CI/KR RESPONSE FOR AZERBAIJAN FOR S/CT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000193 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR GAIL ROBERTSON IN S/CT; EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS ENRG AJ SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR AZERBAIJAN FOR S/CT REF: A. STATE 06461 ¶B. BAKU 00855 ¶C. BAKU 178 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Don Lu for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) The Embassy provides the following response to ref A's request for information on Azerbaijan's critical infrastructure (CI) and key resources (KI),which would "have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States" if destroyed. Embassy recommends that Azerbaijan's primary energy pipelines, platforms, and associated infrastructure be included in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) under the "energy" category. ¶2. (C) Specifically, the Embassy recommends the following CI energy nodes be included in the NIPP: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline, the Sangachal terminal, and the offshore drilling platforms that send oil and gas to Sangachal. These nodes are the core infrastructure for Azerbaijan's ability to extract and export oil and gas resources to Europe; this infrastructure is important for realizing the U.S. policy goal of diversifying Europe's energy reliance on Russia. Any attack on either Sangachal or offshore platforms, the latter of which are currently completely unprotected against any terrorist activities, would have immediate and ongoing effects on global energy prices. Approximately 800,000 barrels of oil are exported through the BTC every day, with the capacity to carry over 1 million barrels/day and approximately 2.8 billion cubic meters of gas was extracted from Shah Deniz in ¶2007. ¶3. (C) The Embassy has been working with S/CT to deepen bilateral cooperation with the GOAJ on critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP),specifically the energy nodes mentioned above. The GOAJ has a plan on paper for addressing its CEIP security gaps, but the GOAJ's plans are hampered by a lack of resources, a lack of coordination among GOAJ agencies, and a fundamental lack of recognition of the vulnerabilities. (See ref B for a review of the GOAJ's CEIP vulnerabilities -- especially the Sangachal terminal and associated offshore platforms, the GOAJ's security plan, and further information on the BTC and SCP's importance for U.S. interests.) During recent meetings with S/CT PDAS Urbancic, GOAJ officials confirmed that they are working actively on their response to U.S. experts, questions on CEIP (ref c). We appreciate S/CT,s support on this important issue. DERSE