AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GUARDEDLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001157

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DAS MATTHEW BRYZA, EUR/CARC
DEFENSE FOR OUSDP DANIEL MELLEBY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR GUARDEDLY
OPTIMISTIC ON KEEPING FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS

Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Ambassador Derse, accompanied by EUR/CARC Office
Director Baxter Hunt, met Novruz Mammadov, chief foreign
policy advisor at the Presidential Apparat, on December 3.
Ambassador unequivocally warned Mammadov that closure of
United States-sponsored broadcasting in Azerbaijan would
cause a serious rupture in relations, but expressed
confidence that negotiations begun this week with BBG will
lead to a satisfactory outcome (septels). Mammadov pressed
for action in Washington on Section 907 of the Freedom
Support Act and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. He expected few
concrete results from recent Russian and Turkish attempts to
influence the N-K negotiations, but also called for
heightened U.S. diplomatic activity to offset Moscow's
assertiveness. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador also briefed Mammadov on preparations of
documents for the Exercise Support Agreement (ESA) for
REGIONAL RESPONSE 2009 and presented the USG draft of the
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) MOU, as well
as DRL A/S Kramer's letter to President Aliyev.

Voice of America/Radio Liberty
--------------


3. (C) Referring to the state of affairs after meetings for a
visiting BBG delegation earlier in the day with Mammadov
himself, the head of the Presidential Apparat Ramiz Mehtiyev
and the head of the National Television and Radio Council
Nurshivan Marrahamli, Ambassador told Mammadov that the
United States looks forward to a decision to extend the
licenses of VOA and RL for a year in their current form
(i.e., broadcasting on FM),during which time the United
States would work with the GOAJ to assure their permanent
presence in accordance with Azerbaijani law. (Note: Such an
assurance will likely require an intergovernmental agreement,
which, according to media lawyers consulted by the Embassy,
is the main method under the law that a foreign broadcaster
can operate on the national FM spectrum. End Note.)


4. (C) Ambassador was pleased that the GOAJ had treated the
issue in talks with the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
as a technical and legal one, and said that the United States
does not want to politicize the issue. However, she
unequivocally told Mammadov that the issue is inherently
political and closing down the broadcasts would have
immediate serious consequences for Azerbaijan both in the
Executive Branch and Congress, which funds the broadcasts.
Director Hunt added that Deputy Secretary Negroponte had told
Azerbaijani Ambassador Aliyev the same thing.


5. (C) Mammadov indicated that he understood the stakes, but
said that the U.S. position was difficult to explain inside
the GOAJ. Many in Baku have difficulty believing that action
on the broadcasting front could really affect issues like
energy cooperation. Also, the GOAJ's earlier decisions to
expel Russian, Turkish and Iranian broadcasters put it in a
difficult position now, especially as strong constituencies
in the GOAJ are sympathetic to Russian and Iranian interests.
Nonetheless, Mammadov said, he is "sincere" and will work
collaboratively to resolve this, emphasizing that the GOAJ's
long-term policy of orientation westward is irreversible.

907 / Jackson-Vanik / Armenia
--------------


6. (C) Mammadov told Ambassador and Director Hunt that the
bilateral relationship is also held back by several issues
that Azerbaijanis find impossible to understand, including
our "unjust and indecisive" position on Nagorno-Karabakh;
Section 907, Jackson-Vanik; and generous U.S. aid to Armenia
) a Russian ally - which he estimated at USD 1.7 billion,
including MCC funds. The United States, he said, should
pursue its aims in Azerbaijan with a "more sensitive
approach," adding that this is what works with Eastern,
Muslim societies like Azerbaijan.


7. (C) Hunt replied that while the Executive Branch generally

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regards 907 and Jackson-Vanik in particular as obsolete, they
are political realities. Azerbaijan could spur their repeal
with progress on N-K, he said, and also flatly denied
Mammadov's belief that the U.S. had offered USD 600 million
to Armenia to offset its economic losses from the August war.
Mammadov replied that
it was widely believed in Azerbaijan that the Vice-President
promised this aid to the Armenian PM during the latter's
visit to Washington. "You can see where the negative attitude
comes from," he added.

Nagorno-Karabakh / Russia / Turkey
--------------


8. (C) Mammadov argued that high-profile Russian diplomatic
activity has significantly strengthened its position as a
mediator in the N-K conflict, and he urged greater U.S.
involvement. However, when asked if Russia's and Turkey's
recent initiatives will produce anything concrete, Mammadov
was pessimistic. "The (Moscow) Declaration doesn't solve the
problem," he said, and separately characterized the recent
round of high-level visits as "diplomatic tourism."

Approaches to the New Administration
--------------


9. (C) At several points in the meeting, Mammadov made
reference to the incoming Administration, and noted the
GOAJ's interest in having a senior delegation travel to
Washington soon after the inauguration to meet new
Administration officials. He positively rated
President-elect Obama's defense and foreign policy
nominations and expressed the view that the United States'
strategic outlook as far as Azerbaijan is concerned is
unlikely to change. Interestingly, while discussing the new
Administration, Mammadov mused that if the issues of the
three imprisoned journalists and the VOA/RL controversy "were
not on the table, so much more could be done."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Mammadov is one of the most reliable interlocutors
we have within the GOAJ, and his views merit particular
consideration. It seems probable from the outcome of BBG's
meetings here (septels) that the message has gotten through
on the seriousness of the broadcasting issue. As long as the
lid can be kept on the politics of the situation, the current
approach seems to have reasonable prospects of success. On
N-K, it is superficially inconsistent for the GOAJ to on the
one hand warn the USG about Russia's strengthened position in
the talks, and on the other dismiss the chances that Moscow's
diplomacy will lead anywhere. However, this should be seen
as an expression of Azerbaijan's need for "balance" in its
foreign policy, i.e., the GOAJ derives its ability to pursue
its interests independently of Moscow from the existence of
an alternative supported by another first-tier power.


11. (C) Mammadov's litany of negatives about U.S. policy
on N-K, 907 and Jackson-Vanik are recurring themes we hear
with increasing intensity from all of our GOAJ interlocutors
recently. Mammedov also referred several times to the growing
difficulty he faces, as the President's international
relations advisor, explaining USG positions in internal GOAJ
councilsand defending positions supportive of US interests
These comments areparticularly telling coming from a reliably
pro-U.S. figure, and suggest that the ongoing debate in the
government about the appropriate degree of foreign policy
"balance" continues to sharpen. These issues will certainly
carry themselves forward into relations with the Obama
Administration.


12. (C) Comment continued: Mammadov seemed highly focused
on the next Administration, and in this sense reflected the
attitude we observed recently from the Foreign Minister
(septel). Strong, consistent efforts will be needed to keep
the GOAJ focused on continuing issues in the remaining weeks
of this Administration, especially as the GOAJ appears to
have an unrealistic idea of how quickly a new Administration

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will be inclined to take up their concerns. This focus,
however, also probably means that they will wait to feel out
the new White House before making any commitments on N-K.
Mammadov's comments suggest that there may also provide an
opening for positive action on the journalists and
broadcasters, if the GOAJ sees that efforts to make an early
positive impression will bring results; although in the
alternative his comments could be taken to mean simply that
he hopes the new Administration will let those issues recede
from view.
DERSE