OSCE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE BLASTS "UNFORTUNATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000354 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AJ SUBJECT: OSCE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE BLASTS "UNFORTUNATE TREND" OF PRESSURE AGAINST JOURNALISTS REF: A. BAKU 268 ¶B. 07 BAKU 1532 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: OSCE Media Freedom Representative Haraszti capped off an April 6-9 visit to Baku with a press conference in which he blasted an "unfortunate trend" of pressure against Azerbaijani journalists, and specifically blamed Prosecutor General Garalov for a "disgraceful" propaganda campaign against Azadliq journalist Agil Khalil (ref a). In a private meeting with the Ambassador, Haraszti said that the GOAJ's obvious "fabrication" that Azadliq journalist Agil Khalil was stabbed during a homosexual lovers' spat and the "massive propaganda action" launched against Khalil convinced him of the need to deliver this unusually blunt public message. Haraszti said GOAJ officials claimed that they had implemented a de facto moratorium on criminal libel cases against journalists but could not stop law enforcement authorities from investigating other criminal cases against journalists. Haraszti believes the GOAJ is "fabricating" cases against journalists in retaliation for their investigative reporting on corruption, and expects the trend to continue through the October election. Haraszti urged OSCE member states to continue their engagement on media freedom issues. End summary. AN UNUSUALLY BLUNT MESSAGE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a widely covered April 9 press conference, visiting OSCE Media Freedom Representative Miklos Haraszti blasted an "unfortunate trend" of pressure against Azerbaijani journalists. In unusually blunt language, Haraszti accused the "Azerbaijani authorities" of "fabricating cases against journalists," pointing to the ongoing smear campaign against Azadliq journalist Agil Khalil as evidence. Haraszti stated that the ongoing, public allegations from government officials that Khalil had been stabbed during a homosexual lovers' spat had been "prepared and managed from a single center" and publicly criticized Prosecutor General Zakir Garalov's handling of the case. Haraszti also called on President Aliyev to pardon imprisoned journalists. ¶3. (C) In an April 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Haraszti said that his private meeting with Khalil's mother had convinced him of the need to publicly label the smear campaign against Khalil as a centrally orchestrated move specifically designed to increase pressure on journalists. Khalil's mother detailed to Haraszti an April 3 meeting with senior Baku police officials - in Khalil's home village of Kurdamir - in which the police officials pressured Khalil's family to recant claims that he had been stabbed or else the family would face "unimaginable suffering." Khalil's mother told Haraszti that the family was presented with three options: Khalil should either admit that he stabbed himself, that he was stabbed by an Azadliq newspaper colleague, or he should drop his claim. Khalil and his family refused to submit to the pressure and, the very next day, the GOAJ began its public allegations that Khalil was stabbed by a homosexual lover. ¶4. (C) Haraszti said that Khalil's mother's very compelling story - coupled with the complete lack of credible evidence presented by the Prosecutor General - led Haraszti to conclude that this was a smear campaign, and needed to be publicly identified as such. He characterized GOAJ actions in Khalil's case as typical Soviet-style dirty tricks, part of a long pattern of law enforcement authorities abusing the justice system to punish perceived enemies of the state. Haraszti was extremely critical of the gross violations of rule-of-law, privacy and journalistic standards included in the campaign against Khalil. Haraszti noted that various GOAJ media outlets had included him in their smear campaign against Khalil. DETAILS OF THE KHALIL CASE -------------- ¶5. (C) Haraszti's private discussion April 9 with the Ambassador contrasted greatly with his April 8 briefing for OSCE member states, in which he was careful to note that he could not make a final judgment on whose version of the Khalil case was accurate. (Haraszti noted this contrast to the Ambassador and emphasized that his April 9 meeting with Khalil's mother was key to his final conclusions.) In both meetings, Haraszti outlined his April 8 discussion with Prosecutor General Garalov, noting that prosecutor had built his case around three pieces of evidence. First, the communications records detailed an existing relationship between Khalil and his alleged homosexual lover. Second, in a separate criminal investigation of Khalil's alleged homosexual lover, the Prosecutor General reportedly uncovered transcripts of text messages that proved the two had a sexual relationship. Third, Khalil's alleged lover "confessed" to the March 13 stabbing. ¶6. (C) Haraszti was very skeptical of the Prosecutor General's evidence. He noted that the Prosecutor General declined to provide a direct answer to Haraszti's question as to whether the February and March attacks on Khalil were linked. Haraszti believes one of the key questions for both cases is whether Khalil was followed prior to the March 13 stabbing, a possibility that the Prosecutor General flatly dismissed without providing any evidence. Haraszti noted to the OSCE member states