CORRECTED COPY OF SCENESETTER FOR S/CT FRANK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ENRG KTFN KISL AJ
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY OF SCENESETTER FOR S/CT FRANK
URBANCIC'S VISIT TO BAKU

REF: STATE 009259

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Frank: My team and I look forward to your February
13-16 visit. Your visit provides a valuable opportunity to
address key security issues with the GOAJ, particularly
extending our non-intelligence CT cooperation and pushing the
GOAJ to address its energy infrastructure gaps.


2. (C) Azerbaijan's pro-Western foreign policy orientation,
geopolitical setting -- sandwiched between Iran and Russia --
cooperation in the war on terror, and ability to provide
alternative energy supplies to Europe and to use its energy
resources to drive growth and development in the region, make
it an important U.S. partner. It is in our interest to have
a reforming, stable, pro-western Azerbaijan, in the Eurasian
heartland. As you know, the bilateral agenda with Azerbaijan
is based on three interdependent interests: diversifying
European energy supplies, promoting political and economic
reform, and extending our security cooperation. Our security
and energy cooperation is strong, but promoting reform
remains challenging.

Azerbaijan's CT Structures and Capabilities
--------------


3. (C) Paragraph classification for reftel Baku 00122 has
been changed. Within the GOAJ, the Ministry of National
Security (MNS) has the lead bureaucratic mandate for
disrupting terrorist networks and also the greatest
operational capabilities for fulfilling this mission. The
service is capable of monitoring Islamic extremist cells and
conducting operations against extremists. Additionally,
President Aliyev has close personal ties with the head of the
service, Eldar Mahmudov, which boosts the MNS' stock within
the GOAJ. Our bilateral cooperation with the MNS, including
on Iran, is strong and growing. The service also
increasingly appears sensitized to the threat posed by Sunni
extremists.


4. (C) The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) is responsible
for conducting investigations of and detaining suspected
terrorists, but it appears to have a limited role in
operational tracking and disrupting terrorist networks. The
State Border Service also has some responsibility for
monitoring and detecting the movement of criminals and
terrorists along Azerbaijan's border. Neither of these two
services, however, appear to have the operational
capabilities or institutional weight of the MNS; they appear
to defer to the MNS on all sensitive issues. The MIA and the
State Border Service suffer from endemic corruption problems.


5. (C) While the GOAJ increasingly recognizes the threat
posed by Sunni jihadist circles, the GOAJ's traditional
perception of the terrorist threat focuses on Iran and
Armenia. Baku maintains cautious relations with Iran, in
part because the GOAJ fears that Iran could easily deploy
terrorist operatives against GOAJ or Western facilities.
Elements within the GOAJ also perceive that Armenia might use
terrorist tactics to weaken Azerbaijan's sovereignty.

Additional Context on Suggested Topics
--------------


6. (C) We believe your visit can have the greatest impact by
focusing on extending our non-intelligence CT cooperation,
pressing for progress on the GOAJ,s long-stalled
counter-terrorism finance legislation, addressing
Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure protection plans and
capabilities, and developing a dialogue with the GOAJ on
Islamic extremsim.

- Non-Intelligence CT cooperation: Both the Ministry of
National Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have
told us that they would like to expand bilateral cooperation
on non-intelligence issues related to counterterrorism. The
GOAJ has identified biometrics and border control systems as
areas of interest. Given Azerbaijan,s rapidly growing
energy revenues, we should consider any new initiatives in
the context of our broader co-financing agreement for
technical assistance.

-Deficiencies in Azerbaijani Law regarding Terrorism Finance
and Facilitation: President Aliyev is the key interlocutor
on this issue. Although Parliament reportedly will consider
new draft anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism finance
legislation in its spring session, the legislation appears to
still be under review by the Presidential Administration.
Over the last four years, the U.S. has worked closely with

the GOAJ on this draft legislation and providing extensive
suggestions. In our February 2007 Economic Parternship
Commission meeting, the GOAJ agreed to present the draft
legislation to parliament in the first half of 2007.

-We encourage you to tell President Aliyev that this is an
important tool in our counterterrorist efforts and that other
counterterrorist partners have taken this step.
Azerbaijan,s lack of strong counter-terrorism finance
legislation is a gaping hole in our otherwise excellent
counter-terrorism cooperation. GOAJ officials in the past
have been slow to move on this legislation due to its
implications for money-laundering and other corrupt
activities. Where and how to structure a Financial
Intelligence Unit appears to be a key sticking point.
Although the National Bank currently operates a small
anti-money laundering unit, it does not appear to play any
real role in investigations or enforcement.

-Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP): The GOAJ
has not yet responded to the U.S. questions regarding
Azerbaijan's CEIP plans and capabilities, although we
understand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has circulated the
questions to the broad range of entities involved in CEIP and
is preparing responses. We believe your meetings with
President Aliyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy
Prime Minister Abid Sharifov are the best format to
demonstrate that the U.S. is serious about Azerbaijan's
ability to protect its energy infrastructure. Deputy Prime
Minister Sharifov heads an inter-ministerial working group on
these issues that is not yet very active, in part because the
division of responsibilities among GOAJ entities is not
clear; we hope your meeting with him will provide greater
insights into the working group and help the GOAJ understand
the need to take more coordinated action. While the GOAJ is
eager for greater cooperation with the U.S. on this issue,
its own internal bureaucracy is riven by rivalries and
unclear delineations of responsibility. The Navy and Coast
Guard, for example, continue to argue over which agency has
lead authority for certain response scenarios. For your
visit, we hope to bring the two services together for a joint
discussion of these issues.

-Islamic Radicalization: The GOAJ is aggressive in seeking
to counter dangerous Islamic radicals. Baku's approach often
fails to distinguish between Islamic radicals and devout
Muslims, with devout non-radical Muslims often being
harrassed. As increasing numbers of Azerbaijanis are seeking
to explore their faith (a natural occurrence in this
post-Soviet society),the GOAJ,s heavy-handed tactics could
prove problematic, as could the GOAJ,s continuing state
control over religious institutions. The GOAJ,s reluctance
to allow Muslims to develop indigenous Islamic institutions
and educational materials also could raise long-term
problems. To the degree Azerbaijan fails to develop credible
indigenous Islamic institutions, pious Muslims are more
likely to fall prey to intolerant, radical interpretations of
Islam. Your meetings with President Aliyev and MNS Chief
Mahmudov will be the best forum to discuss this issue. We
have requested meetings with the Ministers of Justice and
Internal Affairs, which will be useful forums for focusing on
the issue of Islamic radicalization within the Azerbaijani
penal system.
DERSE