UPDATE ON AZERBAIJANI FRUSTRATION WITH CO-CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000320

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS PHUM KPAO AJ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON AZERBAIJANI FRUSTRATION WITH CO-CHAIR
COUNTRIES' UNGA VOTE

REF: BAKU 00306

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Public attention on the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chair countries' vote against Azerbaijan's "Situation in
the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan" UNGA resolution
continues, as do GOAJ official statements and some
orchestrated political activities. While the issue has
gradually slipped off the media frontburner (including the
earlier front-page coverage in all major papers),President
Aliyev's March 2 meeting with the Co-Chairs in Bucharest
raised the issue again. Local press coverage has been less
inflammatory than the days immediately following the March 14
UNGA vote. Trusted Embassy contacts reported that while the
general public's interest in the immediate issue of the UNGA
resolution is fading a bit, the Co-Chairs will have to deal
with the GOAJ and the general public's belief that the UNGA
resolution should serve as a basis for future Minsk Group
negotiations. One independent analyst also suggested that
the GOAJ seeks to channel public frustration over
Nagorno-Karabakh toward the Minsk Group, rather than the
GOAJ, particularly during an election year. Given the
public's general perception that the U.S. was the one truly
honest broker in the Minsk Group, we are facing a greater hit
in the media, with public ire and disappointment focused
largely on the U.S. End Summary.


2. (C) Based on the continuing stream of official GOAJ
statements, some elements in the GOAJ appear interested in
keeping some level of public attention on the OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chair countries' vote against Azerbaijan's
"Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan" UNGA
resolution, although these statements are much more measured
than in the days immediately following the March 14 vote.
Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov gave an April interview,
carried by ANS television and local papers, including
Ekspress. (The majority of Azerbaijanis get their
information from television, vice traditional print media.)
In the Ekspress article, Azimov was quoted as saying that
"the Karabakh talks are in a hopeless condition," while
reiterating his routine criticism of the Co-Chairs for trying
to "monopolize" the process. Azimov also stated that the
Minsk Group Process should be based on the UNGA resolution.
In an April 2 statement after President Aliyev met with the
Co-Chairs, Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Novruz
Mammadov said publicly the meeting was "very tense" and
President Aliyev voiced his "strong protest" against the
Co-Chair countries' voting position.


3. (C) Two other incidents suggest elements in the GOAJ want
to maintain some public attention on the UNGA vote, while not
inflaming the issue. On April 1, the Parliament discussed
the UNGA resolution, with the overwhelming majority of MPs
sounding the themes of the resolution as a "victory" for
Azerbaijan and criticizing the Co-Chair countries' voting
position. Interestingly, MP Fazil Gazanfaroglu from the
government-leaning Great Creation Party criticized the MFA's
poor handling of the vote by not securing more "yes" votes.
On March 19, the pro-government New Azerbaijan Party (YAP)
hosted a roundtable on the UNGA resolution, which resulted in
a statement of protest against the Co-Chair countries,
questioning their objectivity in the peace process, but not
calling for Minsk Group dissolution. The statement was
signed by a variety of government parties and a
government-linked NGO umbrella organization. YAP did not
invite members of the opposition or civil society to this
forum.


4. (C) Tabib Huseynov, the director of the International
Crisis Group in Azerbaijan and an IDP, told us while the
general public's immediate interest in the UNGA issue is
gradually fading, the lasting public impression is that the
UNGA resolution should serve as a basis for future Minsk
Group negotiations. Huseynov said increased criticism of the
U.S. voting position stems from the fact that, fairly or
unfairly, the GOAJ and the general public have higher
expectations for the U.S. than Russia or France. Huseynov
also highlighted the general public's fundamental
misperception about the role of the Minsk Group, noting that
most Azerbaijanis view the Minsk Group as a mechanism for
imposing, rather than facilitating, a settlement. Local

political commentator Ilgar Mammadov agreed with Huseynov
that immediate public outrage is gradually fading, but noted
that the UNGA vote will be a marker that will remain in the
government and public's consciousness. Mammadov also argued
that the GOAJ seeks to channel public frustration over
Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories toward the
Minsk Group, rather than the GOAJ, particularly during an
election year.


5. (C) In addition to the public drumbeat, the GOAJ also is
keeping up steady private pressure on countries that
abstained on the UNGA vote. Several ambassadors told
Ambassador Derse that they have been pressed repeatedly,
formally and informally, by senior GOAJ officials to explain
why their governments voted "against" Azerbaijan; one
frustrated Ambassador said that the Azerbaijanis simply would
not accept that an abstention was nothing more than a
decision not to vote on the issue, noting the GOAJ's "if
you're not with us your against us" view. The OSCE Head of
Office noted that he too is facing pressure form the GOAJ.
In an April 2 meeting, President Aliyev reportedly told the
OSCE Ambassador that although he recognizes that the
bilateral Baku mission (separate from the OSCE
Chairman-in-Office,s Special Representative for NK) had
nothing to do with the UNGA resolution, the Co-Chairs, vote
could not help but cast all OSCE operations in Azerbaijan in
a negative light.


6. (C) Comment: Although the immediate storm of negative
public reaction is passing, we remain concerned that
disillusionment with the U.S. vote against Azerbaijan's UNGA
resolution has hardened attitudes here and could have some
lasting impact on our broader bilateral relations,
particularly on democracy promotion during an election year.
President Aliyev's comment to the Ambassador on March 1 that
he was "very disturbed" by the U.S. vote suggests the U.S.
now faces both bruised egos (reftel) and a hardened
perception among senior GOAJ officials that the U.S. does not
truly "value" Azerbaijan as a partner, as illustrated by our
lack of "support" on Azerbaijan's top policy issue. While
misplaced, the perception is real and will shape the way the
key GOAJ policymakers approach the Minsk Group process and
some issues in the relationship. Apart from generating
genuine feelings of disappointment, the vote also serves as a
convenient excuse for those in the GOAJ who are intrinsically
not disposed to support the U.S. on Azerbaijan's western
aspirations.
DERSE