Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAKU277
2008-03-25 05:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

LOOKING TO ARMENIA,"AZERBAIJAN NOW SYMBOL OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL AJ TX AR ENRG 
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VZCZCXRO3384
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHKB #0277/01 0850522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250522Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5014
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000277 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAKU 147

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ TX AR ENRG
SUBJECT: LOOKING TO ARMENIA,"AZERBAIJAN NOW SYMBOL OF
DEMOCRACY IN CAUCASUS" SAYS PRESIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAKU 147

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ TX AR ENRG
SUBJECT: LOOKING TO ARMENIA,"AZERBAIJAN NOW SYMBOL OF
DEMOCRACY IN CAUCASUS" SAYS PRESIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A clearly pleased President Aliyev branded
the recent Armenian Presidential elections "a fraud," the
incoming and outgoing Armenian President "criminals," and
said that the sham elections and subsequent violence, where
the Armenian government was forced to kill its own people,
all showed the depths to which Armenia had sunk. He asked
why the US and the international community has remained
silent about both the elections and the post-election
violence. He denied Azerbaijani initiation of hostilities
across the line of contact, pointing out that any such action
would not be in Azerbaijan's interest as it would only
consolidate a weakened Armenia. On energy, he said he would
try to reach out to the Turkish Prime Minister in order to
solve the gas transit impasse, and called for continued US
leadership in revitalizing the Nabucco project, offering to
host a conference in Baku. DAS Bryza explained that USG
non-support of Azerbaijan's draft UN resolution did not
indicate lack of strategic partnership between the two
countries. Aliyev asked that the US not seek to dissuade
GUAM members from supporting the resolution. END SUMMARY


2. (C) On March 5 DAS Bryza and Ambassador Derse met with
President Aliyev. Also present was Chief of the Presidential
Apparat's Foreign Relations Department, Novruz Mammadov.
Energyoff was notetaker.

Armenian Rag
--------------


3. (C) An ebullient Aliyev suggested the discussion begin on
Azerbaijan's democratic development, saying this was "easy"
after the recent elections in Georgia and Armenia. Given
recent developments in these countries, Azerbaijan is
exemplary. It was clear that Armenia manipulated the
elections: Sargsyan officially won with 52 percent of the
vote, (averting a second round) but the OSCE's International
Election Observation Mission's (IEOM) preliminary report
stated that the vote count was "bad or very bad" in some 16
percent of the polling stations visited, i.e. Sargsyan didn't
get a majority of the vote. Given that, Aliyev asked why the
OSCE had declared the election "fair," and why "everyone is
happy, and why everyone including Turkey is congratulating
Armenia." Sargsyan didn't win. Aliyev said he expected as
much. Outgoing President Kocharian "came in by force, left
the country in ruins, and his hands are covered in blood."
This was an important historical moment: Armenia has become
"isolated, degraded; a slave to Russia and an enemy to its

neighbors." Justice has been restored, and the Armenian
people understand that their government leaders are criminal
gangs, a mafia unable to lead the country into the future.
Former President Petrossian by contrast was a wise man who
sought peace with his neighbors.


4. (C) Continuing on the theme, Aliyev said that the
government had to "shoot their own people" during the
post-election protests, with at least eight Armenians dead so
far. The police were the ones who had started the violence
against their own people. Sargsyan was a "gangster,"
Kocharian a "criminal," and they both were the organizers of
the Khojali massacre (of Azeri civilians by Armenian troops
in 1992). The problems in Armenia are "only the beginning,"
and God will punish the Armenian criminal leadership. Aliyev
asked why the international community was quiet about the
Armenian government slaughtering its own citizens when it had
been so vocal in May 2005 when Uzbek Karimov had killed Uzbek
citizens in Andijan. Any government that kills its own
people must be condemned. Even Georgia during the recent
Presidential elections was criticized more than Armenia is
being now. Aliyev complained Armenia was creating
international problems through its "slavish" relations with
Russia and close friendship with Iran. The Armenian people
are beginning to realize that they need to change their
policies, or lose their current "quasi-independence."


5. (C) DAS Bryza said that heretofore the USG had been
careful to avoid enflaming a dangerous situation, and wanted
to give him a chance to assess the situation on the ground.
Preliminary assessments failed to uncover more serious
procedural violations that arose later and tainted the
election. Now that the violence had subsided, the USG was
going to issue "sharp criticism" on both the election and the

BAKU 00000277 002 OF 005


post-election violence. OHDIR was also contemplating saying
that the election had been seriously flawed, Bryza noted.

