ARAZ AZIMOV'S COMMENTS ON DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION ON

S E C R E T BAKU 000238 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA AJ AM SUBJECT: ARAZ AZIMOV'S COMMENTS ON DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REF: A. BRYZA/DERSE EMAIL OF 3/11/08 ¶B. USUN 00218 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov on March 12 relayed GOAJ responses to the USG's comments on Azerbaijan's draft UNGA resolution on the situation in the occupied territories (ref a). Azimov provided line-by-line comments on the U.S. recommendations, but his overriding concern was changes that suggested any conditionality with respect to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. He stated bluntly that the U.S. suggestions undercut the principle that NK's future status can only be determined in conformity with Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azimov said Azerbaijan can work with no state that votes against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. He protested the French co-chair's lobbying for "no" votes, said Russia is using him to "kill the Minsk group process" and averred that if "Russia or France" vote against the resolution -- vice abstaining -- Azerbaijan would appeal to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, seeking their removal as co-chairs. Azimov said a promised USG abstention was "not enough" to engage in editing the resolution, and the USG should consider supporting it. Azimov indicated that senior GOAJ officials, including President Aliyev, are personally invested in seeing the resolution pass. Azimov said the GOAJ's next steps depend on what it hears back from the USG. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov on March 12 to review the U.S. comments on Azerbaijan's draft UNGA resolution on the situation in the occupied territories, per ref a. Tofig Musayev, director of the MFAs Foreign Policy Planning and Strategic Studies Department, accompanied Azimov. ¶3. (S/NF) Azimov said he appreciates the U.S. effort to compromise, but he is worried by three motives that appear to underlie the comments. First, the comments aim to secure the Minsk Group's continuing control of the peace process. Second, the recommendations seek to provide "relief" to Armenia by softening some of the draft resolution's language. Third -- Azimov said this was his most serious point of concern -- the U.S. suggestions erode the chances for NK's status to be determined within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity -- indeed, they seem aimed at "resolving NK's status outside the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity." This is not acceptable, Azimov said. ¶4. (S/NF) Azimov said he is particularly concerned by the U.S. recommendations in OP1 and OP4 that would weaken the fundamental principle of resolution of NK's future status within Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azimov highlighted this several times in the meeting, stating that the Minsk Group process has focused on resolving NK's status through a "legal and democratic process in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan," and that NK's future status was never an issue for "negotiation." ¶5. (S/NF) Azimov provided the following line-by-line comments on the U.S. recommendations: OP1: Azimov said OP1 is "untouchable . . . territorial integrity cannot be conditioned." Deletion of the phrase "within its internationally recognized borders" is not possible because it introduces conditionality with respect to territorial integrity and NK's future status. Second, Azimov rejected the suggested U.S. change that "the future status of NK is subject to negotiations under the mediation of the OSCE Minsk group co-chairs," noting that NK's future status, itself, has "never" been the subject of "negotiations" within the Minsk Group. Rather, Azimov said, NK's future status is to be "only subject to legal and democratic processes with the full participation of all ethnicities living in NK within conformity with international law," ie, in conformity with the principles of territorial integrity and self determination, with the latter principle being respected in the context of the former. Whether this would be through a "plebiscite" or a "vote" has not been decided yet. OP2: Azimov said the original proposed language is based on past UNSCRs from 1993, which the USG supported. This cannot be deleted. Azimov said the Azerbaijani side might be willing to drop the words "immediate" and "unconditional" from its original language, since these are issues subject to negotiation. Baku insists however on maintaining the word "complete," since "complete withdrawal is a matter of principle...the population's right to return is fundamentally important to us." Azimov also took issue with the U.S. comment that the original language of OP 2 "only selectively agrees to elements of the proposal without endorsing it in its entirety." Azimov said the U.S. comments on OP1 themselves fall into the trap of selectively citing only some aspects of the proposal. OP3: Azimov said changes proposed to OP3 appeared to be cosmetic with the aim of pleasing the Armenians, but in fact, they were substantive. For example, the GOAJ could not accept changing "inalienable right" to "fundamentally important right" in reference to the right of return. Azimov indicated more flexibility on accepting the proposed U.S. changes to "displaced" (replacing the original language of "expelled") and "need to create," while stating that there was a clear difference between "necessity of creating" and "need to create" because the original Azerbaijani language was more definitive. However, he said, discussion of cosmetic changes can occur only after the differences on more substantive changes are resolved. OP4: Azimov said this proposed deletion is "very serious." His primary concern mirrored his objection to the U.S. recommendation in OP1, specifically, that the proposed new language suggests NK's status can be determined outside of the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The US proposals on OP1 and OP4 "convince me we are in trouble" on this critical point of substance for the GOAJ: "the co-chairs have no intention of keeping NK within Azerbaijan...they are trying to drive us in this direction." Azimov argued that "when a state does not agree that