DAS BRYZA'S MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, CIVIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL PBTS KDEM KIRF KISL AJ SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ISLAMIC COMMENTATORS Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE E. DERSE PER 1.4(B,D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a March 4-5 visit to Baku, EUR/DAS Bryza met separately with a group of Islamic commentators, members of the Karabakh Forum (an informal association of prominent commentators),and leaders of many of Azerbaijan's prominent political parties. The Islamic commentators agreed that Azerbaijan's moderate and indigenous version of Islam is threatened by extremist recruiters and other foreign influences. Members of the Karabakh Forum told DAS Bryza that neither Azerbaijani nor Armenian society is ready for compromise and that Kosovo's independence has created a new obstacle in the attempt to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The political party leaders agreed that there were many problems on the democracy front, and engaged in a thorough discussion on the merits of participating in versus boycotting the October presidential election. With the exception of the Azadliq bloc members, all of these parties are planning to participate in the election, and it was clear that the leaders were frustrated with the Azadliq bloc's decision to boycott, effectively eliminating any hopes of the opposition rallying behind a single candidate. END SUMMARY ISLAMIC COMMENTATORS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On March 4 the Ambassador hosted a dinner for DAS Bryza with local Islamic commentators. Participants included representatives from the Azerbaijan Center for Religion and Democracy Nariman Gasimoglu; Vasif Sadikli; Rasul Hashimov; and Natik Adilov; as well as Haji Shahin Hasanov, an imam at Baku's Dadash Mosque. ¶3. (C) The local commentators agreed with DAS Bryza that Azerbaijan has a tradition tolerant faith and scientific learning, along with elements of Sufism, that provide indigenous defenses against extremist recruiters from abroad. Gasimoglu noted that a key factor in maintaining these Azerbaijani traditions has been the historic lack of formal Islamic structures within Azerbaijan. Haji Hasanov said the traditional Shia emphasis on social involvement has also contributed to the character of Islam in Azerbaijan. The commentators agreed that foreign influences from Iran and Saudi Arabia threaten the moderate character of Islam in Azerbaijan by radicalizing Shia and Sunni communities (respectively),although Hashimov complained that the GOAJ's attempt to control Islamic practice also alienates some believers from Azerbaijan's mainstream traditions. Adilov cited several steps the GOAJ has taken to limit Islamic extremism and political Islam in Azerbaijan, including the closure of 20 madrassas, the temporary ban on azan, and the discussion on banning the headscarf within the context of the draft education law. (NOTE: The education law is still in draft form. Several Members of Parliament in February suggested that the law should ban the headscarf, but the idea was subsequently discarded.) THE KARABAKH FORUM -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On March 5 DAS Bryza and the Ambassador met with member of the Karabakh Council, an informal association of respected academics and public commentators. The organization monitors the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) conflict and sometimes offers public proposals, including greater involvement of civil society in resolving the conflict. Participants included Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Chair Arzu Abdullayeva; independent Turan News Agency Head Mehman Aliyev; Azerbaijan Public Forum Head, former Chief of Administration for former President Heydar Aliyev, and future presidential hopeful, Eldar Namazov; and political analysts Rasim Musabayev; Zardusht Alizade; Tabib Huseynov; Ilgar Mammadov; and Irada Bagirova. ¶5. (C) Several of the commentators observed that Kosovo's independence has negatively affected the prospects for a resolution to the N-K conflict, with Aliyev noting that some Azerbaijanis now view peacekeepers as a negative phenomenon in resolving the conflict because they could open the door to separatism. The consensus view was that neither Azerbaijani nor Armenian society is ready for compromise. Musabayev said he believes there is also no internal political will within Baku or Yerevan to make a final decision, and that outside actors need to use sticks to push the two sides toward a compromise. Several commentators argued that N-K should be given a temporary status, although Namazov said that this could occur within the context of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Given the large number of participants, there was a diversity of views, but participants expressed their gratitude for the meeting and welcomed future exchanges with DAS Bryza. POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) On March 5 DAS Bryza and the Ambassador also met with leaders of many prominent political parties. Participants included Popular Front Party and Azadliq bloc Chair Ali Kerimli; Azerbaijan