Line of Contact Clashes
--------------


6. (C) DAS Bryza said Armenia was claiming that the previous
day's clashes along the Line of Contact were initiated by the
attack of "several hundred Azerbaijani troops." President
Aliyev said that as he had previously communicated, he had
received information sometime ago that the Government of
Armenia (GOA) was "preparing several scenarios" (reftel).
Yesterday's clash was the GOA carrying out one of these
scenarios. Aliyev said "we are happy to see Armenia weaker -
frankly speaking, we want to see their society split." It
was not in in Azerbaijan's interest to initiate hostilities
at this time, since a GOAJ attack would only serve to
consolidate, unify and strengthen Armenia at a time when
Armenia was weak due to the fraudulent elections and
post-election violence. As such, Azerbaijan certainly was
"not looking to break the peace." "Armenia started the
shooting, which happens sometimes." Although Azerbaijan did
not start the hostilities, "we had to respond." There were
more than ten Armenian dead, with four Azerbaijani dead, one
from sniper fire. Their Defense Minister called five or six
times to GOAJ Defense Minister Abiyev, saying "let's stop,"
so we stopped, Aliyev noted. Abiyev had called Aliyev at
approximately noon on March 4 to alert him to the the clash,
at which time Aliyev told him to cease hostilities. At that
time, Abiyev had told him that there were two Azerbaijani
soldiers dead. In response to Bryza's comments that Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan had told him that on March 4
at 6 PM Azerbaijan had started artillery fire, Aliyev said he
knew nothing about such claims, repeating that Azerbaijan
would not have been interested in seeking a fight at such a
time, since it would only help a weakened Armenia consolidate
- "why should we give them an opportunity? - let them drown
in their own blood." (Comment: In a separate discussion with
Bryza, OSCE representative Kasprzyk and the Ambassador,
MinDef Abiyev said no artillery had been used. End Comment).
Aliyev again denied Armenian officials comments to Bryza to
the effect that "several hundred Azerbaijan soldiers" had
started the hostilities by moving across a valley. He added
though that "this shows that the war is not over, and today
they have no chance."


7. (C) Aliyev said Armenia would have to find a new
President, since Sargsyan was part of the violence - "the
(Armenian) diaspora will have to give it some thought."
Laughing, Aliyev said that "only one half-crazy journalist
gets arrested in Nakhchivan" and "Ambassador Derse
intervenes," yet the US remains silent in the face of what
was happening in Armenia. An exultant Aliyev said that
"Azerbaijan is now the symbol of democracy in the Caucuses!"
It was important for the international community to express
its position on the rigged election and post-election
violence, otherwise "other countries will do the same and
Armenia will do the same again." How can it be that a
country can have a Presidential candidate under house arrest,
and the international community is silent? This
international silence was "strange," especially given that
"Armenia is not an important country," and dependent on
Russia. Finishing his musings on 'the fiasco of Armenian
statehood," Aliyev said that Armenia was "losing its chance
for independence." It had been selling everything to Russia
even before this election, and now a "criminal gang" had
"ruined Armenia's statehood dreams," leaving it a "wounded,
non-democratic state with an unclear future."


8. (C) Bryza said he would be traveling to Armenia from
Azerbaijan (via Georgia) and would be issuing and would
stress the need for the status quo to be restored. Aliyev
confirmed the status quo ante had been restored and said
"Azerbaijan would not take advantage of the
situation...Azerbaijan would not start shooting but would
only respond." Bryza asked Aliyev if he thought that given
events in Armenia, Minsk Group negotiations would be delayed.
Aliyev said that Sargsyan was not President, and meeting
with him on the margins of the NATO Summit in Bucharest would
constitute recognition of him as President, which Azerbaijan
was not ready to do. As such, there was no one on the
Armenian side with whom to negotiate for now. In response to
Bryza's question, Aliyev said he didn't think it worthwhile

BAKU 00000277 003 OF 005


to have a meeting of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs with the
Foreign Ministers while the situation in Armenia remained
unclear - "they (i.e. Armenia) must be told to leave our
land," he insisted. Bryza told Aliyev that Armenian press
had misquoted him, in that he had said that he "feared a
pause" in the peace talks due to Armenian uncertainty, not
that he "wanted a pause." Aliyev, continuing on his theme on
Armenia's worsening fate, said that Armenia was "so proud of
its (economic) reforms, but now the (economic) tiger is
dead."


