, and believe that Georgia and Azerbaijan (and in some cases the South Caucasus in general) are linked in the eyes of NATO. GOAJ officials frequently make statements such as "once NATO accepts Georgia, they will accept us" or "if NATO gives Georgia a MAP (Membership Action Plan),they should give us a MAP." The basis and logic for such views is not clear, but it seems to show a lack of understanding that comprehensive political and military reforms need to be carried out prior to deepening ties with NATO. ¶7. (C) The GOAJ is watching the development of ties between Georgia and NATO very closely, and the success or failure of Georgia's "all in" policy will likely have a trickle down effect on both the GOAJ and the general population's perceptions of NATO. Azerbaijani officials also seem to be paying careful attention to NATO's handling of Georgia's territorial integrity issues, given the implications for Azerbaijan's own relationship with NATO. Yet, lurking behind Azerbaijan's intense interest in Georgia's NATO accession is a constant feeling of "Georgia envy." Azerbaijani officials routinely complain that Georgia -- which they believe faces equally difficult corruption and political reform problems -- is held to a different standard than Azerbaijan. As such, key officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, believe that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashviili was manipulating the NATO accession process to bolster his domestic standing (ref b). GOAJ OFFICIALS, UNDERSTANDING OF NATO -------------- ¶8. (C) Our experience with a wide range of working-level MFA officials, both from the Americas section and the Security Affairs department -- almost all of whom can be described as pro-American and pro-reform -- indicates that there is still a general lack of understanding about what NATO is and does, and what NATO membership would mean for Azerbaijan. In addition to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) (see paragraph 10),most GOAJ officials' personal opinions seem to be in line with Azerbaijan's broader foreign policy goal of "balancing" Iran and Russia. They seem to agree that Azerbaijan's carefully calibrated relations with NATO should simultaneously afford the GOAJ some protection from Russia and Iran and refrain from provoking these two regional powers. As such, GOAJ officials appear to view their relationship with NATO more as a strategic tool than as a vehicle by which reform could be implemented. ¶9. (C) In both everyday conversations and in official ministerial-level meetings with senior USG visitors, there seems to be a general misunderstanding in the MOD about the difference between NATO "standards" and NATO "structures." Often Ministry of Defense (MOD) officers and Minister Abiyev himself will comment that the MOD has integrated "all its units" to "NATO standards". In reality, this means that the MOD has changed the names of various units from Soviet to NATO structures. In general these changes are nothing more than cosmetic, and have little do to with units being up to NATO "standards." However, Azerbaijani MOD officers have told Embassy officers that the simple integration to NATO structures has had a positive psychological effect on the mindset of mid- and junior-level officers, as they move away from the Soviet model. NAGORNO-KARABAKH -------------- ¶10. (C) As with almost any public policy issue, the NK issue permeates any discussion of Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO. Many in the GOAJ view NATO through the prism of the conflict, specifically NATO's position toward NK and any peacekeeping role NATO could play in the conflict. It is clear that GOAJ officials, especially those in the MFA and MOD, believe that NATO would not seriously consider accepting Azerbaijan into NATO until the NK issue is resolved. Once Azerbaijanis are told that NATO simply supports the Minsk Group process and wants to see the peaceful settlement of NK, the sentiments toward NATO turn much more pessimistic, with the interlocutor generally throwing their hands up and saying that "NATO would never take us until NK is solved" or that NATO was only interested in Azerbaijan's energy resources. NATO's neutral stance toward the NK issue does not endear it to the general public, which seems increasingly to believe that the international community -- and the Minsk Group in particular -- holds Azerbaijan to a double standard. PUBLIC OPINIONS AND DISCUSSION -------------- ¶11. (C) Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO is a frequent topic of discussion in newspapers, radio and television. Information about NATO appears in both the official and opposition press, and ranges from official press releases about Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation, and the visits and press conferences of visiting NATO international staff (which often includes NATO's criticisms of Azerbaijan),to persistent rumors as to who may be appointed the first civilian Minister of Defense as a result of NATO-related reforms. Azerbaijan also hosts a semi-annual NATO International School, which attracts wide coverage in the media. ¶12. (C) In spite of this wide coverage of NATO-related issues, the