that the GOAJ is "very far from proving its case" regarding the confession of Khalil's alleged lover, and the "massive propaganda campaign" has resulted in a "total blockage" of the GOAJ investigation into the February 22 attack. He noted that the attacks on Khalil were part of the larger trend that is "not in compliance with Azerbaijan's press freedom commitments." ¶7. (C) Haraszti told the Ambassador that he believes the real motivation behind both attacks on Khalil is linked to his reporting on Baku's Olive Garden. Haraszti noted that the original February 22 attack on Khalil occurred after the journalist had stumbled upon the unauthorized destruction of trees and photographed two of the men involved in the incident - one of whom is known to be a Ministry of National Security official. Haraszti said that credible sources have informed him that there is a dispute between the Ministers of National Security and Internal Affairs over the development of the still state-owned Olive Garden. Haraszti believes that the attacks on Khalil - like all other criminal court cases and physical attacks against journalists - are linked to journalists' efforts to conduct investigative reporting on corruption. He added that the jailed journalists had focused their reporting on the First Family and their immediate entourage, an apparent redline for investigative reporting. Haraszti believes the number of journalists facing retaliation for their investigative reporting will only grow, as the GOAJ fears the impact of reporting on corruption and other "moral issues" in the run-up to the October presidential election. THE UNFORTUNATE TREND -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In his briefing for OSCE member states, Haraszti noted that the Khalil case is part of an "unfortunate trend" of pressure against journalists. He noted that, until the December 2007 presidential pardon of five journalists imprisoned on criminal libel charges (ref b),Azerbaijan had been the OSCE member state with the highest number of imprisoned journalists. Following the pardon, Azerbaijan now leads the OSCE member states with the highest number journalists imprisoned on charges unrelated to their work, according to Haraszti. Haraszti believes these three journalists - Eynulla Fatullayev, Ganimat Zahid, and Mirza Zakit - are imprisoned on "fake charges" and face "disproportionate sentencing." He also noted that the GOAJ has done little to investigate the 2005 murder of journalist Elmar Huseynov, pinning responsibility for the crime on "those who want to discredit Azerbaijan." GOAJ CLAIMS DE FACTO MORATORIUM -------------- ¶9. (C) In meetings with Foreign Minister Mammadyarov and Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev, Haraszti said he called upon the GOAJ to implement a real moratorium on criminal cases against journalists and to honor its international commitments with respect to media freedom. Haraszti said Mehdiyev argued that the GOAJ had in fact implemented a de facto moratorium on criminal libel cases but could not stop law enforcement authorities from investigating other criminal cases. Haraszti dismissed Mehdiyev's arguments, noting that law enforcement authorities in post-Communist countries "have been given the task to fabricate stories." Haraszti said he told Mehdiyev that he is convinced that Azerbaijan's three jailed journalists - and particularly the Zahid brothers - face "fabricated stories" in retaliation for their investigative journalism. Haraszti pointedly noted that he hoped "this is not state policy," to which Mehdiyev responded that it is not state policy and there is a "personal story" behind each case. Haraszti said he urged the GOAJ to send a "clear signal" that journalists will not be prosecuted for their work. CALL TO ACTION -------------- ¶10. (C) Haraszti called upon OSCE member states to remain engaged in their efforts to promote media freedom in Azerbaijan. He asked member states to continue to call on the GOAJ to implement a real moratorium on criminal cases against journalists and to comply with its international media freedom commitments. In his private meeting with the Ambassador, he added that he hopes OSCE member states will pick up his public call for the law enforcement authorities to "stop fabricating stories against perceived enemies of the government." He also urged OSCE member states to continue their media training efforts, noting that he had traveled to Baku, in part, to present a book on media self-regulation. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Haraszti already is facing a backlash of criticism for his unusually blunt public remarks. Lider TV (believed to be closely affiliated with the Ministry of National Security) slammed Haraszti's April 9 statements as "interference in Azerbaijan's internal affairs." Haraszti believes only the President can order the law enforcement authorities to stop the pressure and "fabricated" criminal cases against journalists, a point with which we agree. However, the GOAJ's increasing and explicit reluctance to be seen as taking measures in response to western pressure will complicate the task. Senior GOAJ officials do not seem to appreciate the harm that Azerbaijan's increasingly poor media environment is wreaking both on Azerbaijan's international reputation and its ability to improve relations with key partners. We will continue to seek ways to impress the message on our GOAJ interlocutors, and urge Washington interlocutors to use every occasion to pres the point home with GOAJ colleagues as well. DERSE