9. (C) In this regard, Bryza underscored USG concerns and
Congressman Knollenberg (Co-Chair of the Congressional Caucus
on Armenian Issues) concerns that Azerbaijan cease its "war
rhetoric." Aliyev said that the GOAJ was "not saying anything
now; the GOAJ statements are very mild, and only respond to
what they (Armenia) say." This was an ideological and
propaganda war. He repeated his invitation to Congressman
Knollenberg to visit Azerbaijan.

UN Resolution
--------------


10. (C) Referring to the GOAJ's UNGA draft resolution on "The
Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan," Bryza
said we understand that Azerbaijan found itself in a good
tactical position (with Armenia off-balance and Russia having
pushed hard for Serbia,s territorial integrity),and was
pressing its advantage at the UN. Azerbaijan has a sovereign
right to fight for its interests at the United Nations. The
USG objects to the text of this specific draft resolution,
however, because it prejudges several elements under
negotiation in the Minsk Group process. If the USG were to
support the draft resolution it would violate the prime
negotiating rule that "nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed." Speaking as a Minsk Group Co-Chair, Bryza said he
could not support the draft resolution, given its
one-sidedness. Speaking as a DAS, Bryza said he would like
to support the resolution to strengthen bilateral
U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. He told President Aliyev that he
should keep in mind that strategically speaking "there is no
question" about the depth of our countries friendship and
partnership on strategic issues. But, the text of
Azerbaijan,s draft UN resolution was so determinative that
the USG could not support it and thus had to maintain its
impartial status in Minsk Group negotiations. The GOAJ
should not take USG non-support of the resolution as a sign
of lack of USG support for the relationship. Bryza urged
Aliyev not to treat the U.S. vote on Azerbaijan,s resolution
as a test of our strong bilateral relationship.


11. (C) Aliyev said he agreed with Bryza's assessment, adding
that the USG must do what it thinks is right, each country
has to pursue its own interests. "Our friendship and
partnership are indeed strong. I cannot insist that you
support the resolution. We'll see what happens and we'll
think what to do." However, he said, he was upset that some
of his GUAM colleagues weren't supporting the draft
resolution, referring to what he believed was USG advice not
to do so. Even though "without Ukraine the GOAJ can get more
support," from a viewpoint of GUAM solidarity he was not
pleased that the USG was instructing GUAM members to oppose
the resolution, since at the GUAM summit all members had
agreed to maintain solidarity. Bryza said there had been no
instruction to U.S. diplomats to lobby GUAM member states to
oppose Azerbaijan's draft resolution. Bryza said he would
clarify that there are no such instructions to lobby GUAM
countries in this matter.

Energy
--------------


12. (C) Bryza said the main impetus of this current trip to
Turkey and Azerbaijan was to advance the Turkey-Azebaijan gas
transit agreement. On Nabucco, he termed EU Energy
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs as "optimistic" and OMV CEO
Wolfgang Ruttensdorfer "very pessimistic," possibly looking
for pretexts to draw Iranian and Russian gas into Nabucco.
In a recent meeting between Secretary Rice and Greek Foreign
Minister Bakoyianni, the Greek said that since Azerbaijan had
no gas, Greece would be forced to look to the South Stream
Project. Bryza has talked up Azerbaijan gas repeatedly to
the press. He realized that Socar was unable to sign gas

BAKU 00000277 004 OF 005


supply contracts for Nabucco while Turkish transit has not
yet been fixed. While in Turkey, for the first time the
Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu and
FM Babacan raised the issue of Turkish gas transit
themselves, saying that the GOT needed the USG to develop a
strategy to resolve the current impasse with Azerbaijan.
Bryza said he feared that the gas transit issue became
blocked because someone convinced the Turkish PM Erdogan to
support the 15 percent netback scheme, and now everyone is
scared to seek changing this position. Many, including Botas
executives, are afraid of "going to jail" if they wind up
supporting a gas purchase deal that in retrospect is deemed
not favorable to the GOT.


