PM'S ADVISORS DISCUSS BASRAH EXIT STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000998

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS MOPS IR IZ
SUBJECT: PM'S ADVISORS DISCUSS BASRAH EXIT STRATEGY

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In separate March 30 conversations with S/I
Satterfield and Polmilcouns, both National Security Advisor
Muwaffaq al-Rubaie and Political Advisor Sadiq Rikabi
acknowledged the seriousness of the current crisis facing PM
Maliki and the need to provide him with a face-saving exit
but worried that Maliki did not understand the seriousness of
his predicament. Rikabi outlined a plan to have the ISF take
a Basrah neighborhood and then the port of Um Qasr to provide
Maliki with a victory. Rubaie initially dismissed the idea
but later seemed to endorse it. Rikabi and Rubaie outlined
parallel negotiation tracks with OMS in Najaf and Sadr in
Iran although neither could offer much detail on recent
Iranian/Iraqi/Kurdish talks in Sulaymaniyah. Rikabi was
relatively optimistic about Maliki's political future but
Rubaie worried that the PM had suffered "a fatal blow."
Rubaie linked the Basrah offensive to Maliki's "impulsive
nature" and said he was provoked by reports on the abuse of
women in Basrah. Rikabi did not think Basrah Gov. Waeli had
the popular support necessary to form Basrah into a region.
End Summary.

Maliki's current predicament and political future
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Rikabi and Rubaie both worried that PM Maliki did not
understand the gravity of the situation. "We are working to
convince him," said Rikabi. Rubaie explained that Maliki
"doesn't like bad news," adding that Iraq's generals were
military officers under Saddam and avoided delivering
negative messages to their leadership. Rubaie said the PM
told him he "hadn't thought" about when to return to Baghdad,
adding "we will see in two or three days." Rikabi said Sami
al-Askari would stay in Basrah until the PM returned to
Baghdad.


3. (C) Both advisors commented that a military victory was
impossible and that even Saddam Hussein could not control
Basrah's neighborhoods. The solution, they said, was to give
the PM a graceful way out of the predicament. Rikabi said
that PM Maliki "needed to achieve something tangible and
leave." He added that ISF was currently operating in
Hyyaniyah and "hopefully tomorrow they go to liberate Um
Qasr." Later, Rikabi expanded on this plan and offered three
objectives for the GOI in Basrah: 1) Taking Um Qasr to
provide the PM with a victory; 2) Killing or arresting
criminal elements; 3) Using ISF operations to send "a strong
message" to the Sadrists that they cannot oppose the
government. Rubaie was more candid, saying that Maliki
needed an "artificial success and face-saving formula."
"Frankly," he added, "if Maliki comes back having failed he
will be doomed, and our progress will be difficult to
sustain." He initially dismissed the plan to go into
Hyyaniyah and Um Qasr, but near the end of the meeting
referred to the same plan as a way for Maliki to leave Basrah
with his image intact.


4. (C) Rikabi was relatively optimistic over the PM's
political future, saying that Maliki's political situation is
"not too bad" because the main parties, including the UIA,
the Kurds, and even the Sunnis, realize that "the price of
defeat will be paid by all of Iraq." Rubaie was less
sanguine, responding that "absolutely, the knives will be
out" on the PM's return to Baghdad and musing that Maliki may
have suffered "a fatal blow."

Political solution to crisis?
--------------


5. (C) Rikabi and Rubaie outlined complementary but separate
negotiation tracks between the GOI and Sadrists. According
to Rikabi, Hadi al-Amri (Head of the COR Badr Organization
bloc) and Ali al-Adib (head of the COR Dawa bloc) met with
Muqtada al-Sadr in Iran on March 29 to secure a statement
from Sadr ordering his followers from the streets and
condemning criminal elements. In return, the GOI would agree
to target only criminal elements rather than the Sadr
movement as a whole. Rikabi clarified that Sadr would deny
his followers possessed any medium or heavy weapons and in
turn would give the GOI permission to target any individuals
carrying such weapons. Rikabi said the meeting produced a
letter from Sadr to his followers. He said the letter was
delivered to Najaf and expected it to be released "soon."
(Note: A letter from Sadr outlining nine points for his
followers and the government was released shortly after the
meetings concluded.) Rubaie likewise said a political
agreement was "very possible" and outlined a three-point
proposal negotiated with OMS political leadership in Najaf:
1) PM Maliki returns to Baghdad; 2) Sadr orders his followers
from the street; 3) OMS and GOI form a joint committee to
discuss governance decisions.

BAGHDAD 00000998 002 OF 002




6. (C) Neither advisor offered much information on the
recent Iranian/Kurdish/Iraqi talks held in Sulaymaniyah.
Rubaie said he had not been briefed on the outcome of the
talks but added that "to be brutally frank, Iran is the
decisive factor in this." Rikabi said the talks centered on
three points: 1) Kurdish interests; 2) Iranian interests; 3)
Need for the PCNS to meet. Rikabi added that following
completion of the talks PM Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah was
returning to Baghdad.

Why Basrah? Why now?
--------------


7. (C) Asked for the reasons behind PM Maliki's offensive
into Basrah, Rubaie shrugged and said "you know his
character, he has an impulsive nature." The trigger, he
elaborated, seemed to be a series of reports on the abuse of
women in Basrah. Rubaie did not know the origin of the
reports but said they included daily statistics on the
mutilation and killing of women in Basrah. He criticized the
reports as alarmist but said that Maliki called a meeting on
March 19 and, referring to the reports, said "enough is
enough" and announced that the ISF needed to restore control
of Basrah. Rubaie said he interjected only once, pointing
out that Gen. Mohan had worked closely with MNF-I officials
to develop a multi-phase security plan. In response Maliki
said he would fire Mohan and IP Chief Jalil and personally
oversee the effort to secure the city. According to Rubaie,
Maliki's initiative received the support of Minister of State
Safa al-Safi, Ali al-Adib, and various ISCI leaders at a
General Support Group meeting on March 21. Two days later,
Rubaie noted, Maliki traveled to Basrah "with his entourage"
to lead the effort.

Role of Gov. Waeli?
--------------


8. (C) Rikabi accused Gov. Waeli of being linked to Basrah's
corruption and violence and predicted that he will not be
elected to serve another term as governor. Rikabi dismissed
the possibility that Waeli would exploit the current crisis
to press ahead on forming Basrah into a region, saying the
governor lacked the necessary popular support.


9. (C) Comment: Despite the relative optimism of his
comments, Rikabi was clearly anxious and had more difficulty
than normal communicating in English. Rubaie was more
pessimistic but appeared to derive some sense of personal
vindication from the PM's current predicament. Both advisors
seemed unsure over the PM's plans or their ability to
influence his decisions. End comment.


10. (U) Note: S/I Satterfield did not clear on this cable
before transmission. End Note.
CROCKER