DEPUTY FM AZIMOV RAISES THE ANTE ON AZERBAIJAN'S

S E C R E T BAKU 000246 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA AJ AM SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM AZIMOV RAISES THE ANTE ON AZERBAIJAN'S DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION REF: A. BRYZA/DERSE EMAIL OF 3/12/08 ¶B. BAKU 00238 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: An angry Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov told the DCM that a U.S. vote against Azerbaijan's UNGA resolution on March 14 would be "the biggest mistake" the U.S. could make, which he would interpret as the U.S. voting against a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. Azimov threatened that the GOAJ would no longer recognize the co-chairmanship of any of the co-chair countries that votes against the resolution, vice abstaining from the vote. Azimov said there was "no way" Azerbaijan would revoke its draft resolution. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The DCM shared ref a points with Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov on March 13, emphasizing that the U.S. would have to vote against Azerbaijan's draft UNGA resolution if it was not amended to reflect the Basic Principles sought in the Minsk Group Peace Process. The DCM also emphasized that the U.S. strongly prefers that Azerbaijan withdraw the draft and allow the Minsk Group co-chairs to assist in redrafting a more balanced resolution. ¶3. (C) A clearly angry and frustrated Azimov said there is "no way" Azerbaijan will revoke its draft and the March 14 vote will be a "moment of truth" to clarify which governments authentically support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azimov stated that Azerbaijan has the votes to pass the resolution. ¶4. (S/NF) Azimov argued that the GOAJ increasingly has been questioning whether the co-chairs are genuinely committed to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, citing "drastic changes" to the Basic Principles document since October 2006 and Kosovo's independence as points of concern. Azimov's cited the following complaints with the Basic Principles document: the absence of the right of return for ethnic Azeris to Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia's control of the Lachin corridor, the introduction of ten years of uncertainty regarding Kelbajar, and NK's status becoming frozen. According to Azimov, the timing of Azerbaijan's resolution is "perfect" because it will force the co-chairs "to take their masks off" and reveal their true positions toward Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azimov said the GOAJ has let both the U.S. and the French know this resolution is coming, and he is now "convinced" that the co-chairs' motivation is to create further conditions for NK's withdrawal from Azerbaijan. Azimov also reiterated his March 12 argument (ref b) that NK's status has never been the subject of negotiations and ref a's claim that "NK,s status is the subject of negotiations" is a "mistake." ¶5. (C) Azimov threatened that the GOAJ would no longer recognize the co-chairmanship of any co-chair country that votes against the resolution. Azimov flatly noted that a U.S. vote against the resolution would be the "biggest mistake" the U.S. could make, bigger than the decision to invade Iraq. ¶6. (C) Galib Israfilov (head of the MFA's International Security Division) privately told the DCM after the meeting that the Azerbaijani Mission to the OSCE has been instructed to examine the bureacratic mechanisms for expressing a lack of confidence in the current Minsk Group co-chairs. ¶7. (C) Comment: The usually calm, deliberative Azimov was angry and visibly flustered at points. While Azimov typically has a good memory, he forgot the name of the French co-chair (Bernard Fassier) during the meeting and had to ask his assistant for help. We believe Azimov's bureaucratic stature and credibility are linked to this resolution. Per ref B, President Aliyev instructed Azerbaijani UN Permrep Mehdiyev to move forward with this resolution. The cultural importance placed on prestige, honor, and saving face likely are shaping Azimov's strong reaction. These same traits also suggest that President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov are unlikely to back down, especially if the MFA may have already promised President Aliyev that the resolution was a done deal. ¶8. (C) Comment continued: In terms of Azimov's threat concerning not working with the current Minsk Group co-chairs, this is a bigger decision than he could make alone. The Foreign Minister is currently traveling in West Africa and we have seen little indication of the President's involvement in this issue. He have seen issues in the recent past, notably CFE, where Azimov's bluster did not necessarily track with the final position taken by the government. DERSE