media alost never touches upon the specific, fundamental eforms -- political, economic, and military -- tat must be undertaken as part of the NATO accessio process. The GOAJ, which insists on treating is NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) as classified documents, is largely to blame. As a result, the general public seems entirely unaware of the real changes -- and real benefits -- that would result from a serious NATO accession effort. This skewed coverage of NATO also appears to have created the mistaken impression that Azerbaijan's potential acceptance into NATO depends solely on NATO member states, not on any reform steps taken by the GOAJ. As such, public discussion of NATO focuses on broader political-military issues, such as missile defense and the international community's standoff with Iran, and how these issues might affect Azerbaijan's chances of NATO membership. COMMENT: PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE -------------- ¶13. (C) Given Azerbaijan's carefully structured pursuit of balance in its foreign policy, its ultimate goal with NATO may be very similar to its goals with respect to the EU. As President Aliyev recently told a senior U.S. official, the GOAJ recognizes that it has no possibility of actually entering the European Union any time soon. Yet the structures and values of the EU, according to Aliyev, offer a model and system that the GOAJ can strive to achieve as part of its political and economic reform agenda. Given the GOAJ's concerns about Russia and Iran, and the leading role that Soviet-era relics such as Minister of Defense Abiyev continue to play in Azerbaijan's national security policy, our best hope seems to be that the GOAJ will look to NATO, like the EU, as a model that the GOAJ can strive to replicate in its ongoing reform efforts, rather than as the ultimate goal of its national security policy. While this relationship with NATO -- pursuing reform while at the same time refraining from embracing future membership -- will prove beneficial in some key areas, the GOAJ should pursue a more open public discussion of its NATO IPAP goals in order to maximize the reforming impact of NATO. Unfortunately, to date the serious structural reforms, consistent with a EU or NATO aspirant, have not been put forth. The GOAJ's close-hold treatment of its IPAP commitments may indicate that the senior levels of Azerbaijan's political-military structure are not yet ready to embrace the far-reaching reforms required for true NATO integration. ¶14. (C) Some have started to suggest that, in the lead up to the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit that there may be a internal debate taking place within the Azerbaijani government regarding going further in stating their desire to become a NATO member or that Azerbaijan may present more defined objectives. There is certainly increased attention to NATO in the media, as well as a series of comments by senior officials suggesting the possibility of an internal dialogue. However, given our initial reading of Azerbaijan's second proposed Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP-2), it does not appear to be any more ambitious, and in some respects less so, than IPAP-1, which included goals for the upgrading of an airbase and toward civilian control of the military. Additionally, it would be difficult to expect that any serious movement would be made during an election year (the Azerbaijani presidential elections are in October 2008). During a November 2007 meeting with the Ambassador, DFM Azimov raised the prospect of an "intensified dialogue" but he was quick to point out that there may only be the possibility for such a move in a few years, and at least not before 2010 or 2011 after the term of IPAP-2 ended. NATO Special Representative to the South Caucasus Robert Simons said that Azimov had told him that Azerbaijan was not even ready to seriously consider an intensified dialogue. If there is such an internal debate about NATO membership, it has yet to produce any tangible public steps in the direction of reversing the policy of moving slowly and guardedly toward a greater role in NATO. ¶15. (C) DAO Comment: The Defense Attache agrees that the GOAJ's policy toward NATO can generally be characterized as "intentional ambiguity," although this ambiguity parallels many other former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet countries' early relations with NATO. The GOAJ's ambiguity also stems from the perception that the West has not yet decided to stand with Azerbaijan. While the GOAJ often has unrealistic expectations of what the West should do to demonstrate its support for Azerbaijan, the GOAJ's sense of unmet expectations exists. Senior GOAJ officials have also privately suggested that Azerbaijan has a long-term intention to join NATO, but the GOAJ is not yet ready and it is worried about Russia and Iran's responses. While the MOD is not capable of planning genuine, far-reaching defense reforms, Azerbaijan's interactions with NATO -- including providing troops for coalition efforts in Afghanistan -- have at a minimum pushed the MOD to understand that its military future lies in adopting NATO standards. LU