Liberal Party Deputy Chair Avaz Temirkhan; Azerbaijan Democratic Party Chair Sardar Jalaloglu; Yeni Siyaset bloc Chair Eldar Namazov; Azerbaijan Democratic Reforms Party Chair and Member of Parliament (MP) Asim Mollazade; Hope Party Chair and MP Igbal Agazade; and Civil Solidarity Party Chair and MP Sabir Rustamkhanli. ¶7. (C) Jalaloglu outlined the democratic backsliding he saw in Azerbaijan, with media freedom among the worst. He blamed the situation in part on the international community, which he said had not made sufficient efforts to counter such trends, and noted that Azerbaijanis were losing faith in democracy. Jalaloglu also raised the need for balanced composition of election commissions. Agazade said that the opposition faces many difficulties, including limited media access, a lack of funding (which he thought should be provided by the GOAJ),and restricted freedom of assembly. Despite these difficulties, Agazade noted the importance of participating in elections and the democratic process. Not participating in this October's presidential election, he said, would take Azerbaijan "backwards, moving towards autocracy;" without an alternative, the government "could do anything." Encouraging Azerbaijanis to boycott the election would eliminate the alternative, he concluded. ¶8. (C) Rustamkhanli expressed strong concern about the media situation, criticizing the GOAJ for boasting about pardoning five journalists in December; "Why are we arresting so many people who then need to be released?" he asked. He said that the GOAJ's tax inspection of the Chap Evi printing house -- Azerbaijan's only independent printing house -- was "completely illegal." (Rustamkhanli's brother, Shahbaz Khuduoglu, is the head of Chap Evi.) Rustamkhanli, who is considering running for president in the October election, concluded that the opposition gave up the chance to win any election when it split in the early 1990s: "Now we're surviving as orphans; even the MPs are in a critical situation" he said. ¶9. (C) Namazov, who intends to run for president, noted the need for real, effective exit polling in the October election, which he claimed had not taken place in past elections. Noting that electoral fraud starts with candidate registration, he asked for U.S. attention to the entire electoral process. Namazov said the opposition had two options for the election: to boycott, or to participate and demand recognition of the real results; he preferred the latter. If the opposition boycotts October's election, Namazov said, it might as well consider itself out of the running for the 2010 parliamentary elections and 2013 presidential election. Mollazade agreed with his colleagues' concerns on democratic backsliding, and noted that the political situation was reflective of the economic situation. He echoed the notion that participation was the best track for the presidential election. ¶10. (C) Kerimli was uncharacteristically quiet, stating only that he had come to hear DAS Bryza's views and did not want to take up time repeating things he had said to DAS Bryza in the past. Temirkhan -- the only other representative of the Azadliq bloc present -- attempted to counter the statements regarding participation, stating that the authorities view elections only in terms of staying in power. At this rate, he said, Azerbaijanis would have to wait a thousand years for a democratic election. The decision to boycott, Temirkhan continued, was intended to make the election more democratic, not less so. If the government falsifies the results as it has done in each election, he asked, "why should we kill our last hope by sacrificing our best, bravest people to get arrested, beaten, or killed in the streets?" In a thinly veiled reference to some in the room, Temirkhan also noted that some "fake opposition" party leaders were sitting in Parliament because of falsified election results in their districts. ¶11. (C) Jalaloglu noted that the opposition had been in a similar situation prior to the 1998 presidential election, which some parties -- including the Azerbaijan Democratic Party -- had decided to boycott. Those who participated, he said, had "damaged democracy" more than those who boycotted. But the situation was different now, he continued: "We won't get democracy if we sit at home begging for it. If we want it, we have to act." DAS Bryza concluded that participation in the election was the only way forward. He pressed upon the participants the need to take responsibility for their supporters and their country. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The comments made by several of the political party leaders on participating vice boycotting the October presidential election clearly were directed towards the Azadliq bloc, and can account for Kerimli's uncharacteristic silence during the meeting. In separate meetings, several of these party leaders have expressed frustration that Azadliq's decision to boycott the election eliminated any hope the opposition may have had of uniting behind a single candidate, which most said they would prefer. We will report fully the potential candidates' views on the election and campaign plans septel. ¶13. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. DERSE