13. (C) Bryza said that the GOT doesn't necessarily desire to
be a gas broker; they are primarily concerned about securing
a sufficient supply of gas at a "politically palpable price,"
i.e. lower than the Gazprom price. Their demand over the
next ten years is expected to increase from 35 to 70 bcm/a.
Bryza thought the GOT might be willing to forego their 15
percent netback scheme if they could secure a direct gas
sales and purchase agreement at a "politically sustainable
price." The bilateral gas transit impasse must be solved at
the political level of Aliyev-Erdogan, since the people below
were "frightened." If the Turkish gas transit impasse isn't
solved soon, "Nabucco looks like it will die." Bryza
stressed that both BOTAS and SOCAR could cite strong
commercial precedents for their respective models of gas
pricing. The only way to resolve this dispute would be to
elevate it to the political level.


14. (C) Aliyev took the point, and said he would "try with
Erdogan," but that any agreement must take into account not
just "our friendly relationships," but also "international
practices." Referring to Nabucco, Aliyev cited the Hungarian
position as "very strange." He had met with the Hungarian PM
for two hours during a recent state visit, during which the
PM was very positive on Nabucco and Azerbaijani gas. Then the
PM goes and tells the press that "Southstream will be quicker
than Nabucco." "We can't work with such partners," Aliyev
said. Referring to the various Nabucco participating
countries, Aliyev said that "if the US doesn't lead us, it
won't work." He suggested a conference of Nabucco Energy
Ministers and company heads, including EU, Turkish, Georgian,
Azerbaijani and perhaps Turkmen, to give impetus to Nabucco,
with the US having the main role - "Piebalgs is a nice man,
but he is not for this purpose." He suggested Ambassador
Mann and DAS Bryza both attend such a conference.

(No) Gas for Georgia
--------------


15. (C) Continuing, Aliyev said that gas prices are going up.
Georgia is asking for more gas, but "we don't have it." If
we burn mazut so that we can give the GOG gas, we will have
to charge USD 300 per thousand cubic meters so as not to
incur any financial losses. If te GOAJ had access to the
associated gas from theACG field, "then we could charge
Georgia a frienly price," such as USD 180 per tcm.
Alternativel, Azerbaijan would be willing to strike a
long-tem deal to sell gas at a low price if it could buy he
Georgian railroad, or some other infrastructure. The
Georgian PM is coming to Azerbaijan to discuss the issue.
However, the GOG is also giving the GOAJ problems over the
Kulavi terminal (owned by Socar). After forcing the GOAJ to
include Georgian non-investing partners in the project, the
GOG is now delaying the Kulavi terminal project due to
problems relating to these investors. However, the GOAJ has
to act in accordance with the contracts they've signed.
Georgia is trying to link other issues to getting inexpensive
gas from Azerbaijan, to include delays in railroad projects.
Two weeks ago the head of the Georgian railroad threatened
Azerbaijan that it had to provide the GOG with cheap gas or
it would face problems. Aliyev asked Bryza to please tell
the Georgian PM when he saw him later in the day that such
threats coming from GOG officials are counter-productive and
not the actions of a friend.


16. (C) Aliyev said Georgian Prime Minister Gurgenidze is
different than his predecessor Noghaideli. He seems unaware
of the history of close bilateral GoG-GOAJ relations, and
unaware of the danger of these relations being undermined for
commercial reasons.

BAKU 00000277 005 OF 005




NEC
--------------


17. (C) Aliyev told Ambassador Derse that he had signed the
document authorizing the Baku mayor to sign the lease "the
first thing that morning," knowing he was going to see her
later that day. Ambassador Derse thanked him for his help,
and stressed that the whole process has to be finished by
March 14 in order not to lose funding for construction in
FY08.

Afghanistan
--------------


18. (C) Ambassador Derse gave President Aliyev the non-paper
with various options for contributing to the ISAF effort in
Afghanistan, following up on his request of several days
earlier.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) President Aliyev was clearly pleased at the contrast
provided by the recent events in Armenia, and eager to chide
the US and international community for what he saw as a
double standard in reacting to these events. His call for
USG leadership and guidance to revitalize the Nabucco project
is heartening, and Embassy will be working with Headquarters
and other colleagues in the field to determine the best
source of action. The news of GOAJ-Turkmenistan agreement to
begin exploring work on a possible production pipeline is
surprising and positive (upcoming septel relating to
Ambassador Derse conversation with SOCAR President Abdullayev
in this regard). END COMMENT.


20. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared on this cable.
DERSE

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