one of its territories can separate, there is only one option, territorial integrity, and self determination must be implemented in compliance with territorial integrity." He said he could not accept deleting the phrase "within the Republic of Azerbaijan." Azimov suggested the final portion of this paragraph be revised to: "....which will allow for the building of an effective democratic system of self-governance in this region through a legal and democratic process in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan." Per his comments on OP3, Azimov indicated some flexibility in changing the phrase "necessity of providing" to "need to provide." OP5: Azimov said the U.S. proposal to delete the phrase "nor render aid or assistance in maintaining this situation," implies that the U.S. believes its assistance aids the "occupation." Keeping this language in the resolution will assure Azerbaijan "the US is sure its assistance is not of this type." If the USG would provide assistance to the Azerbaijanis of NK, as well, this would help. OP8: Azimov suggested the language could be amended to note that the UN Secretary General submit "a separate report on NK in cooperation with or with the assistance of the Minsk Group." Azimov noted that there is a precedent for the UN Secretary General preparing reports on NK-related issues with SIPDIS the assistance of the Minsk Group -- as this was the case with UNSCR 822 from 1994, which gives the Secretary General the mandate to report on the situation in Kelbajar and the occupied territories. The Secgen sought the assistance of the Minsk Group in the past in carrying out this mandate. Azimov suggested that the U.S. and Azerbaijan probably could agree on this compromise. It is incorrect to state that reports on NK fall only within the purview of the Minsk Group, he said. ¶6. (S/NF) Azimov said the GOAJ became "so nervous" after Kosovo's independence, especially given USG argumentation with respect to the application of UNSCR 1244, ie, that language in the preamble on territorial integrity of Serbia did not constitute a binding obligation, and only applied to the "interim status" of Serbia. Azimov said Azerbaijan has been working for three years on the Basic Principles; he and FonMin Mammadayarov have been "pushing on what would be practical...Lachin and Kelbajar returned, IDP's returned...but we see in the 2008 Basic Principles no Lachin, no Kelbajar and no right of return." This, coupled with the Kosovo argumentation, raised serious concerns. Kosovo may not be precedential, he said, but "processes are...when we saw that the right of return was not absolutely guaranteed, coupled with the USG's edits on the new resolution and changes like inalienable to fundamentally important, we see even more conditionality" being introduced. ¶7. (S/NF) The Basic Principles, Azimov opined, "take us through a field of uncertainty to the loss of NK." Under the Principles, NK would be "frozen, cleansed, controlled by Armenians, as would Lachin, and peacekeepers will prevent Azerbaijan from economic and humanitarian activities because status is frozen." Azimov continued that ten years later, the international community may say, as French FonMin Kouchner told FonMin Mammadayarov with respect to Kosovo, "we are tired..we'll decide NK's status unilaterally if you do not reach agreement with the Armenians." ¶8. (S/NF) Azimov requested Bryza's assistance in reining in French Minsk Group Co-Chair Bernard Fassier, who Azimov accused of personally lobbying several European governments (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in the name of the co-chairs to vote against the draft Azerbaijan UNGA resolution. Azimov said Fassier was doing so unilaterally, while claiming to represent the Minsk Group. He warned that this would work against the Minsk Group process: "He will kill the Minsk Group if he continues..we cannot work with any country that votes against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity." ¶9. (S/NF) Azimov said the US should analyze Moscow's role and aims, saying Russia is manipulating Fassier in this action because "they are trying to kill the Minsk Group...Putin will rub his hands and say no Minsk Group mediation -- we'll work directly with Azerbaijan The U.S. should understand that Russian Co-Chair Yury Merzlyakov is a heavyweight boxer, using KGB tactics, who could deal a powerful blow through Fassier's "outrageous" efforts. Azimov threatened that if France or Russia, or even the U.S., vote against the resolution -- vice abstaining -- Azerbaijan will appeal to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to express a lack of trust and confidence in their Minsk Group Chairmanship and seek their removal, "even though we know we are being provoked" by Russia. Azimov repeated that "we won't work with Russia and France voting against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity..we cannot work with anyone who votes against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity." ¶10. (C/NF) At several points, Azimov suggested that senior GOAJ officials are personally invested in the draft resolution. He confirmed that President Aliyev supports the resolution (ref b),stating that Azerbaijani UN permrep Mehdiyev told Azimov that he had spoken on the telephone with President Aliyev yesterday, and Aliyev instructed Mehdiyev to move the resolution forward. Azimov also suggested Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov was personally invested in the process, noting that "I cannot set up Elmar" by agreeing to changes that will not be accepted up the line. As the Ambassador was leaving the meeting, Azimov said "I am behind the resolution," adding it remained to be seen whether he would still be around after March 14. ¶11. (C/NF) Azimov said that a promise of abstention was "not enough for editing" the draft resolution. The USG should consider voting in favor. He said Azerbaijan would "have to see what comes back to us from you" to decide next steps. ¶12. (C/NF) COMMENT: The GOAJ has been working over the past year around the world to build support for its position in the UN. They are confident they have the votes, and are using Kosovo and the disarray in Armenia to draw a line in the sand with respect to the issue which they have repeatedly made clear, publicly and privately, is fundamental -- territorial integrity. DERSE